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1.1 Background  
This thesis deals with the politics of donor-recipient relations, country ownership, and aid 
coordination in developing countries. It analyzes how policy assumptions in this discourse are 
explained in practice in the political economy setting of ‘developmental states’ in Africa that 
are heavily dependent on foreign aid. In-depth study of aid politics, country ownership, and 
donor coordination using a context-specific approach will make a valuable contribution to the 
field.  
Theoretically, foreign aid effectiveness and its coordination are highly disputed concepts, 
despite the fact that donors’ foreign aid policies, as well as resource allocation philosophies, 
are based on these unsettled debates and huge volumes of aid still continue to flow to 
developing countries, accordingly. From 1960 to 2016, for example, developing countries 
received USD 4.3 trillion (2016 constant price) net ODA (Official Development Assistance), 
and 35% of this flowed to Africa (OECD-DAC, 2018b), although its effectiveness has been 
constantly under debate. 
Cross-country meta-studies conducted in line with this debate about the effectiveness of foreign 
aid to bring economic growth and sometimes poverty reduction in developing countries are 
inconclusive and methodologically debatable (see, for example, Mosley et al., 1987; Boone, 
1996; Hansen and Tarp, 2003; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008, 2009, 2013; Mekasha and 
Tarp, 2013). One of the main reasons is that cross-country meta-studies are not context-specific 
and do not consider time lags in aid effectiveness due to investments in different economic and 
social sectors. Hansen and Tarp (2003) argue that the query on the level of foreign aid 
effectiveness is basically empirical in nature and would be meaningfully addressed if studied 
in a ‘reduced form’ at a micro level. This is logical given the differences and dynamics in the 
political economy settings of recipient countries, including the political ideology and behavior 
of their regimes, their democratization level, and their economic status, as well as donors’ 
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disparate motives behind aid giving. Consequently, donors are increasingly practicing a 
contextual approach in their interventions in terms of development cooperation (Fisher and 
Marquette, 2016).  
What is empirically and methodologically right would be, therefore, studying in-country 
practices of the respective theoretical and policy assumptions in a context-specific approach. 
This would enable a more flexible and context-specific understanding of donor-recipient 
partnerships and their coordination behavior in a specific political economy context of 
developing countries. This would also benefit donors and recipient partners to develop policy 
recommendations that are relevant to the specific country reality.  
Responding to this debate and concluding with a series of piecemeal attempts from the 1990s 
to reform the ‘traditional’ approaches of foreign aid, the Paris Declaration in 2005 made aid 
effectiveness the focus of the global agenda. The Declaration suggests that foreign aid would 
be effective at best under strong country ownership, reinforced by alignment and harmonization 
of donors’ programs with recipients’ development priorities and systems, aimed at thriving 
results that are subject to continuous joint assessment on the basis of mutual accountability 
(OECD, 2008c, 2011c). The basic policy assumption is that effective coordination in the 
context of strong country ownership would be key to ensure sustainable aid effectiveness 
(OECD, 2008c; Gore, 2013; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015). 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence is thin in the area relating to how the agency of the recipient 
improves the effectiveness of foreign aid through the given mechanics of coordination on the 
ground in a specific political economy context of a country. This thesis, therefore, addresses 
how theoretical and policy assumptions about aid effectiveness and coordination are explained 
in practice bounded by context-specific political economy settings at the micro level on the 
ground. In doing so, this study aims to conduct in-country analysis on country ownership and 
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donor coordination with further empirical evidence at a sector level from Ethiopia as a critical 
case.  
The remaining part of this section is organized as follows. The first part deals with the debates 
on the politics of aid and donor-recipient relations. This will set a general context in which 
donor coordination takes places in a given political economy setting. This is followed by the 
conceptualization of country ownership in donor coordination in the context of ‘developmental 
state’ regimes. Finally, the section presents the methodology employed in this thesis. 
1.2 The political economy of aid and donor-recipient relations 
In the principal-agent model, foreign aid is an international public good that draws a donor to 
a recipient country in the aid market. Theoretically, the transaction is determined by the factors 
from the supply and demand sides of both the donor and the recipient of the aid. In other words, 
the size and quality of aid and the corresponding donor-recipient relation would be a function 
of the donor’s aid-giving motivation and the demands of the recipient country. This sets the 
debate for aid effectiveness and its determining factors in developing countries. 
This section looks at the literature on how the factors from both sides determine the donor-
recipient relationships. This is because understanding the political economy of the development 
process in a given context helps to better understand the dynamics of aid effectiveness and 
donor-recipient relationships on the ground (Hout, 2012). It should also be noted that the set of 
motives for aid-giving by donors and the political economy of the recipients evolve over times, 
which affects the dynamics of the relationships in the process.  
One of the ranges of arguments in the literature discloses that donors commonly give more 
consideration to their political motives and strategic interests in aid allocation decisions than 
to the factors on the recipient's side (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Werker, 2012). Theoretically, 
a ‘rational’ donor reasonably expects a return for its foreign aid expenditure in the form of 
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national security, political and diplomatic influence, a market for the products of its home 
companies, or goodwill for its citizens. Therefore, according to this view, aid would probably 
fail to meet the socio-economic interest of the recipient countries, because it is designed to 
serve the interest of the donors and enforced by harsh conditionalities and incentives so as to 
optimize donor’s utility.  
In his seminal work, Morgenthau (1962) presumed that foreign aid is mainly a foreign policy 
instrument of aid providers. A review of related empirical studies by Hout (2004) supports this 
theoretical assumption, particularly during the 1960s. Another group of related literature also 
shows that during the Cold War, the rich countries in the West, in particular the US, used 
foreign aid to contain the spread of communism and simultaneously to promote liberal 
ideologies mainly in developing countries in the South (Mosley, 1985; Hout, 2004); to 
strengthen their political alliance with their past colonies irrespective of the level of their 
democracy and economic efficiency (Mosley, 1985; Alesina and Dollar, 2000); and to a lesser 
extent, to get political support from aid-recipient members at times of important votes in 
organizations like the United Nations (UN) (Dreher et al., 2008). This set of literature generally 
concludes that the decisions of foreign aid allocation by western aid providers have little 
association with the level of corruption, respect for human rights, rule of law, and economic 
position of the recipient country (Mosley, 1985; Boone, 1996; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Hout, 
2004; Dreher et al., 2011), although this inference doesn’t hold for the Nordic donor countries 
whose aid giving decisions mostly consider income level and good governance variables of the 
recipient countries (Disch, 1999; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). According to Dreher, 
Nunnenkamp, and Thiele (2011), there is not such a significant difference in the aid-giving 
motives and aid allocation behavior of the traditional donors and the ‘new’ donors from the 
South. This implies that domestic political decisions by the givers are more important than the 
demands of the aid recipients. But why generally do the donors still give more and more aid 
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and the recipients also keep receiving it given the deviations in the motives of aid giving and 
the presumed outcomes in recipient countries? This leads us to search for a converging 
objective that the two counterparts mutually seek to attain. 
According to Werker (2012), poverty reduction has become the converging point for the 
strategic interests of both the donors and the aid-recipient poor countries. Migration has also, 
more recently, become a pressing problem for national security for developed nations. Largely, 
there is common analysis by both the donor and the aid recipient that an increased level of 
poverty is the primary source of national insecurity. This means that a shared commitment and 
interventions directed towards poverty reduction would optimize the utility of the donors as 
well as the recipient countries. Consequently, since the mid-1990s, the international donor 
community and governments of the aid-recipient countries in the Third World have 
strategically responded to this common agenda by strengthening their commitment to 
implementing the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), further reinforced by the ‘war on terror’ since the 9/11 incident in the early 
2000s. Accordingly, the donor community from the West commonly aligns its foreign aid with 
achievements of the recipient countries in the MDGs, supporting development policies and 
strategies that are effective in poverty reduction via broad-based economic growth, investments 
in the social sectors, and sustainable development. This implies that countries that show 
successful achievements in poverty reduction and economic growth, as well as those that are 
also strategically important in fighting terrorism will have a superior advantage to secure 
substantial aid from western donors.  
In any case, it appears that aid effectiveness would be central in a logically sound agenda for 
both the donors and aid recipients who sensibly strive to optimize their utilities through the 
common goods, i.e. aid. For the donor, each aid dollar invested in developing countries has to 
effectively serve its strategic security, political, and/or commercial interests. Here, there is 
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good reason to believe that the donors will exert influence to make their aid better coordinated 
and effective in order to optimize the value of their money. Likewise, recipients, rationally, 
would like to benefit from each coin of aid received to reduce poverty, which is assumed to be 
a major threat to their national security and stability. Consequently, the international 
community has pursued a reform agenda since the 1990s that puts coordination of joint efforts, 
anchored on country ownership, at the center of the approach for improved aid effectiveness to 
better serve the mutual benefits of both parties. This leads to the conceptualization and 
understanding of country ownership in the aid effectiveness debate. 
1.3 Country ownership: Recipient in the ‘driver’s seat’ of coordination 
The common traditional model used to explain the donor-recipient relationships is the 
principal-agent theory, which in short is stated as agency theory (Paul, 2006). According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308), an agency relationship is defined as ‘a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principal[s]) engage another person (agent) to perform some service 
on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent’. In 
that sense, donors (the principal) give decision-making authority to use the authority over their 
money to the recipient (the agent). According to this theory, goal divergence and information 
asymmetry are the basic triggers that compel the principal to exercise control and incentives 
over the agent to optimize its utility.  
In that sense, because of possible goal divergence that may arise due to implicit and explicit 
motives of aid provision by the donor and asymmetry of information about the recipient’s 
activities, the donor often ties conditionalities or applies selectivity measures to its aid in order 
to ensure the optimum use of that aid in its best interest by putting pressure on the agent. In 
that case, strict control and conditionality by the donor limit the autonomy of the recipient, who 
is supposed to be the owner of its development agenda and priorities. In such a situation, mutual 
trust between the two parties would presumably be undermined.  
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 19
9 
 
Nevertheless, this model in its old form is criticized for both theoretical and empirical reasons. 
Agency theory, according to Paul (2006), theoretically failed to explain the ‘double principal’ 
nature of the aid relationships in which the recipient government is also the principal of its own 
development agenda and priorities. The literature also shows that the conditionality model 
constructed based on the traditional form of principal-agent approach has practically failed to 
ensure aid effectiveness and mutual partnership between donors and aid-recipient countries 
(White and Morrissey, 1997; Paul, 2006; Gore, 2013; Brolin, 2017). The principal-agent 
relationships and the conditionalities attached to the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) 
by the western donors, the IMF, and the World Bank in the ‘Washington Consensus’ over the 
poor African countries in the 1980s and 1990s are typical examples of conditionality failure. 
In both cases, according to Morgenthau (1962), aid without condition has a chance for failure 
and aid with condition results in ‘xenophobic suspicions’ between the counterparts. 
This leads to the new discourse of reform on aid effectiveness and donor-recipient relations in 
the spirit of the Paris Agenda, which confers strong ownership and wider discretion to the 
recipient to define its own development agenda and priorities. Following the global reform of 
aid effectiveness agenda since the 1990s and mid-2000s, the old version of agency theory is 
substituted by the new approach (Gore, 2013). The assumption is that the donor-recipient 
relationship in the traditional principal-agent model weakens country ownership and fails to 
ensure aid effectiveness. This necessitates bringing country ownership in its true sense to the 
center of the aid reform (Booth, 2012). Does this infer the need to re-orient donor-recipient 
relations and change donor policies towards the assumptions of stewardship theory?  
Stewardship theory is the extended version of agency theory, which is presumed to better 
explain the power relationships of donors and recipients under the notion of the Paris Agenda. 
According to Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997), stewardship theory portrays the agents 
as ‘collectivities, pro-organizational and trustworthy’. The theory suggests that the interest of 
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the principal is best served when the agent is given wider discretion of authority with a high 
sense of shared ownership and trust (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  
This model implies that the donor-recipient relationship in the aid market should be based on 
mutual trust and accountability, shared ownership, and joint coordination for long-term 
benefits, unlike the agency theory that promotes control and sanctions undermining the role of 
ownership by the aid-recipient partners in optimizing the utility of both parties. This means 
that, because of its idea of shared ownership and mutual accountability, the stewardship model 
is presumed to be effective in addressing goal divergence and information asymmetry problems 
of the agency theory. Particularly, strengthening country ownership on the basis of the 
mutuality principle would be logically useful a the time when there are multiple principals of 
a different type in the aid market, which practically aggravates the problems of goal divergence 
and information asymmetry as well as increasing the transaction cost of coordination (Martens, 
2005; Paul, 2006). Empirical results in the field also support the theoretical assumptions of the 
stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The implication is that if donors and aid-
recipient partners strengthen their commitment and re-orient the implementation of their 
development cooperation policies towards the spirit of this model, aid effectiveness will be 
considerably ensured. 
The global aid reform agenda, which was declared with the Paris Declaration (PD) in 2005, 
appeared to be rooted in the theoretical assumptions of stewardship theory. According to 
Hasselskog and Schierenbeck (2017), terms like ‘shared ownership’ that connote mutuality of 
responsibility and accountability in the joint coordination of aid and development have 
prevailed in the coordination landscape since 2005. Theoretically, the assumption is that the 
donor trusts that the aid-recipient partner is a steward of its development agenda and priorities 
and that its implementation ultimately meets the interests of both parties so that the donor is 
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supposed to provide unconditional aid and is committed towards the ownership and capacity 
of the recipient with more involvement in the joint coordination mechanisms.  
However, according to Martens (2005), this would not be practical unless the traditional donors 
are committed to converge their motives of aid giving and support the recipient partners to 
strengthen their capacity for strong country ownership. In that case, the bilateral donors can 
further reduce the agency problems and strengthen the ownership of the aid recipients by 
delegating their ‘principal right’ to the multilateral donors that are presumed to tone down the 
competing political interests over the recipients, which are also the principal sources of aid 
fragmentation and donor proliferation (Dollar and Easterly, 1999). It should also be noted that 
strengthening South-South cooperation, which involves so-called ‘new’ donors and is believed 
to be less conditional but is mostly tied to commercial activities and tailored to the economic 
and production sector, would be influential in changing the traditional model of donor-recipient 
relationships (Gore, 2013; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015). As Morgenthau predicted, it appears 
that approaches by donors from the South like the China model are more appealing to the 
recipients, as ‘their problems and achievements are more meaningful to the underdeveloped 
nations’ (1962: p. 307) than models from the traditional donors in the west with free market 
and liberal democracy values (Lengauer, 2011).  
Nevertheless, if ownership is put at the center of the new model in the aid architecture, 
deliberating on what explains country ownership would be the most relevant query. Precisely, 
the very essence of the Paris Agenda underlines that donors can play a vital role in realizing 
aid effectiveness in the aid market via strengthening the sustainability of national systems by 
aligning their support with the national development plans and priorities of the recipients, 
harmonizing their procedures using joint arrangements through continuous policy dialogue, 
and increasing the use of general form aid modalities like budget support and pooled funding 
(OECD, 2008c, 2011c). Each of these elements is discussed in the following paragraphs: 
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A.  Quality and content of national plans 
Country ownership is primarily explained by the fact that the aid-recipient country has its own 
development agenda, strategies, and priorities and that it takes the lead in coordinating its 
implementation (OECD, 2008c). National development and poverty reduction plans that are 
strategic, comprehensive, well-prioritized, and more detailed enhance the level of country 
ownership and facilitate the alignment of donors’ support (Brown, 2017; Hasselskog and 
Schierenbeck, 2017). Donors also play important roles in strengthening country ownership 
through aligning their support with the national economic development and poverty reduction 
plans and priorities. However, some traditional donors associate their aid with liberal values 
and give more priority to developmental plans that are ‘market-friendly’ and ‘trade-oriented’ 
(Hout, 2002, 2006). Conversely, in countries where policy development capacity is weak, the 
role of donors in formulating the national agenda and priority setting is blurrier. In such a case, 
donors sometimes weaken ownership by influencing the policy formulation process during the 
policy dialogue and by providing technical assistance in the process (Hasselskog and 
Schierenbeck, 2017).  
B. Capacity and motivation of the leadership 
Form and content of a national development plan are important in determining the level of 
ownership, but the capacity and motivation of government leadership are also central in 
ensuring country ownership. Ownership in the aid market basically requires top leadership and 
critical mass in a recipient country whose vision is ‘developmental’, as in the case of Ethiopia 
or Rwanda, with a capacity to formulate its own development agenda and with strong political 
commitment to achieve its national goals and defend its priorities (Booth, 2012; Hasselskog 
and Schierenbeck, 2017). A national government that is capable and consistent in defending 
and achieving its national priorities gains credibility and wins strategic support from donors 
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(Disch, 1999; Borchgrevink, 2008). Sustainability of aid effectiveness is better fortified by 
establishing this type of strong country-owned development, and donors can ensure this by 
strengthening their support in that direction rather than by means of conditionalities and 
incentives as they do in the traditional model (White and Morrissey, 1997; Dollar and Easterly, 
1999). Donors, however, may bypass the formal state structures and use other alternative 
channels when the state is fragile and/or the recipient government is corrupt (Bourguignon and 
Sundberg, 2007; Acht et al., 2015).  
C. Quality and scope of policy dialogue 
Divergence in the political motives of aid giving and possible information asymmetry by the 
bilateral donors often lead to policy dialogue between donors and their aid-recipient 
counterparts (Whitfield and Fraser, 2009). This is a critical process in which the recipient can 
retain ownership and legitimacy, or the donors may be able to influence the national 
development agenda and priorities at the cost of country ownership (Hasselskog and 
Schierenbeck, 2017). The larger the tendency by donors to influence the national development 
agenda and approaches in the name of policy dialogue and partnership, the more it weakens 
country ownership and the bigger the chance that it will influence aid effectiveness negatively 
in the long-term (Jerve, 2002). Nevertheless, there are tendencies that show that both donors 
and recipient countries are committed to strengthening country ownership when the recipients 
show a strong commitment to country ownership (Hasselskog et al., 2017).  
D. Functionality of coordination platforms  
Coordination is a strategic response to increasing aid effectiveness notwithstanding the motives 
of aid giving. Particularly, country-led joint coordination would have a bigger chance to reduce 
most of the agency problems by minimizing the divergence and multiplicity of objectives and 
asymmetric information through promoting involvement and increasing mutual accountability. 
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The assumption is that country-led joint coordination increases aid effectiveness (Balogun, 
2005; OECD, 2008c; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015) by reducing transaction costs and aid 
fragmentation and promoting the use of Program-based Approaches (PBAs) (Bigsten and 
Tengstam, 2015). Effective coordination thus, as we will see, is benefited by the use of 
program-based approaches. 
E. Increased use of Program-based Approaches 
PBAs involve Sector-wide Approaches (SWAps), budget support, and joint financial 
arrangements like pooled and Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), and they are assumed to 
increase country ownership through improved alignment and harmonization (Balogun, 2005; 
Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015; Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017). PBAs increase mutual 
accountability, ensure shared ownership, reduce corruption by increasing transparency, 
reduced influence from bilateral donors, increase policy dialogue, enhance mutual learning 
experiences, promote horizontal coordination by decreasing competition and coordination 
fatigue, and ensure sustainable development (Acharya et al., 2006; Bigsten and Tengstam, 
2015; Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017). Nevertheless, budget support and MDTFs may 
give a chance for donors to influence development priorities more directly during policy 
dialogue and aid allocation decisions, which would ultimately decrease ownership of the aid-
recipient partners (Barakat, 2009; Swedlund, 2013). 
Generally, the literature suggests that the effective implementation of such coordination 
modalities ensures functional donor coordination and thus ultimately brings aid and 
development effectiveness for the reasons that PBAs 1) strengthen country ownership as well 
as the use of national systems and the alignment of donors’ support through government-led 
coordination for sustainable development (Kanbur et al., 1999; Bandstein, 2007; OECD, 
2008c; Delputte and Orbie, 2014; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015); 2) reduce aid fragmentation 
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and transaction costs of development coordination without discouraging the mobilization of 
minor support from small donors (Foster and Leavy, 2001; Bandstein, 2007; Prizzon and 
Rogerson, 2013; Delputte and Orbie, 2014; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015); 3) strengthen joint 
coordination for results, fostering shared ownership and mutual trust between donors and 
government (Foster and Leavy, 2001; Bandstein, 2007; Martínez-Álvarez and Acharya, 2012); 
4) reduce corruption by increasing transparency and mutual accountability (Kanbur et al., 1999; 
Foster and Leavy, 2001); 5) share the risk of aid investment for donors where the financial and 
governance systems of recipients are weak or undemocratic (unlike in the case of budget 
support) and reduce political influence from bilateral donors on the recipient partner (Kanbur 
et al., 1999; Acharya et al., 2006; Bandstein, 2007); 6) create a conducive environment for 
policy dialogue and mutual learning experiences (Kanbur et al., 1999; Bandstein, 2007); and 
7) increase horizontal coordination among donors by reducing competition among themselves 
and also with the government, which ultimately decreases coordination ‘fatigue’ (Acharya et 
al., 2006). 
Nevertheless, empirical studies and evaluations of the Paris Agenda implementation show that 
only limited progress has been achieved on almost all the targets globally, with the exception 
of some slow improvements observed in the strengthening of country ownership due to 
increased commitments by the recipient countries (OECD, 2011a; Wood et al., 2011; Gore, 
2013; Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017). Donors show little commitment to strengthen 
country ownership of their recipient partners by declining the use of common financing 
arrangements and national systems even when they are reasonably reliable (Gore, 2013).  
Yet, overall, the volume of aid flowing to developing countries is still huge and growing, and 
new donors are appearing on the ‘aid market’, which makes coordination even more complex 
and challenging. In some areas, aid fragmentation has increased to higher levels than before 
the Paris declaration (Acharya et al., 2006; Leiderer, 2015; Nunnenkamp et al., 2016). This 
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suggests that studying donor coordination is still relevant when analyzing aid effectiveness. 
Lessons from the analysis of practices of a specific country case or sector-level cases in a 
specific political economy context will contribute to the debate on aid effectiveness and 
reforms of aid policies and coordination practices. As suggested by Brown (2017), studying 
cases from countries that are led by a government with a developmental state approach and 
have strong relationships with ‘new’ donors like China could show a distinct form of country 
ownership and power relations in the coordination landscape. 
1.4 Ownership in the context of ‘developmental state’ regimes 
The concept of ‘developmental state’ has gradually evolved into a widely conversed theory in 
development economics rather than simply a form of state political governance (Kim et al., 
2013; Evans and Heller, 2015). The ‘developmental state’ theory asserts that a state can play a 
leading role in strategic planning, promoting, and transforming an economy, unlike the neo-
liberal conception of a limited state role with an emphasis on the market as a panacea. 
According to Evans and Heller (2015), the theory of ‘developmental state’ corresponds to 
modern development economics thoughts, including the ‘capability approach’ as advocated by 
Sen (Sen, 1994; Sen, 1999), which underscore development mainly as a process of improving 
human capabilities internally rather than by an exogenous flow and accumulation of capital. 
This sets the theoretical implication on the relevance of national ownership in the realm of a 
‘developmental state’ that strives towards capability-building and development coordination. 
Leftwich defines the ‘developmental states’ as ‘states whose politics have concentrated 
sufficient power, autonomy, and capacity at the center to shape, pursue, and encourage the 
achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the 
conditions and direction of economic growth, or by organizing it directly, or a varying 
combination of both’ (Leftwich, 1995: 402). According to this definition and analysis of other 
related literature, a typical ‘developmental state’ model is principally characterized by the 
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presence of political elite and institutions at the top with autonomy and bureaucratic capacity 
primarily to achieve national developmental objectives. This implies that ownership would be 
generally strong in developmental states as explained by the following points. 
First, the combined effect of strong autonomy by the political elite and high capability by the 
bureaucracy, which is bolstered by rapid economic growth and transformation, fortify the 
leverage and legitimacy of the state to exercise strong country ownership in determining its 
own development agenda and to define its relationships with actors in the development 
coordination landscape, accordingly. For Kim et al. (2013: 319), the ideal formation of 
autonomy and capability by the top political elite, the bureaucracy and the institutions would 
allow a regime to exercise ‘true ownership’, which the authors define as a state of ‘going 
against the wishes of donors’. This, theoretically, refers to the fact that the leadership self-
sufficiently formulates its own development agenda and priorities and that these are not set 
externally by the donors. The relevance of strong internal capability is even more justifiable 
for poor states that are heavily dependent on foreign aid and that could be vulnerable to the 
influence of their donors (Evans and Heller, 2015).  
Second, the state bureaucracy and institutions in developmental states are generally much 
stronger than the civil society and the private sectors, which commonly play a ‘subordinate 
role’, especially in agrarian societies where they are naturally weak (Leftwich, 1995). This 
gives the political elite effective control over pressure from internal interest groups, which 
allows the regime to form hegemonic power and centralized approaches in the national 
development planning and resource mobilization for developmental objectives (Leftwich, 
1994, 1995). This would also grant the political elite more power and freedom to negotiate with 
donors in the spirit of strong country ownership. 
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Third, the experience of East Asian developmental states shows that their commitment to 
sustainably ensuring economic growth and national capabilities brought them ‘performance 
legitimacy’ from their constituents internally (Leftwich, 1995). Empirical studies also show 
donors tend to legitimize the autonomy of political elites in developmental states that are 
effective in utilizing the development assistance and bringing results (Kim et al., 2013). This 
ultimately supports ownership for governments of developmental states not only for the 
constituent subjects but also by the development partners.  
This line of discussion is relevant in understanding the relationships of recipient countries with 
their donor counterparts under the context of such a political economy. This is because 
development is a complex political process (Leftwich, 1994) in which the dynamics of 
development cooperation are explained by the politics of a state. Actually, analyzing the 
developmental states is not the scope of this study; however, it is discussed here with the aim 
to understand the context and because it will help us to better appreciate the nature and scope 
of country ownership in donor coordination in the context of a developmental state like 
Ethiopia. Given this context in mind, the thesis specifically addresses the following policy 
assumptions and questions. 
1.5 Policy assumptions and research questions 
This thesis principally studies how policy assumptions related to country ownership and 
coordination are demonstrated in practice in accordance with the principles of the Paris 
Agenda. This thesis, therefore, in a context-specific setting of a developing country, 
systematically tests and illustrates the policy assumptions about country ownership in the 
development coordination architecture at a micro level. This leads to the following main 
research question:  
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How are policy assumptions guiding country ownership and coordination practiced in 
an aid-dependent developmental state, and what political economy factors and 
coordination approaches explain any divergences between the assumptions and the 
practices? 
There are four sub-questions, which are associated with three major policy assumptions related 
to the political economy of aid in donor-recipient relations, country ownership, and donor 
coordination: 
1. How does the political economy context in Ethiopia influence the magnitude, sources, and 
composition of foreign aid flows throughout the evolution of donor-government relations 
across the three regimes in Ethiopia?  
2. How do policy assumptions according to the Paris and Busan principles turn into practices 
in a ‘developmental state’ context like in Ethiopia, and how is country ownership explained 
in this process?  
3. How do sector-specific factors explain effective coordination in the health sector in 
Ethiopia, and to what extent does this affect results being achieved?  
4.  How do sector-specific factors explain effective coordination in the agriculture sector in 
Ethiopia, and to what extent are results being achieved in the context of country ownership? 
Analysis of the sub-issues in the specific research questions will aggregately address how 
policy assumptions on country ownership and donor coordination are realized in developing 
countries on the ground. Accordingly, this thesis comprises four studies that are constructed 
based on basic policy assumptions related to the political economy of aid, country ownership, 
and coordination in developing countries. The core assumption that guides these studies is that 
where there is strong agency by the recipient partners and donors are committed to supporting 
them towards that direction, coordination will be operative and aid will be ultimately effective.  
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 30
20 
 
The study in Chapter Two is built on the assumption that the motives of donor policies and the 
political economy of recipient countries determine the relationships of donors with their 
recipient partners in developing countries. The dynamics of the relationships determine the 
type, size, and composition of aid as well as the level of engagement of donors. Analysis of aid 
flows from different types of donors across the three regimes in Ethiopia helps to understand 
how changes in the political economy of the regimes affect the relationships of the Ethiopian 
governments with their bilateral and multilateral aid providers. This establishes a general 
context for the subsequent studies that focus on practices related to country ownership and 
donor coordination.  
The study in Chapter Three analyzes the assumption that the different types of aid modalities, 
program-based approaches (PBAs) in particular, are important instruments in promoting 
effective coordination and policy dialogue through strengthened country ownership. The study 
assesses the implementation of the Paris Agenda principles in Ethiopia, where Ethiopia is 
heavily dependent on foreign aid and tries to lead the country by a developmental state 
approach in which the state is in the forefront of stimulating economic activity by investing in 
social and economic infrastructure. 
The studies in Chapters Four and Five further test the assumptions in Chapter Three to better 
understand the reality at a sector level in view of two critical cases from the social and 
production sectors. An analysis of the comparison between the health and agriculture sectors 
helps to further identify sector-level factors that can explain effective coordination in 
developing countries. 
1.6 Contributions to the literature 
The studies in this thesis analyze practices that in the end explain country ownership at the 
center of development coordination, drawing relevant theoretical and policy assumptions into 
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 31
21 
 
the discourse. This cross-analysis of policy practices in view of related policy assumptions 
would contribute to the debate on aid effectiveness, which is presumed to be best achieved 
through country ownership and thus promotes recipients being in the ‘driver’s seat’ of 
development policies and cooperation. It also suggests finally policy recommendations that 
donors and recipient countries might consider in development cooperation policies. 
Specifically, the contribution of each of the studies is explained as follows. 
Contribution 1: The first study explores the effect of political economy variables that form a 
context for donor-recipient relationships at the level and composition of aid. This adds to the 
literature underlining that political economy factors (with the political regime and behaviors in 
focus) are vital to the comprehensive and practical understanding of aid politics and the 
coordination landscape in aid-recipient countries. Cross-analysis of aid relationships between 
the traditional and bilateral donors compared to the new emerging donors in a context of strong 
country ownership will contribute to the literature relating to North-South cooperation and the 
approaches that governments of developing countries employ to the stimuli from both strands 
of donors in the category. It also provides context-specific understanding from the field for 
policy recommendation. This is because, empirically, there are few studies on aid in Ethiopia 
and on aid relations in Africa that go deeper than somewhat superficial accounts of donor-aid 
recipient relations. 
Contribution 2: The second study examines country-owned and -led coordination practices 
grounded in policy assumptions derived from the Paris Agenda. It analyzes division of labor 
of donors in the aid architecture by examining the status of aid fragmentation at the country 
level. This contributes to the literature relating to the good practices and flip sides of 
coordination in aid-recipient countries. This leads to the discussion on how aid recipients 
institutionalize models that reinforce country ownership in their coordination landscape. This 
contributes to the literature on factors that explain strong country ownership in developing 
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countries by assessing the good practice of program-based approaches, including joint 
financing arrangements, basket/pooled funding, and country-led and -owned coordination 
platforms that are underpinned by policy dialogue.  
Contribution 3: Studies four and five explore the principles and practices of context specificity 
of country-led coordination at a micro level with empirical analysis at the sector level. 
Comparing the social (health) and production (agriculture) sectors, the studies look at how 
donors coordinate and behave in the two sectors with some specifics. This contributes to the 
literature by describing how effective coordination and country ownership are explained at the 
sector level, given the specificity of a micro-level context that includes the sector development 
plans, the leadership, the functionality of the coordination platforms, and the division of labor 
by donors in the sector coordination platforms. 
1.7 Methodology 
The first study in Chapter Two uses mainly quantitative datasets from international databases, 
while the remaining studies are based on large-scale quantitative datasets and on original 
qualitative interview data (see details in the appendix of this chapter). This section portrays the 
research design, the country and sector selection procedures, and the data and methods 
employed in each of the studies.  
1.7.1 Research design 
This study is designed as a single case study, where Ethiopia represents a critical case. Ethiopia 
is one of the poor countries in Africa but with a fast-growing economy is heavily aid-dependent. 
Ethiopia is also assumed to be one of the ‘developmental states’ in Africa with a strong 
emphasis on country ownership (Clapham, 2018). The criteria and rationales considered to 
select Ethiopia as a critical case are discussed in the following section.  
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1.7.2 Country selection 
Ethiopia is an interesting critical case in the study of aid effectiveness and donor coordination 
in aid-recipient countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Ethiopia was a ‘pariah’ for most of the 
western donors during the Cold War because of its ideological alliance with the socialist world 
in the 1980s and its repressive regime (Kissi, 2005; Broich, 2017). However, following the 
change in government in 1991, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) government, directed by the developmental state principles, showed strong 
leadership in the design, implementation, and coordination of its poverty reduction and 
development strategies (Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013; Broich, 2017). This gradually showed 
impressive results, and Ethiopia became one of the fastest growing economies in Africa (The 
Economist, 2011; World Bank, 2016a), which also attracted more support from donors. Along 
with its geopolitical position in Africa, Ethiopia has become a ‘donor darling’ country not only 
for the traditional donors from the West but also for the emerging donors from the South, 
mainly China (Cheru, 2006; Adem, 2012; Mascagni, 2016a; Broich, 2017; Dittgen and 
Demissie, 2017).  
There are many donors in Ethiopia (48 in 2016), and big streams of aid are flowing into the 
country, particularly since the mid-2000s. From 2000 to 2016, Ethiopia received USD 45.4 
billion net ODA (63% of the aggregated net ODA of the 57 years from 1960 to 2016), and 
Ethiopia is currently one of the largest aid recipients in Africa. Being a ‘developmental state’ 
with a regime that boldly resisted the ‘Washington Consensus’ principles of development 
cooperation, this huge support from the West poses questions about what explains ownership 
and effective coordination in the context, which will be analyzed in this thesis. To get a more 
precise picture of donor coordination in Ethiopia, we also look at sector-level coordination in 
Ethiopia, in addition to analyzing aid flows to Ethiopia, general donor coordination, and aid 
fragmentation in Ethiopia.  
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Ethiopia was one of the good performers in the Paris Agenda survey in 2010 (OECD, 2011a) 
and the post-Busan evaluation in 2013 (OECD and UNDP, 2014). Ethiopia has improved its 
country ownership, scoring a grade of ‘B’ for the quality of its operational development 
strategies and 4.0 and 3.5 for the reliability of its public financial systems during both the 2008 
and 2011 Paris Agenda monitoring survey reports by OECD-DAC, respectively (OECD, 
2008b, 2011b). It has also scored 3.5 points for the quality of its public financial systems during 
the 2013 Busan monitoring survey reports (OECD and UNDP, 2014). This shows that Ethiopia 
has managed to ensure national ownership of development, and it also shows a high level of 
donor presence. Therefore, analysis of the case of Ethiopia could be safely compared with its 
structural peers, as they are systematically identified by the World Bank (2016b), like Rwanda, 
Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
1.7.3 Sector Selection 
For the sectoral analysis of donor coordination, we selected the health and agriculture sectors 
as critical cases. Agriculture is a major pro-poor sector in Ethiopia, and it is categorized under 
the production sector based on the OECD’s classification. Agriculture is the major source of 
livelihood and economic growth for Ethiopia. About 80% of the Ethiopia population live in 
rural areas (FAO, 2017), and agriculture in 2015 produced more than 40% of the national GDP 
and 84% of the total export (ATA, 2015). Consequently, agriculture has become the central 
focus of Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI), which is a long-term 
visionary strategy for sustainable and transformative development in Ethiopia, and it is also 
presumed as a critical source of economic growth in the Growth and Transformation Plans 
(GTPs). Practically, the sector plays an important role in poverty reduction (World Bank, 
2016b, 2016a), although it has also been vulnerable to climate shocks because of its heavy 
dependence on rainfall and archaic farming technology.  
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The health sector is also an important component of the social sector development of the GTPs 
and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Ethiopia, as well as the priority sector of 
the traditional donors. The health sector is one of the ‘donor darling’ investment areas, and it 
is one of the sectors where the government of Ethiopia shows strong country ownership and 
strategic leadership with impressive results in the last two decades. The agriculture sector, on 
the other hand, is a difficult sector for aid investment, and it was unpopular among donors in 
recent decades (as the aid to agriculture, in general, was halved in recent decades); only recently 
have donors started to pick up investments in agriculture again. 
1.7.4 Data and methods 
This is a qualitative study, mainly based on interview data and complemented by datasets from 
international and national online databases. We used similar methods and materials for the last 
three independent papers (in Chapters Three, Four, and Five) in this thesis, while the paper in 
Chapter Two was constructed based on datasets from online databases. The interviews were 
administered in two rounds: the first round in February and March of 2016 and the second one 
in March and April of 2017. We interviewed 42 participants, including heads of development 
cooperation, health and agriculture specialists, and program heads of donor countries stationed 
in Addis Ababa at offices in their respective embassies or delegations in Addis Ababa, as well 
as representatives from government organizations, including Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Cooperation (MoFEC), Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources. (See the profile of the respondents in the appendix attached.) The interview 
participants from the donor community were randomly selected from large, medium, and small 
donors to minimize the biasedness of the interview data. For the health and agriculture papers 
in Chapters Four and Five, we included specialists working in the donors’ offices of bilateral 
as well as multilateral organizations in the respective areas. We interviewed several participants 
in 2017 as well as in 2016. 
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The interviews were conducted based on a thematically organized interview guide with semi-
structured questions, developed by consulting existing literature on aid effectiveness and donor 
coordination. The themes in the interview guide included a brief overview of donors’ programs 
and respective portfolios; their views towards Ethiopian government policies, plans, and 
flagship programs (both national and specific to the health and agriculture sectors); donor 
coordination platforms and practices; government leadership and country ownership in 
coordination; the role of big, small, and medium bilateral and multilateral donors in donor 
coordination; quality of policy dialogue at the coordination platforms; level of donors’ 
alignment to the government programs and priorities; coordination of donors with different 
ministries (comparison among the strong and weak ministries); and views towards program-
based approaches and the use of pooled and parallel funding systems in Ethiopia. Almost all 
the interviews were voice recorded and transcribed verbatim. The transcribed interviews were 
coded and colored based on themes derived from the interview guide for analysis, and then 
thematically analyzed using framework analysis.  
We also looked at the documents of the main donors, including their country cooperation 
strategies with Ethiopia, program evaluations, and progress reports, along with the main 
development policy papers, strategies, plans, and progress reports of the Ethiopian government 
both at the national and sectoral levels and specific to the health and agriculture sectors. We 
studied reports from the global platforms on aid and development effectiveness that are 
worldwide and specific to Ethiopia, including the 2004 reports on harmonization and alignment 
survey, as well as survey reports on monitoring the Paris Declaration in 2006, 2008, and 2011 
by the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), along with the 2014 
report on the post-Busan survey on development effectiveness and the annual progress reports 
by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). We also analyzed 
the Development Assistance Group (DAG)-Ethiopia reports from 2004 to 2016 and the 
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 37
27 
 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) reports. In the analysis of the context, we also 
consulted the international literature not only on aid to Ethiopia and donor coordination in 
general, but also empirical studies on agriculture and health in Ethiopia, the economy, and the 
political situation in general, which were built into a large database of reports, articles, and 
theses. 
Datasets from international databases complemented the data from the interviews and 
secondary sources. Data on net Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows and Country 
Programmable Aid (CPA) to Ethiopia were mainly extracted from Credit Reporting System 
(CRS) of the OECD online database, which is the most reliable one, with coverage of over 90% 
of the net disbursements from the 1990s (Lemi, 2017). Data on gross national income (GNI), 
gross national product (GDP), and foreign direct investment (FDI) were taken from the world 
development indicators (WDI) open database of the World Bank. WDI is a database integrated 
with other international sources, including OECD, and it is published in a timely manner and 
easy for comparative analysis. Data on funding to the flagship programs in Ethiopia, which is 
not available in the international databases, was retrieved from the Aid Management Platform 
(AMP) of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MoFEC) of Ethiopia. AMP is 
an information sharing platform designed by Development Gateway with financial and 
supervisory support by the DAG/UNDP, the World Bank, and MoFEC, with participation of 
other donors in Ethiopia. It was launched in 2005 and records actual aid disbursements by all 
donors in Ethiopia, including China and other non-DAC donors (Development Gateway, 2005; 
DAG, 2018b). We used a dataset from AidData to analyze aid to Ethiopia from China. We 
noted that this dataset is more comprehensive in its coverage of related aid from China to 
Ethiopia than is the AMP of the MoFEC.  
On top of the databases stated above, the sectoral level analysis utilized specific datasets 
relevant to the sectors. Additional data on the financing of the agriculture sector was extracted 
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from the databases of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAOSTAT) and the Rural 
and Economic Development and Food Security (RED&FS) Secretariat office. Likewise, aid to 
and expenditure in the health sector were organized from the Development Assistance for 
Health Database by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), the Global Health 
Observatory (GHO) and the Global Health Expenditure database by WHO, and UNdata. 
Finally, data from the interviews, the datasets, and reports and other documents were 
triangulated, portrayed, and thematically analyzed. 
1.8 Limitations of the study 
First, we use one interview guide to collect data from participants during the interviews. This 
might lead to one data collection instrument bias. However, data from the interviews were 
substantiated by analysis of datasets from international online databases, which would 
strengthen the quality of the research. Second, we analyze the change in the types, sources, and 
composition of aid and other financial flows across the three governments in Ethiopia from the 
1960s to 2016. However, the data coverage varies between the early time and the current years; 
particularly that from the 1990s is different. Therefore, interpretations related to the 
comparison of the trends deserves some caution. Third, we also use multiple sources and 
measurements in the analysis of financial flows to Ethiopia. For example, data from the 
National Bank of Ethiopia on aid by INGOs was reported in current prices, thus requiring some 
attention when compared with other figures that are reported in constant prices. Fourth, our 
analysis of aid fragmentation is limited to the national and sectoral level – not extended to a 
project or program level. This underestimates the reports of the fragmentation level in Ethiopia. 
Specifically, aid fragmentation for the agriculture sector in Ethiopia is limited to basic 
agriculture, according to the classification by the OECD-DAC. However, in Ethiopia 
agriculture is organized into rural development, livestock, fisheries, and forestry. Therefore, 
the fragmentation ratio reported in this report could be understated. 
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1.9 Structure of the dissertation 
This thesis is organized into four interrelated but independently structured papers for 
publication in academic journals. The first paper in Chapter Two is on aid to Ethiopia and the 
relationships of donors that evolved across the three governments in Ethiopia: the Haile 
Selassie government (1960-1973), the Derg (1973-1990), and the EPRDF (1991 to present). It 
specifically addresses trends in the aid flows, the types, sources, and composition of aid to 
Ethiopia, and its share in the economy with some emphasis on donor relationships with 
Ethiopia as a developmental state during the EPRDF regime. This paper also comparatively 
examines how aid from non-traditional donors, especially China, affected the nature and scope 
of the aid architecture in Ethiopia, with a conclusion on the major issues. 
The second paper in Chapter Three is on donor coordination in Ethiopia. It analyzes the level 
of aid fragmentation in Ethiopia; the functioning of the DAG coordination platforms and other 
coordination structures, including joint programming and the UN One Fund System; the level 
of donors’ participation in the coordination platforms; the quality of policy dialogue in the 
platforms; and the practices of program-based approach practices in Ethiopia. 
The third paper in Chapter Four is on donor coordination in the agriculture sector in Ethiopia. 
It deals with the policies, strategies, and plans for agriculture in Ethiopia (2000-2020); aid to 
agriculture; and the level of aid fragmentation. It portrays the coordination platforms and the 
status of donor coordination in the flagship programs, and it presents an analysis of donors’ 
views on the leadership of the Ministry as well as on the effectiveness of the coordination 
structures in the sectors. Finally, it analyzes the results from agricultural investments. 
The fourth paper in Chapter Five is on donor coordination and aid effectiveness in the health 
sector. It develops a conclusion from the analysis of the organization and leadership of the 
Ministry of Health; aid to health and the status of aid fragmentation in the sector; the health 
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plans; political and professional commitment of the leadership in implementing the plans and 
leading the coordination; the functioning of the coordination platforms, and the major results 
achieved from the investments in the health sector in Ethiopia. The last chapter discusses and 
points out theoretical and policy implications from the overall thesis. 
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Overview of interview data 
Organization 
Organization 
Type 
Number of 
Respondents 
Respondent Background 
Date 
Interviewed 
Austria Bilateral 1 Generalist* 
2016.03.04 
2017.03.21 
Denmark Bilateral 2 
Generalist 
2016.02.25 
2017.02.24 
Generalist 2016.02.25 
EU Delegation Multilateral 3 
Generalist 
2016.02.23 
2017.02.30 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.24 
Health specialist 2017.03.28 
Finland Bilateral 1 Generalist 
2016.03.01 
2017.03.29 
France Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.03.02 
German Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.29 
Ireland Bilateral 3 
Generalist 2016.02.25 
Health specialist 2017.03.21 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.21 
Italy Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.25 
Netherlands Bilateral 4 
Generalist 
2016.02.24 
2017.04.05 
Health specialist 2016.02.24 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.20 
Health specialist 2017.03.20 
Norway Bilateral 4 
Generalist 2016.02.25 
Generalist 
2016.02.25 
2017.03.22 
Generalist 2017.03.22 
Generalist 2017.03.22 
Sweden Bilateral 2 
Generalist 2016.02.24 
Generalist 2017.03.28 
UK (DFID) Bilateral 3 
Generalist 2016.03.01 
Generalist 2017.03.23 
Health specialist 2017.03.23 
World Bank Multilateral 3 
Generalist + Agri. specialist 
2016.03.02 
2017.03.27 
Health specialist 2017.02.27 
Health specialist 2017.02.27 
MoH Government 2 
Health, Senior Expert 2016.02.23 
Director, PPD 2016.02.19 
Japan (JICA) Bilateral 2 
Generalist 2017.03.23 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.23 
MoANR Government 2 
Director, PPD 2017.05.04 
Secretariat, RED&FS 2017.03.29 
Spain Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.28 
UNDP Multilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.30 
USA (USAID) Bilateral 4 
Generalist 2017.03.31 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.31 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.31 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.31 
MoFEC Government 1 Int. Devpt. Cooperation 2017.05.05 
Canada Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.22 
UNICEF Multilateral 2 
Health specialist 2017.04.04 
Health specialist 2017.04.04 
 
*Generalist means that the respondent is either a Head of Agency or Program Officer 
  
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 42
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 43













	

530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 44
 
 
Abstract 
Relations between the Ethiopian government and the international donor community are 
characterized by a series of ups and profound downs. In this paper, we present a historical 
sketch of this relationship. First, we highlight Ethiopia as a ‘developmental state’ and the 
dynamics of the relationships with its donors. Second, we present an analysis of financial flows 
to Ethiopia over the years and the relationship between donors and Ethiopia in three periods: 
the time of Emperor Haile Selassie, the years of the military dictatorship under the Derg, and 
finally during the time of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
coalition. In the last section, we analyze the emergence of new donors, China in particular, and 
we discuss what kind of influence this might have on the relationships with the international 
donors in the aid architecture. 
 
Key Words: Development assistance; Ethiopia; Haile Selassie; Derg; EPRDF; humanitarian 
aid 
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2.1 Introduction 
Ethiopia has long been a country of hunger and famines, such as the disastrous famines in the 
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s under Haile Selassie regime and the big drought and famine of 1983-
84/85 under the Derg regime. Ethiopia was thus connected with pictures of starving and dying 
children for whom the world – from states to individual singers through Live Aid – joined 
together to provide humanitarian aid. However, under the Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic 
Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) government, the country as a ‘developmental state’ has grown 
to a ‘donor darling’ receiving vast amounts of aid in close alignment with the government’s 
development and poverty reduction policies. It shows also the growing popularity of Ethiopia 
among a large group of small donors, thanks to its successes in economic growth, poverty 
reduction, and progress on social indicators. Recently, the aid architecture in Ethiopia has 
attracted not only the traditional donors from the north but also donors from the south, which 
would certainly broaden the aid landscape of the country. China, India, and Brazil, among the 
donors from the south, have been increasing their role as aid providers in Ethiopia (Nebebe and 
Bosch, 2015; Cheru, 2016; DAG, 2018a). 
Aid has thus become a major component of socio-economic activities in Ethiopia. However, in 
the history of development cooperation for the last nearly 60 years from 1960, the relationships 
that Ethiopia had with donors were never simple or steady. Nevertheless, there is only a limited 
number of studies that try to analyze the nature, dynamics, and magnitude of aid flows to 
Ethiopia from different sources, including from Southern donors, and the relations of the 
respective donors across the three government periods from the 1960s up until today. This 
study, therefore, aims to analyze how the dynamics in the political economy affect the sources 
and composition of aid flow to Ethiopia during different regimes in the country as well as the 
donor-government relations in the period. The study also aims to comparatively analyze how 
non-traditional donors affected the aid architecture and its dynamics in Ethiopia. 
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Ethiopia, for several important reasons, is an interesting critical case to analyze the nature and 
influence of both traditional and non-traditional donors in the aid system of a developing 
country. On account of its geopolitical position in the Horn of Africa and its encouraging results 
in fighting poverty (Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013; Broich, 2017), Ethiopia received generous 
support from a large number of donors in recent years, and it has become one of the top aid-
recipient countries globally despite being known for its ‘authoritative’ developmental state 
regime. In 2016, Ethiopia received total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) of USD 
4.07 billion (OECD-DAC, 2017d). During the period 2000 to 2014, China alone channeled, on 
average, USD 1.1 billion per year to Ethiopia (Dreher et al., 2017). In the following sections 
we will first present the methodology followed in this paper, then present visions on Ethiopia’s 
aid relations over time in order to compare these with figures on aid (and other financial flows) 
in the last four sections. We then conclude with an analysis of what aid figures tell us about the 
relations of Ethiopia with its donors in the last 60 years. 
2.2 Methods and materials 
This study qualitatively analyzes aid flow to Ethiopia from 1960 to 2016 separately examining 
the aid sources, types, and composition across the three governments during the period. It 
principally uses data on net ODA disbursed to Ethiopia as reported by donors and recorded in 
the Credit Reporting System (CRS) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) during the respective 
period. In addition, data on gross national income (GNI), gross national product (GDP), foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and other related flows were taken from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) open database of the World Bank. A small proportion of interview data is 
also utilized to substantiate the secondary data. 
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Net ODA disbursement for major purposes or sectors in Ethiopia were analyzed based on CRS 
data available since 2002, as related records for the earlier period were not available. Also, aid 
data for the earlier years is not complete, as it does not include all the support from donors. 
According to Lemi (2017), for example, in 1995 CRS incorporated only 77% of the net ODA 
disbursement. The coverage has increased since 1999 to include over 90% of the 
disbursements. Therefore, results related to the comparison of aid flows across the regimes 
should be carefully understood with these reservations in mind.  
Data on the external financial inflows from international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs) was extracted from the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) and recorded at current 
prices. This would also require attention while comparing aid data from CRS that are recorded 
at constant prices. In the analysis of the contribution of individual bilateral and multilateral 
donors to Ethiopia in different regimes, donors with support of less than USD 250,000 were 
omitted to minimize some outlier effects at the lower tiers of the aid structure.  
Overview of interview data 
Organization Organization Type 
Number of 
Respondents 
Respondent Background Date Interviewed 
Austria Bilateral 1 Generalist* 
2016.03.04 
2017.03.21 
Denmark Bilateral 2 
Generalist 
2016.02.25 
2017.02.24 
Generalist 2016.02.25 
EU Delegation Multilateral 1 Generalist 
2016.02.23 
2017.02.30 
Finland Bilateral 1 Generalist 
2016.03.01 
2017.03.29 
France Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.03.02 
German Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.29 
Ireland Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.25 
Italy Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.25 
Netherlands Bilateral 1 Generalist 
2016.02.24 
2017.04.05 
Norway Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.25 
Sweden Bilateral 2 
Generalist 2016.02.24 
Generalist 2017.03.28 
UK (DFID) Bilateral 2 
Generalist 2016.03.01 
Generalist 2017.03.23 
World Bank Multilateral 1 Generalist 
2016.03.02 
2017.03.27 
Spain Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.28 
UNDP Multilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.30 
USA (USAID) Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.31 
MoFEC Government 1 Int. Devpt. Cooperation 2017.05.05 
Canada Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.22 
*Generalist means that the respondent is either a Head of Agency or Program Officer 
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2.3 Review of donor-Ethiopia relations from 1950 to 2016 
2.3.1 Relations during the emperor Haile Selassie and Derg regimes 
In this section, we present a short overview of what has been written on Ethiopia’s relations 
with the international donor community during the three periods of political governance in the 
last 60 years: the emperor Haile Selassie period (up until 1974), the Derg regime (1974−1990), 
and the EPDRF (1991 until now). Ethiopia started official aid relationships with donors in the 
early 1950s when most of the African countries were under colonization (and with the US even 
earlier with the Mutual Aid Agreement of 1942). This put the government in a position to carry 
the relationships on equal footings with donors (Furtado and Smith, 2007). However, the level 
of the aid flow to Ethiopia during the period was low, e.g. technical and economic assistance 
from the US of USD 66 million between 1959 and 1962 and in the following 5 years on average 
USD 24 million (McVety, 2012). This was primarily because the government viewed receiving 
aid as a compromise to the dignity and pride of the imperial regime, which ruled a sovereign 
state that was never colonized (Furtado and Smith, 2007; Broich, 2017). Based on that mindset, 
the government declined to reveal to the donor community even the 1973/74 great famine that 
occurred in Ethiopia (Kissi, 2000; Lemi, 2008). Secondly, donors mobilized fewer resources 
to support Ethiopia than they did for their former colonies among most of the other African 
countries (Furtado and Smith, 2007; Mascagni, 2016b). Thirdly, Ethiopia for a long period had 
a ‘closed door’ policy, and that limited its interactions with more important donors from the 
west (Furtado and Smith, 2007). Consequently, relationships during the period were limited to 
a few donors, including the United Kingdom, the United States, the World Bank, and Italy 
(Adams, 1970). On the other hand, Haile Selassie was seen as a negotiator who ‘spoke the 
language of economic growth theory fluently’ and a shrewd diplomat who also was able to get 
support from the Soviet Union, but was afraid at the same time to move power away from the 
throne (McVety, 2012: 144-147). It meant, looking at Ethiopia’s strategic position vis-à-vis the 
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Middle East, that in all those years American military aid under the Mutual Security Program 
was larger than its economic assistance. 
During the time of the Derg government, the relationship with the western donors was largely 
‘hostile’ and aid was principally in the form of humanitarian and food support. First, this was 
mainly because the Derg was a socialist government, which was against the capitalist ideology 
of western donors during the Cold War period (Broich, 2017). Second, the traditional donors, 
particularly the United States, cut their developmental aid (in the late 1970s) as serious human 
rights violations and dictatorship by the Derg increased despite donors’ generous response to 
the cruel 1984/85 famine in Ethiopia (Kissi, 2005; Broich, 2017). Third, the Derg persisted 
with the legacy that aid, particularly from the capitalist donors, would compromise the Marxist 
political ideology and sovereignty of the country (Kissi, 2005; Mascagni, 2016a). Fourth, the 
civil war that took place for nearly two decades throughout the lifetime of the government 
constrained developmental activities and opportunities for improved aid relationships. 
2.3.2 Relations during the EPRF government: Ethiopia as a ‘developmental state’  
Ethiopia has a long history of statehood, which was not molded by colonial institutions as in 
other African states. Modern Ethiopia during emperor Haile Selassie and the Derg regimes was 
as well a unitary state with all the attributes of patrimonial authoritarianism. It evolved from a 
semi-feudal state up to the early 1970s to a socialist command economy until the 1990s. 
Obviously, the political and social institutions of that past would shape the nature of statehood 
for the current Ethiopia as a ‘developmental state’ during the EPRDF government from 1991 
onwards. The Ethiopian ‘developmental state’ is one of the most well-designed and profoundly 
specific models in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Routley, 2014; Clapham, 2018). It is a pro-poor 
rural developmental state model that gives priority to agriculture and rural development with a 
focus on smallholder farmers, as is clearly shown in its longstanding strategy, known as 
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Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI), and in its subsequent development 
and poverty reduction plans (Nem Singh and Ovadia, 2018).  
The top political elite of the EPRDF government, whose members were disciples of the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, have been politically committed to the developmental and poverty 
reduction objectives derived from the East Asian model of developmental states. An 
assessment by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) determined 
that ‘the regime is truly committed to development’ (USAID, 2018a: 8) This small circle of the 
top political elite, led by the late prime minister Meles Zenawi, has been the center of gravity 
in building the developmental state. In the process, the EPRDF government uses a philosophy 
of ‘revolutionary’ democracy, which emphasizes ‘democratic centralization’ and consensual 
decision-making (Vaughan, 2011; Matfess, 2015). According to one of our interviewees, this 
decision-making centralization is demonstrated as follows: 
Even if they [EPRDF government officials] know that something is useful, they will 
never say in your face: ‘You are right; we have to change it’. What they do is, they 
listen and they take you very seriously; and only after a couple of months, it 
depends on the internal decision-making structure, which is sometimes effective 
and sometimes hopelessly bureaucratic, you see actually whether they have taken 
your criticisms or remarks on board or not. (Participant BMG_4, personal 
communication, February 2, 2016) 
This would give more power and autonomy to the EPRDF hegemony in following its 
developmental strategies and in defining its relations with the international actors as well as in 
defending its developmental priorities with strong ownership. A response by Ethiopian 
government officials, according to a narrative by one of our interviewees, to a project proposal 
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from one of the lead donors that was not aligned to the priorities of the government, shows this 
reality:  
…and, they say ‘thank you very much and we are much honored; but this does not 
fit within the way we do our things’. That time we say: ‘Now conditionality is the 
word which does not work here and is counterproductive’. (Participant BMG_4, 
personal communication, February 24, 2017) 
The top leadership has also been successful in developing strong bureaucratic capacity in some 
key ministries, which gives more power and autonomy to the government. According to our 
interviewees, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MoFEC), National Planning 
Commission (NPC), Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Ministry of Education (MoE), and 
Ministry of Health (MoH) have been among the strong ministries in Ethiopia. Particularly, the 
MoFEC and NPC together with the office of the Prime Minister have been responsible for 
setting policy goals and strategic development objectives and have become centers of strategic 
economic direction for the nation and thus also in directing development assistance. Some of 
the witnesses on the donors’ side substantiate this: ‘The Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Cooperation is doing good. I love working with them and they often are committed to making 
things work and [making] our relations sustainable’ (participant BMH_1b, personal 
communication, March 20, 2017). One of the respondents further observed the capability of 
one of the units in the bureaucracy in Ethiopia, which is central in development cooperation 
and donor coordination: ‘So, to make something out of the ownership, like we see in the 
MoFEC, we need some technical capabilities’ (participant BMG_4, personal communication, 
February 24, 2016). 
The EPRDF government has also retained its power and autonomy by embedding itself in state- 
party-organized and sponsored mass organizations as well as controlling the private sector 
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using party-owned companies. The government established strong ‘infrastructural power’ 
using cooperatives, youth associations, women associations, and farmer associations, and 
through its developmental bureaucratic machinery like the agricultural extension program and 
the health extension program (Lefort, 2012; Berhanu and Poulton, 2014; Routley, 2014). This 
approach further weakens the formal civil society sector in Ethiopia, which is actually feeble 
because of the nature of the agrarian society, and increases social control by the state. The 2009 
Charities and Societies Proclamation (GoE, 2009), for example, fundamentally restricted the 
role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Ethiopia in checking the power of the state and 
limited their role as implementers at a local level. Some of the donors appeared to some degree 
to excuse the action of the government in view of the fragile context Ethiopia is in and its 
relatively acceptable level of achievement in poverty reduction. One of the interviewees, 
representing one of the largest donors in Ethiopia, tried to rationalize the case in the following 
way: 
Ethiopia is in a fragile region of the world, but doing a very good job to remain a 
stable country for decades despite the fragmentation that is going on outside its 
borders. We need to have people with more voice, but we also understand that the 
government fears that some of the advocacy NGOs are not good for the stability of 
the country. (Participant MLG_2, personal communication, March 2, 2016) 
The government has further strengthened its power by controlling the role of the private sector 
and influenced the economy using its own lucrative business companies like Ethio Telecom, 
Ethiopian Airlines, and Metal and Engineering Corporation (METEC), which is an Ethiopian 
Military-Run Corporation, as well as party-owned endowment companies, including the 
Endowment Fund for Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) and an endowment organization 
owned by the Amhara National Democratic Movement that is simply named ‘TIRET’, meaning 
‘endeavor’ (Matfess, 2015; Clapham, 2018). This approach instigated substantial government-
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led investments in public works, despite the fact that Ethiopia is constrained by low savings 
and limited domestic resources (World Bank, 2012). 
The Ethiopian government, in pursuing its developmental state trajectory, has achieved 
remarkable economic growth and thus gained performance legitimacy by the majority of its 
citizens and the international community (Nem Singh and Ovadia, 2018). However, the 
approach is criticized as only ‘nominally democratic’ and being actually ‘developmental 
authoritarianism’ because of the domination of a single party in the political landscape, along 
with election malpractices observed during the three consecutive elections from 2005 onwards, 
as well as strong social control by the government (Matfess, 2015). Corruption has also become 
a major challenge of the state government. Consequently, the government encountered 
widespread opposition, especially following the death of Meles Zenawi, against the repressive 
developmental state. These protests have shaken the government and brought changes in the 
leadership of the coalition from the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)-dominated 
EPRDF to the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) and the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) under 
the leadership of the new prime minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed since 2018. Overall, the success of 
Ethiopian development policies that began under the political leadership of Meles Zenawi is 
deteriorating since his death (Routley, 2014)]. According to the view of one of our respondents, 
the social unrest during 2015-16 shows a tendency towards the creation of strong ‘regional 
developmental states’ within a developmental state:  
This country state is still the ‘authoritarian’ state, but if you see the change from 
the last year [2016], there has been a shift in the balance of power towards the 
regional states. It gave rise to regional governments to be more assertive in their 
roles. The ownership is still there but it works a bit differently here. (Participant 
BMG_4, personal communication, April 5, 2017) 
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Under this developmental state model, the Ethiopian government, on the one hand, received 
large development assistance, but the relationships, on the other hand, were uneven. The 
market-led economic policies and reforms of the EPRDF government attracted more support 
from the donor community; the EPRDF has strengthened relationships with the traditional 
donor community. Unlike the preceding governments, the EPRDF government has been more 
open to viewing aid as a vital resource to realize national development strategies, reduce 
poverty, and ensure food security. Other relevant reasons that improved the relationships with 
donors and increased aid to Ethiopia, particularly from the early 2000s, include: 1) MDG 
initiatives and increased commitment of donors to support poor countries; 2) improved 
effectiveness and competence by the government to deliver results in implementing its own 
development programs; and 3) the shift in approach by the donor community to strengthen 
governments of poor countries by channeling support through bureaucratic structures after the 
9/11 incident and the ‘war on terror’ (Mascagni, 2016a). 
However, relations of the EPRDF government with its donors have never been smooth (see 
also Feyissa, 2011). Basically, the relations deteriorated as the government of Ethiopia openly 
rejected the ‘Washington Consensus’ model and boldly followed its ‘revolutionary democracy’ 
against it. In the mid-1990s the government encountered friction with the IMF and with other 
traditional donors that were influenced by the Fund at the time the government of Ethiopia 
showed some resistance to the conditions relating to the eligibility for the Expanded Structural 
Adjustment Program (ESAP) (Wade, 2001). Unlike other SSA governments, such 
confrontation with a strong sense of country ownership was not customary for the traditional 
donors (Furtado and Smith, 2007; Borchgrevink, 2008). However, the government finally won 
by proving that its strategies worked to bring results (Wade, 2001). Support from World Bank 
senior officials like Joseph Stiglitz was notable to promote the success that Ethiopia achieved, 
and that laid the groundwork for continued support from the international financial institutions 
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and helped to convince other donors accordingly (Wade, 2001, 2002; Feyissa, 2011). The 
World Bank’s 1998 report also substantiated that Ethiopia had a good policy environment and 
strong leadership (World Bank, 1998), which paved the way for more aid from the traditional 
donors.  
The conflict with the IMF continued during the Ethio-Eritrea War in 1998. In response, most 
donors declined to continue support to Ethiopia. This resulted in strong mutual distrust between 
the government and the donor community (Mascagni, 2016a). Donors resumed support starting 
from the early 2000s, but this lasted only for a short period until the election dispute in 2005 
and the repression of protests. According to Abbink (2006), the behavior of the EPRDF 
government in narrowing the democratic space disappointed the donor community. This time, 
however, most donors did not quit their support, but instead shifted their strategy from direct 
budget support to program-based aid like the Protection/Promotion of Basic Services (PBS), 
which has become a huge social protection program in Africa (Khan et al., 2014; Mascagni, 
2016a). Also, the World Bank, which continued budget support during the Eritrea war, 
temporarily suspended budget support and then reconfigured it (Abbink, 2006; Barkan, 2009). 
This was because of the compromise donors chose to avoid harming the basic service delivery 
that was already showing results, and also to send a message of discontent about the human 
right abuses by the government (Abegaz, 2015; Mascagni, 2016a). Convergence of the goals 
of donors (i.e., mainly security and poverty reduction) and the government in such programs 
and improved results through joint coordination have reinforced positive relationships between 
them and more aid from donors (Abegaz, 2015; Mascagni, 2016a).  
Adem (2012) argued that actions by the traditional donors in response to the 1998 war with 
Eritrea and the 2005 election disputes led the government to strengthen relationships with non-
traditional donors like China. In the process, Ethiopia has maintained a balance between the 
relationship with the traditional donors and the non-traditional southern donors, whose role has 
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increased from time to time in Ethiopia (Cheru, 2006). This increased the negotiation power of 
the government with the traditional donors (Woods, 2008; Mascagni, 2016a; Clapham, 2018). 
Despite the fact that Ethiopia, as an ‘authoritarian’ developmental state, has bad records on 
human and democratic rights (Easterly and Freschi, 2010) and that it boldly opposed the line 
of the neo-liberal ideology defined by the ‘Washington Consensus’, the basic sources of such 
strong relationships with donors from both groups are Ethiopia’s geopolitical strategic location 
in the Horn of Africa (Cheru, 2006; Adem, 2012; Mascagni, 2016a; Broich, 2017; Dittgen and 
Demissie, 2017), its position as a showcase for successful results of development cooperation 
(Adem, 2013; Matfess, 2015; Cheru, 2016; Clapham, 2018), and its commitment as a strategic 
partner of the West in the ‘war on terror’ (Matfess, 2015; Clapham, 2018). Particularly, the 
commitment of the EPRDF government in its pro-poor investments converged with the 
objectives of the donor community and garnered huge support in its poverty reduction and 
growth programs (Appendixes F and X). 
2.4 Aid flows and donors’ relations across the regimes in Ethiopian 
2.4.1 Overview on trends of aid flows to Ethiopia (1960−2016) 
According to the recently available data by OECD, for the last 57 years from 1960 to 2016, 
Ethiopia received net ODA of USD 72.6 billion (2016 constant price). It grew 30-fold from 
USD 132.6 million in 1960 to USD 4.07 billion in 2016. Based on the aggregate amount of net 
ODA flow to developing countries during the period, Ethiopia was one of the top 10 aid-
recipient countries next to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, Tanzania, and Afghanistan during this 
period (Appendix A). Particularly from the early 2000s, net ODA to Ethiopia rose above the 
aid flows to the other top recipient countries except for Iraq (which received high debt 
reduction), Afghanistan, and very recently Syria – countries which have been devastated by 
wars and received a huge amount of humanitarian aid. 
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However, the volume of aid flows to Ethiopia and its rate of growth in different periods showed 
big variations. A close look at the trends in the aid flows to Ethiopia (Graph 1) shows that net 
ODA disbursements from 1960 to 1972 were low and steady until they started to rise in 1973 
and reached a peak in 1974, which was twice the net ODA flow of 1972. This was because of 
increased humanitarian support by donors in response to the drought and famine that occurred 
in 1973/74 in Ethiopia (Kissi, 2000, 2005). Humanitarian aid steadily increased through a 
decade and again started to rise from 1983 to reach a new peak in 1985 (nearly four times 
higher than net ODA in 1982) due to a response by donors to the devastating famine in 1984/85. 
With some level of fluctuation, humanitarian and food aid persisted until the mid-1990s. This 
indicates that aid to Ethiopia in the mid-1970s and 1980s was associated mainly with 
humanitarian aid. 
Graph 1: Net ODA disbursements to Ethiopia by major donor groups (constant, 2016 USD million): 1960-2016 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018e) 
 
From the mid- to the late 1990s, aid to Ethiopia dropped sharply and reached its lowest point 
following a decline in donors’ support in response to the Ethio-Eritrea War (Mascagni, 2016b) 
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and difficult policy discussions with the IMF and the World Bank (Wade, 2001). The annual 
average net ODA during the period from 1995 to 2000 (USD 914 million) was nearly 40% less 
than the aggregate average annual flow from 1960 to 2016 (i.e., USD 1,272.95 million). But 
this aid downturn was short-lived, as the volume of the aid flow began to recover suddenly in 
2001, then continued to rise above the aggregate annual average aid flow during the whole 
period.  
Both the traditional bilateral donors (the DAC countries) and the multilaterals were important 
sources of aid to Ethiopia, though the share of bilateral donors in the aid landscape was 
relatively higher than the multilaterals. Overall, in the period from 1960 to 2016, the bilateral 
DAC donors contributed more than half (53%) and the multilateral donors covered 46%, while 
the non-DAC and private donors together covered the remaining 2% of the total net ODA flow 
to Ethiopia during the period (Appendix D). As indicated in Graph 1, the support of multilateral 
donors from 1960 to 1973 was negligible in Ethiopia until it started to increase during the mid-
1970s – mainly from the UN agencies including the WFP – in response to the drought and 
famine shocks of 1973/74 in Ethiopia. Their presence and dominance persisted for almost a 
decade from 1976 to 1983 till the bilateral donors took over the position and increased their 
humanitarian support as a consequence of the harsh famine that occurred in 1983/84 in 
Ethiopia. Again, the multilaterals came to picture in the aid system in Ethiopia from 1991 to 
1993 with support mainly in the form of loan and debt reduction by the World Bank and the 
IMF (IMF and World Bank, 2017). Generally, a pattern can be discerned (as observed in 
1973/74, 84/85, and also in the later years in 1994, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2015/16) 
that as drought and famine occurred in Ethiopia, aid from the bilateral donors increased above 
the multilateral donors. 
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2.4.2 Total net ODA receipt by regime 
Ethiopia received the smallest yearly average net ODA of USD 195.3 million, which was only 
4% of the average total net ODA, during Emperor Haile Selassie’s government from 1960 to 
1973, despite the rate of growth of ODA flow being relatively smooth during the period. 
However, aid to Ethiopia significantly increased during the two successive regimes. On 
average, the socialist Derg regime received USD 828 million net ODA per year (19% of total 
average net ODA), which was four times higher than the volume during the Haile Selassie 
government. This was because of a sharp increase in humanitarian aid and rehabilitation 
programs following the 1973/74 and 1984/85 droughts and famines that occurred in Ethiopia. 
Nevertheless, the flow of aid during the Derg government was not smooth compared to the 
preceding regime, as it was in response to the intense droughts and its relations with donors 
were rough (Graph 4). 
Following government changes in 1991 in Ethiopia, the EPRDF government enjoyed 
accelerated support from donors. On average, the EPRDF government received USD 2.14 
billion per year from 1991 to 2016, which was the largest share at more than three-quarters 
(77%) of the total average net ODA received during the whole period from 1960 to 2016. This 
yearly average net ODA was nearly 10 times and three times higher than the yearly average 
receipts by the Haile Selassie and the Derg governments, respectively. Particularly, both the 
volume and the rate of growth of ODA from the early 2000s were exceptionally high, although 
the pattern of the flow was not stable. From 2001 to 2016, for instance, Ethiopia enjoyed the 
largest yearly average net ODA flow (USD 2.8 billion), which was two-fold the aggregate 
yearly average flow of the whole period. This yearly average ODA reached a peak at USD 3.4 
billion ODA disbursement per year during the period from 2011 to 2016.  
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Graph 2: Yearly average net ODA disbursements by regimes in Ethiopia (constant, 2016 USD million) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018b) 
[ 
According to Alemayehu and Tafere (2011), this substantial increase in the volume of aid was 
mainly linked to the G-8 decisions at the Kananaskis summit in 2002, which advised donors to 
boost their support to the developing countries in order to realize the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) and related global initiatives. Apart from its strategic position in the ‘war on 
terror’ in the Horn of Africa, results achieved through the consecutive poverty reduction and 
development strategies of the government of Ethiopia from 2002, including the Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Reduction Program, Plan for Sustainable and Accelerated 
Development to End Poverty, and the first and second Growth and Transformation Plans also 
appeared to attract much support as well as alignment with the donor community. From 1991 
to 1998, Ethiopia was basically in the process of building its developmental state power and 
autonomy, and the model has become more operative in the 2000s (Clapham, 2018).  
2.4.3 Aid flows by provider by regime 
Ethiopia has been a destination for the big donors in the global aid architecture. As shown in 
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disbursement from 1960-2016, constituted above three-fourths (76%) of the total net ODA 
flow to Ethiopia. The first three large-sized donors, including the United States, the World 
Bank, and the EU institutions, covered nearly half (47%) of the total net ODA flow to Ethiopia. 
Table 1: Net ODA disbursements by top 10 donors in Ethiopia (constant, 2016 USD million): Aggregate, 1960 – 2016 
Donor Total 
Yearly Average 
Net ODA 
Disbursement 
Share (% of Total Net ODA) 
Cumulative 
Share 
United States 13,779.18 241.74 19.0% 19% 
IDA/World Bank 13,158.44 230.85 18.1% 37% 
EU Institutions 6,830.02 119.82 9.4% 47% 
United Kingdom 5,227.62 91.71 7.2% 54% 
Italy 3,642.04 63.90 5.0% 59% 
AfDB 3,480.09 61.05 4.8% 64% 
Germany 3,134.00 54.98 4.3% 68% 
WFP 2,173.82 38.14 3.0% 71% 
Sweden 2,076.22 36.42 2.9% 74% 
Canada 1,934.69 33.94 2.7% 76% 
Total 55,436.12 972.56 76.4%  
Grand Total Net ODA 72,558.15  100%  
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018e) 
Meanwhile, the contribution of non-DAC countries and private aid providers in the Ethiopian 
aid system was minor (Appendix B). Non-DAC countries as aid providers to Ethiopia showed 
up from 1974 and in 1985, though their support was insignificant, at 1.2% of the total net ODA 
disbursement, and inconsistent through the period compared to the traditional donors. Private 
donors (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) also joined the donor community in Ethiopia 
in the late 2000s, but like the non-DAC donors, their contribution was insignificant, at 0.5% of 
the total net ODA disbursement.  
A close look at the role of the donors’ groups across the regimes in Ethiopia (Appendix B) 
shows that the contribution of multilateral donors increased from its low level during the 
imperial regime. During the Haile Selassie government, the DAC bilateral donors contributed 
83%, while the multilateral donors contributed only 17% of the total net ODA disbursement 
from 1960 to 1993. This was because most of the multilaterals joined the aid architecture in 
Ethiopia during the early 1970s. During the Derg government, the gap significantly narrowed 
as the bilateral donors’ share fell to 51% and the multilateral donors’ contribution increased to 
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46%, while the contribution of the DAC bilateral donors during the EPRDF government was 
52% and the multilaterals covered 47% of the total ODA disbursed during the period. The main 
reason for the increase in the ODA share of the multilateral donors was the presence of the UN 
humanitarian agencies in response to the recurrent drought and famine crises during the 1970s 
and mid-1980s. 
Graph 3: Average net ODA disbursement and share of top 10 donors by regimes (constant, 2016 USD million) 
  
  
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018b) 
Analysis of the top 10 aid providers to Ethiopia through the periods (Appendix I and Graph 5) 
also substantiated that the contribution of individual bilateral and multilateral donors varied 
across the regimes. During the Haile Selassie government, the United States had by far the 
largest share at 42% of the total net ODA disbursement during the period, followed by Italy 
(15%), Sweden (10%), and Germany (10%), which together with the United States constituted 
more than three-fourths (77%) of the net ODA disbursement during the period. The World 
Bank (9%), UNDP (4%), and the United Kingdom (3%), together with the other two small UN 
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agencies, and Japan cumulatively contributed nearly one quarter (23%) of the net ODA flow 
to Ethiopia during the period. The United Kingdom was a strategic partner to the imperial 
regime before the United States replaced its position as a principal aid provider to Ethiopia in 
the early 1950s (Adams, 1970; USAID, 2018b). For several historical reasons, Italy was also 
an important partner during the period (Lemi, 2008). In general, the top 10 aid providers 
mobilized more than USD 2.5 billion, which was almost all (95%) of the net ODA received by 
the regime from 1960 to 1973. The contribution of the remaining 12 donors (from the total of 
22 donors during the period) was rather small. 
The socialist Derg regime was characterized by Marxist military rule, which also faced drastic 
droughts and famines that occurred in 1973/74 and 1984/85. Despite the Derg government 
being a ‘pariah’ to many of the western donors because of its socialist ideology during the Cold 
War and the serious human rights violations it committed, donors mobilized huge humanitarian 
aid during the period that made ODA even bigger than the preceding regime. Excluding donors 
with contributions of less than USD 0.25 million, the number of donors during the Derg 
government increased to more than 34.  
The top 10 donors mobilized cumulatively more than three-fourths (USD 10.7 billion) of the 
total net ODA disbursed during the regime period. Italy, at 14% of the total net ODA 
disbursement during the regime period, continued to have the highest share in the aid system. 
The joining of the EU institutions in the aid architecture in Ethiopia in 1973 along with a more 
visible presence of the WFP contributed to an increased share of the top 10 multilateral donors 
during the period. In contrast, the share of the United States dropped sharply, nearly five-fold, 
from 42% to 9% of the total net ODA disbursement during the regime period. The aggregate 
contribution of the United Kingdom further decreased to the lowest ranking among the top 10 
donors during the regime period. 
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The EPRDF government has been seen as a system led by market-oriented economic 
development ideologies explained by well-defined poverty reduction and agriculture-led 
development strategies, which have been aligned with the global aid effectiveness agenda from 
the mid-2000s in particular. In aggregate, there have been more than 60 donors in the aid system 
of the country for the last 26 years from 1991 to 2016. The top 10 donors during the period 
mobilized nearly 80% of the total net ODA flow during the period. The remaining 50 donors, 
which were numerous but with a small share in the aid architecture, all together contributed 
only 20% of the total net ODA flow during the period from 1991 to 2016.  
The presence of the United States and the World Bank during the EPRDF government was 
singularly high. The United States, with the highest share at 20.5% of the total net ODA, 
regained its position as an important partner in the aid system of the EPRDF government. The 
role of the World Bank, with a 20.4% share, was also significantly higher than its contribution 
in the two preceding regimes. The United States, the World Bank, and the EU institutions (the 
third largest donor during the period) cumulatively accounted for nearly 50% of the total net 
ODA flow from 1991 to 2016. As well, the United Kingdom, with an 8% share of the total net 
ODA flow during the period, stepped up as a large donor in the aid architecture of the EPRDF 
government.  
The newcomers in the list of top 10 donors during the period, including the Africa Development 
Bank (AfDB) with a 6% share of the total net ODA flow to the government together with the 
Global Fund (3%), Canada (3%), and the Netherlands (3%), also contributed to the increase in 
the net ODA flow to Ethiopia. Unlike the two preceding regimes, Italy disappeared in the list 
of top 10 donors during the EPRDF government. According to Lemi (2008), this is because the 
support of Italy to Ethiopia was mainly associated with Eritrea, and aid data to Eritrea has been 
recorded separately since its independence in 1993. 
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Generally, based on the aggregate contribution of the top 10 donors in the last 57 years from 
1990 to 2016, the United States and the World Bank had without parallel the highest share of 
net ODA contribution followed by the EU institutions and the United Kingdom. Italy, AfDB, 
Germany, WFP, Sweden, and Canada in that order were also among the top 10 donors with 
high ODA shares in the Ethiopian aid architecture. The United States, Germany, the World 
Bank, and the United Kingdom were consistently in the list of the top 10 donors as loyal 
partners in the three regimes. In the list of the top 10 multilateral donors (Appendix K), the 
presence and the increased role of vertical donors, including the Global Fund and GAVI, have 
been a new phenomenon in the aid system of Ethiopia.  
2.4.4 Aid receipts by the composition of ODA 
The composition of grants in the total net ODA disbursement increased as the share of ODA 
loans decreased across the regimes in Ethiopia (Appendix L). During the Haile Selassie 
government, the yearly average share of grants was 73% of the total yearly average net ODA 
during the period, while 27% of it was composed of net ODA loans. The share of the yearly 
average grants during the Derg government increased to 78%, while loans accounted for 22% 
of the yearly average net ODA flow during the period. The share of the yearly average grants 
continued to increase, reaching 86% during the EPRDF government as net ODA loans 
constituted only 14% of the total yearly average net ODA during the period. In aggregate, 
during the period from 1960 to 2016, grants composed 84% of the total net ODA flow 
throughout the whole period, while the net ODA loans shared 16% of the aggregate net ODA 
disbursement. 
A look at the other types of aid across the regimes (Graph 6, Appendix M, N) shows that 
humanitarian and food aid has grown as a major component of the aid system in Ethiopia, 
particularly during the last two governments. During the Haile Selassie government, the shares 
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of humanitarian aid, debt-related actions, and development food aid were almost zero. 
However, support in the form of technical cooperation had visibly the largest share, on average, 
at 39% of the net ODA disbursement during the period. During the Derg government, donors’ 
support was mainly composed of humanitarian aid and food aid (21% of the total yearly 
average net ODA flow during the regime period). Support in the form of technical cooperation 
with the government was also high, at 21% of the total yearly average net ODA flow. 
Graph 4: Yearly average net ODA disbursements by type of aid by regime from 1960-2016 (constant, 2016 USD million) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018e) 
During the EPRDF government, humanitarian aid and programmed food aid together formed 
the highest share, at 24% of the total yearly average net ODA disbursed during the period from 
1991 to 2016. This was the next largest amount after net ODA flow to social sectors in Ethiopia 
(see also Appendix W). Aid forgiveness, unlike in the two preceding regimes, emerged to take 
the next largest share, at 11%, after humanitarian aid. Donors’ support in the form of technical 
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cooperation took the lowest share in the aid architecture of the EPRDF government, unlike in 
the two other regimes.  
The volume and magnitude of change in the humanitarian and food aid during the EPRDF 
government were much higher even than in the preceding regimes. This was because of 
intensified donors’ support in response to the series of harsh drought that frequently occurred 
during the period. According to Global Humanitarian Assistance (2011), the 2003, 2005, and 
2008 droughts affected 12.6, 2.6, and 6.4 million people, respectively, which demanded 
humanitarian aid equivalent to USD 804 million, USD 658 million, and USD 886 million, 
accordingly. The drought that occurred in 2015/16 was also one of the most serious ones in 
Ethiopian history. According to Speckhard (2016), it was acknowledged as ‘the worst drought 
in 50 years’, affecting the life of 10 to 15 million people and consuming billions of dollars. 
However, the drought was brought under control without human loss, unlike the major drought 
of 1883-85, which claimed the lives of more than a million people in Ethiopia.  
On the other hand, the programmable ODA flow to Ethiopia, which accounted for on average 
57% of the total yearly average net ODA received, continued to grow during the EPRDF 
government. In 2014, for example, CPA composed 81% of the actual net ODA disbursement 
in Ethiopia, which was higher than the African average, during the same year (OECD-DAC, 
2018e). (See also Appendix V). However, it appeared that the share of the humanitarian and 
food security aid to Ethiopia was higher than the African average, and it overshadowed the 
possible increase in the share of CPA as a percentage of the total net ODA disbursement in 
Ethiopia.  
2.4.5 External financial inflows by type of flows by the regime 
From 1968 to 2016, on aggregate, more than USD 107 billion was channeled to Ethiopia in the 
form of ODA, foreign direct investment (FDI), transfers by international non-governmental 
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organizations (INGOs), personal remittances, other official finance (OOF) and export credit, 
private aid, and securities and claims. Compared to the other financial flows, ODA has been 
the major external resource to Ethiopia. For the period from 1968 to 2016, it accounted for 67% 
of the total external financial flows to Ethiopia. The grant component of the net ODA 
disbursement on aggregate was larger (84%) than the net ODA loan (16%).  
Graph 5: Aggregate external financial inflows to Ethiopia from 1968-2016 by regime (constant, 2016 USD million) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018i, 2018b, 2018g), NBE (2014), and the 
World Bank (2018e) 
However, from the mid-1990s, the other external financial sources including FDI and personal 
remittances, which were almost insignificant until the mid-1990s, appeared to rise as the next 
most important financial resources to Ethiopia after ODA. FDI accounted for 14% of the total 
external financial flow to Ethiopia in the period, followed by transfers by INGOs (10%), 
personal remittances (8%), export credit (1.5%), and very insignificantly from private aid 
(0.4%) and securities and claims (0.2%) (Graph 7, Appendix O, P). 
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A separate look at the external financial flows across the regimes in Ethiopia shows that the 
magnitude of their share varied across the regimes. During the Emperor Haile Selassie regime, 
nearly 80% of the external financial flow was ODA, followed by export credit (12%). The other 
external financial sources were either insignificant or zero, or related data was not recorded. 
During the Derg government, the share of ODA was even higher, at 96% of the total financial 
inflow to Ethiopia, while the contributions of OOF and export credit (3.4%) and personal 
remittances (0.3%) were insignificant during the regime. During the EPRDF government, ODA 
still took the largest share at 62.3% of the total external financial inflows. However, the shares 
of the other financial sources were relatively high, unlike the two preceding regimes. FDI 
composed 16% of the total external financial inflows during the period from 1991 to 2016, 
followed by INGOs (11.5%), personal remittances (8.7%), private aid (0.4%), and securities 
and claims (0.2%). 
2.4.6 The share of ODA in the economy of the regimes 
For the last nearly 60 years from 1960 to 2016, Ethiopia received, on average, net ODA per 
capita lower than the SSA average. During this period, an ordinary Ethiopian received on 
average USD 15 per year, which was nearly two times lower than an individual in the other 
SSA countries, who received on average USD 24 per year. However, the gap in the average 
net ODA per capita receipt narrowed, mainly from the mid-1980s, across the regimes in 
Ethiopia compared to the average receipt in SSA.  
During the Haile Selassie government, Ethiopia received, on average, per capita USD 1.2, 
which was three times lower than the SSA average (USD 4.1) at the time. During the Derg 
regime, the average net ODA per capita receipt increased to nearly USD 10, which was eight 
times higher than the preceding regime but two times lower than the SSA average. During the 
EPRDF government, the average net ODA per capita receipt reached USD 25.6, which 
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increased by more than two-fold from the Derg government; but this was lower nearly by half 
than the SSA average. The low net ODA per capita flow to Ethiopia was because the population 
size of Ethiopia was higher than the SSA average. However, a look at the trend shows that the 
gap became narrower from the mid-2000s, as the volume of aid flow to Ethiopia grew higher 
than the aid flow to most of the SSA countries since then. 
Graph 6: Net ODA receipt per capita (USD), and net ODA receipt as percentage of GNI and GDP of Ethiopia from 1960-
2106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on World Development Indicator (World Bank, 2018e) 
On the other hand, analysis of the share of net ODA in the GDP and GNI of the country (Graph 
8 and Appendix Q) shows that the level of dependence of the Ethiopian economy on aid grew 
higher compared to an average SSA country. Available data from 1980 to 2016 shows that the 
average ODA receipt as a percentage of GDP for Ethiopia during the period was 12.3%, while 
the share of the SSA average receipt was 3.5%. During the same period, the share of net ODA 
as a percentage of GNI for Ethiopia was 5.8%, while the SSA average was 4.3%. However, in 
the period from 1991 to 2016, the difference increased substantially, as the percentage of net 
ODA to GNI for Ethiopia was 11%, while the SSA average remained rather constant at 4.5%. 
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2.5 Aid from non-traditional donors: China in focus 
The presence of non-traditional donors from the south in the aid landscape in Ethiopia has been 
growing and influencing the nature of development cooperation in the country (Nebebe and 
Bosch, 2015; Dreher et al., 2017; DAG, 2018a). Recent available data captured from 2007 to 
2016 by the Ethiopian aid management platform shows that donors from the south, including 
China, India, Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, have been important players in the aid 
architecture of Ethiopia. India and Turkey have been members of the DAG Ethiopia. While 
data on their actual aid disbursement was not complete, the AMP aid records show that they 
cumulatively disbursed more than USD 2.1 billion in the period from 2007-2016.  
Further sectoral analysis of their actual disbursement (Appendix R and V) gives a clue that the 
representation and sectoral engagement of those donors appeared in the areas that the 
traditional donors neglected somehow. They were more present in economic infrastructure and 
production sectors, including energy and supply at almost 30% of the total actual disbursement 
by the donors in the period, followed by transport and storage (27%) and agriculture (17%). In 
total, the sub-sectors received almost three-fourths of the overall actual aid disbursed by donors 
in the given period. One-quarter of the aid disbursement went to railway (10%), industry 
development (7%), and water supply and sanitation (7%), with a small share of aid going to 
education and other multi-sectors.  
However, the contribution of China among the donors in the club was exceptionally high during 
the period. According to the AMP data, China, for example, accounted for nearly three-fifths 
(59%) of the total aid disbursed by the non-traditional donors during the period, while India 
disbursed only one-fourth of it, followed by Turkey (10%). This incomplete evidence invites 
more detailed analysis on the role of Chania in the aid landscape in Ethiopia. 
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A closer analysis of the most recent version of the AidData dataset, which recorded aid flows 
from China to Ethiopia in the period from 2000 to 2014, reinforced that China emerged as an 
important player in the aid system in the country during the period. Aid from China flowing to 
Ethiopia from 2000 to 2014 totaled USD 16.7 billion (2014 constant prices), which was 
equivalent to a flow of, on average, USD 1.1 billion per year. However, the trend in the aid 
flow from China to Ethiopia shows that it was highly volatile (Graph 9). It started low and 
smooth for the first 5 years from 2000 to 2005, at a yearly average rate of USD 104 million, 
until it jumped to USD 1.3 billion in 2006 and dropped to USD 14 million in 2008. Again, it 
rose to a yearly average of USD 2.4 billion from 2009 to 2014 but with a pattern of huge ups-
and-downs every year throughout the period. 
Graph 7: Total financial/aid flow to Ethiopia from 2000 to 2014 (constant, 2014 USD million) 
 
 
Source: Based on data from AidData (Dreher et al., 2017) 
From the total Chinese aid, the largest share (79%) was intended for developmental support, 
and only 3% of the total disbursement was commercial, while the remaining 18% was delivered 
with mixed intentions (Appendix S). However, the nature or type of aid from China was not 
clear or consistent with the definitions of ODA by the OECD-DAC (Appendix T). For example, 
only one quarter (26%) of the total financial flow to Ethiopia during the period was recognized 
as ODA-like aid, while 61% of the financial flow was too vague to label as ODA or OOF as 
defined by OECD-DAC. OOF and debt forgiveness was composed of 11% and 2% of Chinese 
aid to Ethiopia during the period, respectively. 
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Table 2: Aggregate aid from China to Ethiopia by type of financial flow from 2000-2014 (constant, 2014 USD millions) 
Aid Type/Year USD million Share Cumulative Share 
Loan (Vague Official Finance) 8574.80 51% 51% 
Loan (ODA-like) 3981.99 24% 75% 
Loan-OOF like 1919.95 11% 87% 
Export Credits (Vague Official Finance) 1579.66 9% 96% 
Debt Forgiveness 308.75 2% 98% 
Grant (ODA-like) 262.44 2% 100% 
Technical Assistance (ODA-like) 50.66 0% 100% 
Other Vague Official Finance 23.38 0% 100% 
Scholarships (ODA-like) 1.91 0% 100% 
Total 16,703.55 100% 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data by AidData (Dreher et al., 2017) 
Comparative analysis of Chinese aid with the net ODA provided by the traditional donors 
shows that ODA-like inflow from China to Ethiopia in the period from 2000 to 2014 accounted 
for 11% of the total net ODA disbursed in Ethiopia by all donors (as recorded by CRS) during 
the same period and equaled 21% of the aid from DAC countries, one-quarter (25%) of that 
from multilateral donors, and half (49%) of that from the United States (Appendix U). Also, 
unlike the structure of ODA by the traditional donors, the loan component of Chinese aid to 
Ethiopia, which excludes debt rescheduling, aggregately composed the highest share, at 87% 
of the total financial inflow during the period. 
Graph 8: Aggregate total aid and share from China to Ethiopia by sector from 2000-2014 (constant, 2014 USD million) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from AidData (Dreher et al., 2017)  
Sectoral analysis of China’s aid to Ethiopia (Graph 10), based on AidData, shows that the 
largest share of China’s aid, at 43% of the total financial flow during the period, was directed 
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to transport development, followed by energy generation and supply (30%). The two sectors 
consumed almost three-fourths of the total support for China in the period from 2000 to 2014. 
Social sectors including education and health, together with the industry and mining sub-
sectors, received close to none in the given period. China’s humanitarian support to Ethiopia 
was also among the lowest. On the contrary, it is noted that the social sectors and humanitarian 
aid by the traditional donors to Ethiopia constituted, on average, more than half (53%) of the 
net ODA disbursed during the period (Appendix E and V). 
2.6 Conclusions 
During the Haile Selassie government, aid flows were low but started to rise due to 
humanitarian aid. The same is true for the Derg government; at the time, donors were 
responsive mainly to the serious droughts and famines that occurred in the early 1970s and 
mid-1980s in Ethiopia. However, although the donor community had major problems with the 
Ethiopian government due to the war with Eritrea in the late 1990s, economic policies in the 
1990s that were based on ‘revolutionary democracy’ principles of a ‘developmental state’, and 
the 2005 and 2010 election disputes along with of human rights violations, it increased its aid 
substantially after 2000. This is better explained by the political economy context in Ethiopia. 
This was mainly due to the successes of the Ethiopian government in growth and poverty 
reduction, which converges with the national security objectives of most of the donors, and 
Ethiopia’s strategic position in the ‘war on terror’. This resulted in Ethiopia becoming a ‘donor 
darling’ and one of the top aid-recipient countries globally, unlike in the 1970s and the 1980s 
when the Derg government during the period was a ‘pariah’ to the western donors. In general, 
donors’ relations with the Ethiopian governments and aid flow to Ethiopia have never been 
smooth. From the 1960s they fluctuated corresponding to the droughts and famines occurring 
at different times in all three regimes, the Ethio-Eritrea war in the late 1990s, and the global 
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changes, including the ending of the Cold War in the 1990s and the increased commitment of 
the donor community to intensify the volume of aid and its effectiveness from the mid-2000s.  
Donors’ support to Ethiopia from the early 1990s experienced an accelerated increase in the 
volume of aid but also changes in the composition and diversity of the sources, including the 
aid providers and types of aid, which gradually affected the nature of the aid architecture in 
Ethiopia. First, programmable or developmental aid has been increasingly high since the early 
2000s, although humanitarian and emergency food aid, as well as debt relief, have also grown 
during the same period. For the last 5 years from 2014, the composition of country 
programmable aid has substantially increased to more than 80% of the net ODA flow. This 
would not happen without a strong commitment by the donors to support the development and 
poverty reduction programs and respect the priorities of the government under the principles 
of the Paris aid effectiveness agenda in a context of reasonable mutual trust between the donors 
and the government. Because of increased donor support to Ethiopia, the share of aid as a 
percentage of GDP and GNI has increased in the recent period, even though this in turn would 
increase the level of dependence of the economy on foreign aid.  
Second, while ODA has been a dominant source of external financing for Ethiopia, the shares 
of FDI and resources from other development actors, including INGOs, citizens living abroad 
(in the form of personal remittances), and private aid providers, have been growing as major 
sources in the external financial resources map of Ethiopia from the early 2000s. Even the 
structure of ODA in Ethiopia is changing. Since the mid-2000s, even though grants have 
dominated the net ODA flow to Ethiopia, the composition of loans has been increasingly 
growing in the aid system in Ethiopia. 
Third, aid architecture in Ethiopia has for a long time been exclusively dominated by a 
relatively equal aggregate contribution by traditional bilateral and multilateral donors. The 
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proliferated presence of the bilateral donors mainly derives from the strategic position of 
Ethiopia in relation to the political and strategic interest of the donors. Above all, large-sized 
donors, including the United States, the World Bank, the European Institutions, the United 
Kingdom, and the African Development Bank, have shown a strong presence in the aid system 
and accounted for a large proportion of support to the country. However, the support of these 
traditional donors was skewed to the pro-poor sectors, particularly to the social sectors, as well 
as to humanitarian and food aid and aid forgiveness. 
However, since the 2000s, the scope and nature of the aid landscape in Ethiopia has been 
changing because of the growing presence and increasing contribution of non-traditional 
donors from the south, including China, India, Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates. The growing role of vertical sources of aid, including the Global Fund and 
GAVI as top aid providers, and the joining of private aid providers in the aid system have also 
influenced the aid architecture and the relationships between the government and its donor 
partners. 
Particularly, despite its volatile nature, a visibly significant source of support to Ethiopia came 
from China. While the non-ODA component of Chinese aid was large, its ODA-like aid from 
2000-2014 was significant in such a way that it was half of the support of the United States and 
equal to the contribution of the World Bank, even greater than the support of some of the 
traditional principal aid providers to Ethiopia in the same period. Aid from China exhibited 
fundamental discrepancies as compared to aid from the traditional donors. The major structure 
of China’s aid to Ethiopia was composed of loans (about 90% of the total aid), which were 
principally developmental in purpose. Like any of the other non-traditional donors, Chinese 
aid to Ethiopia was mainly channeled to economic and production sectors. Transportation 
infrastructure development, as well as energy generation and supply, accounted for about three-
fourths of the support from China to Ethiopia during the period. On the other hand, the support 
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of China and the other non-traditional donors to the social and humanitarian sectors in Ethiopia 
was insignificant. The challenge is that China and the other principal donors from the south did 
not participate in the aid coordination platforms in Ethiopia. In general, changes observed in 
the aid architecture in Ethiopia would support suggestions in the literature that the nature and 
relevance of ODA in developing countries are shifting. This would generally give the Ethiopian 
government as a developmental state more room for maneuver and increased negotiation power 
in its relations with donors, both the traditional ones and the southern emerging donors. 
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Abstract 
The Paris Declaration of 2005 urged donors to align more with local government plans and 
coordinate more and better among themselves and with the local government. In many aid-
recipient countries, structures were developed to make this coordination possible. Also, in 
Ethiopia, under the leadership of the government of Ethiopia and the Development Assistance 
Group (DAG), a big tree of working groups and platforms were created. Furthermore, the UN 
One System and the European Union and its member states also have, due to the division of 
labor, their own parallel structures for programming. This article presents an overview of the 
coordination structures and assesses donor coordination in Ethiopia. It argues that strong 
country ownership and special joint arrangements make donor coordination successful in 
Ethiopia, although donors indicate that the policy dialogue is still rather superficial. The article 
is based on a series of interviews with donor representatives and government officials in 
February to March 2016 and March to April 2017. 
 
Keywords: donor coordination; Paris Declaration; country ownership; aid fragmentation, 
Ethiopia 
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3.1 Introduction 
Donor coordination has been a central theme in the debate on aid effectiveness. The 2005 Paris 
Declaration (PD) agenda set a milestone in this debate by asserting that productive donor 
coordination would result in aid effectiveness and reduce aid fragmentation and donor 
proliferation, which would consequently decrease the transaction costs of development 
coordination and the administrative burden for aid-recipient partners (OECD, 2008c; Bigsten 
and Tengstam, 2015). However, there has been modest improvement in the application of 
‘good practices’ in donor coordination, and consequently, aid fragmentation and donor 
proliferation have continued as a major problem of development cooperation in many poor 
countries in Africa (Aldasoro et al., 2010; Bürcky, 2011; Lawson, 2011; Schulpen et al., 2011; 
Wood et al., 2011; Gore, 2013; Nunnenkamp et al., 2016). This problem is intensified by the 
growing presence of non-traditional Southern donors and non-state actors in the aid market 
(Lawson, 2011; Schulpen et al., 2011; Gore, 2013).  
Moreover, in-country analysis of donors’ division of labor, mainly at the sector level, could 
further signal poorer donor coordination and greater aid fragmentation, particularly in sectors 
where many donors are present. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on in-country division of 
labor and coordination of donors and sector-level aid fragmentation, for which there are limited 
related empirical studies. The purpose of this study is, therefore, to provide empirical evidence 
to the broader debate on aid effectiveness analyzing the donor coordination landscape and 
practices in Ethiopia.  
Ethiopia is an interesting case because it has become one of the top aid-recipient countries 
globally and a ‘donor darling’ for many bilateral and multilateral donors as well as thousands 
of non-state actors with aid projects and programs. It owes this to its geopolitical position in 
the Horn of Africa and its commitment to fight poverty in the last three decades (Prizzon and 
Rogerson, 2013; Cheru, 2016). In 2016, 28 bilateral and 18 multilateral donors (OECD-DAC, 
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2017c) contributed a total net ODA of 4.07 billion USD to Ethiopia (OECD-DAC, 2017d). 
This has a significant implication for concerns related to donor proliferation and aid 
fragmentation, as well as practices in the joint coordination platforms in Ethiopia. The 
development cooperation landscape in Ethiopia is also getting more complex due to the 
presence and increasing influence of Southern and non-traditional donors (like Korea, China, 
India, and Brazil) in the country (Nebebe and Bosch, 2015; DAG, 2018a). This study tries to 
analyze the dynamics of donor coordination processes in Ethiopia and tries to assess how donor 
countries and multilateral institutions live up to the principles of the Paris Declaration and its 
follow up documents of Accra and Busan. 
3.2 Donor coordination: Concepts, approaches, and problems 
According to Balogun (Balogun, 2005) and Bigsten (2006), donor coordination is mainly 
explained by the harmonization and alignment principles of the PD. Alignment implies 
provision of consistent financial and technical support to the national development plans and 
priorities, using and strengthening the systems of aid-recipient partners (Balogun, 2005; 
OECD, 2008c). For Ashoff (2004), ‘policy coordination’ comes close to ‘alignment’ when both 
the donors and recipients agree on the rules of the game in their cooperation through a robust 
policy dialogue. Donor coordination also benefits from strong harmonization that involves (1) 
country-led joint assessment and coordination systems, (2) simplified and transparent 
procedures that can reduce the administrative burden of a recipient partner, (3) effective 
division of labor with increased concentration of efforts and little fragmentation of aid, (4) joint 
programming, and when necessary, (5) cooperating by delegating aid or sector dialogue to 
lead-donors (Ashoff, 2004; Balogun, 2005; OECD, 2008c; Delputte and Orbie, 2014). It has 
been noted already for a long time that donor coordination and development cooperation, in 
general, would not be successful in the absence of country-led and government-owned joint 
coordination measures (Ashoff, 2004; Balogun, 2005; OECD, 2008c). Country ownership is 
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by default the necessary and primary condition for effective alignment and harmonization 
(OECD, 2008c, 2011c; Gehring et al., 2017; Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017). Therefore, 
donor coordination is a broader process that involves all organizing activities that strengthen 
country ownership, alignment, harmonization, and inclusive partnership, as well as mutual 
accountability in the relationship between donors and recipients. 
At the heart of contemporary donor coordination ideals, we find issues like the division of 
labor, program-based approaches (PBAs), strong country ownership, and genuine and inclusive 
partnership. Effective division of labor reduces aid fragmentation and donor proliferation, 
which are seen as major problems of donor coordination (OECD, 2008c; Lawson, 2011; Annen 
and Knack, 2018). Program-based approaches, according to the definition of OECD-DAC, 
generally denote practicing ‘one plan, one budget, one report’ under strong country ownership 
(OECD, 2008c). The common PBAs include (1) Sector-wide Approaches (SWAps), (2) budget 
support (either general or sector budget support), and (3) joint financing mechanisms like 
pooled funds (Martinez-Alvarez and Acharya, 2012; Delputte and Orbie, 2014; Riddell and 
Niño-Zarazúa, 2016). General Budget Support (GBS) is an approach whereby donors put block 
grants or loans directly into a national central treasury, and the government of the recipient 
discretionarily allocates this money to its development priorities or to specific programs 
(Driscoll et al., 2005). Sector budget support channels aid to a specific sector or program. 
SWAp is simply an application of PBAs at the sector level. 
PBAs reduce aid fragmentation and transaction costs as well as reducing the administrative 
burden of aid recipients, in particular when the number and diversity of donors in the aid market 
increase (Ashoff, 2004; Lawson, 2011; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015; 
Fløgstad and Hagen, 2017). It is commonly argued that practicing common arrangements like 
the PBAs reinforces strong government-led coordination, as it would result in effective 
financing of government development plans and priorities, and it would increase the use of 
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government systems, which in turn would sustainably improve the internal capacity of the 
recipient partner; it would also improve the predictability of aid flows, harmonization of 
procedures, increased joint evaluation, and mutual accountability (OECD, 2008c, 2011a, 
2011c). This implies that PBAs are central to successfully achieve the policy assumptions of 
the Paris and Busan aid and development effectiveness agenda. 
More than a decade has passed since the global initiatives for donor coordination were formally 
settled by the PD in 2005 and then further reinforced in the third and fourth High-level Forums 
(HLFs) on aid effectiveness in Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). Yet, donor coordination, as the 
evaluation of the Paris Declaration found, has made little progress, as donors are reluctant to 
use country systems, result frameworks, and mutual accountability structures of recipients 
(OECD, 2011c; Wood et al., 2011). Rather, donor coordination declined and aid fragmentation 
increased even after the 2005 PD initiatives (SSA) countries (Lawson, 2011; OECD, 2011d, 
2011a; Wood et al., 2011; Martínez-Álvarez and Acharya, 2012; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015; 
Nunnenkamp et al., 2016; Habraken et al., 2017), particularly in the SSA countries (Fløgstad 
and Hagen, 2017). This is what we want to test in this paper, in which we do not look at 
coordination in the way it is done in cross-country studies (e.g., Aldasoro et al., 2010; 
Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Fuchs et al., 2015), but much more at how coordination is 
implemented on the ground in line with other country studies (e.g., Hayman, 2009; McCormick 
and Schmitz, 2011; Delputte and Orbie, 2014; Leiderer, 2015; Habraken et al., 2017). 
Some studies showed that the large-sized and leading bilateral donors, particularly the United 
States, Japan, Germany, Norway, and France, among others, largely contributed to increased 
aid fragmentation in low-income countries (Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Fløgstad and Hagen, 
2017). This was mainly attributed to their divergent ‘political goals’ and behavior inconsistent 
with the ‘good practices’ of harmonization in the field of donor coordination (Lawson, 2011; 
Nunnenkamp et al., 2013). Likewise, good governance problems, including corruption and 
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weak coordination capacity of aid-recipient partners, were also among the obstacles to effective 
donor coordination (Habraken et al., 2017). The literature suggests that ‘harmonization and 
coordination fatigue’ developed among traditional donors (Wood et al., 2011; Martínez-
Álvarez and Acharya, 2012; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015). Lastly, donors have been 
introducing, under a conservative swing, their own ‘value for money’ agendas, which imply 
stronger control from headquarters (Yanguas, 2017). 
3.3 Methods and materials 
This is a qualitative study based on thematically organized interviews conducted with 42 
respondents drawn from donors residing in Ethiopia, the secretariat of DAG in Ethiopia, and 
high government officials from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MoFEC), 
the Ministry of Health (MoH), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources 
(MoANR), along with an analysis of other relevant government documents and data. We used 
a systematically designed interview guide organized into semi-structured questions, which 
were constructed based on the existing body of knowledge related to donor coordination and 
aid effectiveness. These interviews were administered in two rounds: the first round in 
February and March of 2016 and the second one in March and April of 2017. In the interviews, 
both specialists and heads of development cooperation from large, medium, and small-sized 
multilateral and bilateral donors took part. About half of the participants were interviewed in 
both the first- and second-round interview sessions to check the data on consistency and to 
track new developments. Almost all the interviews were voice-recorded and transcribed 
verbatim. 
We also use and triangulate data from different database sources. The historical data on the 
actual disbursement of Country Programmable Aid (CPA) for Ethiopia was extracted from 
OECD historical CPA records and the Credit Reporting System (CRS) of the OECD-DAC 
database. Meanwhile, data on funding to the flagship programs in Ethiopia were also taken 
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from the Aid Management Platform (AMP) of MoFEC. Results from OECD monitoring 
surveys on Paris and Busan Declarations for Ethiopia (2005-2013) were also considered. 
The interview guide was organized in thematic areas, including views of the interviewees 
towards donors’ programs and coordination practices in Ethiopia; government policies, plans 
and flagship programs; government leadership and country ownership in donor coordination; 
role of donors in the coordination structures; and quality of dialogue at the coordination 
platforms. Data from the interview was systematically coded and thematically analyzed using 
framework analysis. 
Overview of interview data 
Organization 
Organization 
Type 
Number of 
Respondents 
Respondent Background 
Date 
Interviewed 
Austria Bilateral 1 Generalist* 
2016.03.04 
2017.03.21 
Denmark Bilateral 2 
Generalist 
2016.02.25 
2017.02.24 
Generalist 2016.02.25 
EU Delegation Multilateral 3 
Generalist 
2016.02.23 
2017.02.30 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.24 
Health specialist 2017.03.28 
Finland Bilateral 1 Generalist 
2016.03.01 
2017.03.29 
France Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.03.02 
German Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.29 
Ireland Bilateral 3 
Generalist 2016.02.25 
Health specialist 2017.03.21 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.21 
Italy Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.25 
Netherlands Bilateral 4 
Generalist 
2016.02.24 
2017.04.05 
Health specialist 2016.02.24 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.20 
Health specialist 2017.03.20 
Norway Bilateral 4 
Generalist 2016.02.25 
Generalist 
2016.02.25 
2017.03.22 
Generalist 2017.03.22 
Generalist 2017.03.22 
Sweden Bilateral 2 
Generalist 2016.02.24 
Generalist 2017.03.28 
UK (DFID) Bilateral 3 
Generalist 2016.03.01 
Generalist 2017.03.23 
Health specialist 2017.03.23 
World Bank Multilateral 3 
Generalist + Agri. specialist 
2016.03.02 
2017.03.27 
Health specialist 2017.02.27 
Health specialist 2017.02.27 
MoH Government 2 
Health, Senior Expert 2016.02.23 
Director, Policy and Planning 2016.02.19 
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Japan (JICA) Bilateral 2 
Generalist 2017.03.23 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.23 
MoANR Government 2 
Director, PPD 2017.05.04 
Secretariat, RED&FS 2017.03.29 
Spain Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.28 
UNDP Multilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.30 
USA (USAID) Bilateral 4 
Generalist 2017.03.31 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.31 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.31 
Agri. specialist 2017.03.31 
MoFEC Government 1 Int. Devpt. Cooperation 2017.05.05 
Canada Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.22 
UNICEF Multilateral 2 
Health specialist 2017.04.04 
Health specialist 2017.04.04 
 
*Generalist means that the respondent is either a Head of Agency or Program Officer 
 
3.4 Donors’ division of labor and aid fragmentation in Ethiopia 
The level of donor proliferation and aid fragmentation in a country could show the degree of 
its donors’ coordination problems. From among the methods to analyze the scope of aid 
fragmentation, we used the OECD approach in our analysis. The measurements signify how a 
donor can meaningfully contribute via concentrating its support in as few sectors and programs 
as possible (OECD, 2009b). This analysis compares in-country donor concentration and aid 
fragmentation trends in Ethiopia before and after the Paris Declaration, analyzing the latest 
data available on actual CAP disbursed by donors.  
Derived from the broader definition in the 2009 and 2011 OECD reports on division of labor 
(OECD, 2009a, 2011d), in-country donors’ support is ‘significant’ in either of the following 
conditions: a) if the donor ‘concentrates’ in a few sectors or programs, which means that CPA 
share of the donor in the country is above its CPA share globally, or b) if the donor is 
‘important’ in the country, which means the donor’s CPA contribution in the country 
constitutes at least 90% of cumulative CPA from all donors. The in-country fragmentation ratio 
is therefore analyzed based on ‘insignificant’ relations, which means that the donor is neither 
important (i.e., among small-sized donors with less than 10% of cumulative CPA), nor is its 
support concentrated in the country.  
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Accordingly, as shown in Table 1, the level of aid fragmentation for Ethiopia increased from 
time to time, staying constantly above the global average. It increased as the number of CPA 
providers and their support surged over time. For instance, in the decade from 2004 to 2014, 
the total number of donors in Ethiopia nearly doubled, and their CPA contribution rose more 
than twice as the global share of CPA flow to Ethiopia increased nearly by one-quarter. 
Consequently, the fragmentation ratio in Ethiopia increased by 15% in the period.  
Table 1: Trends of in-country aid fragmentation in Ethiopia from 2004 to 2016 
Year 
Total CPA to 
Ethiopia (constant, 
2013 USD million) 
Total No. of 
CPA donors 
Non-significant 
Relations 
Fragmentation 
Ratio, Ethiopia 
Fragmentation 
Ratio, Global 
Average 
2004     1,375.4  23 8 35%  
2007   2,119.1  38 15 39% 38% 
2008   2,091.6  38 16 41% 38% 
2009     3,039.2  36 16 44% 40% 
2010   2,572.0  41 18 44% 39% 
2011   2,578.7  39 19 49% 40% 
2012   2,504.6  39 17 44% 40% 
2013   3,151.5  40 20 50% 39% 
2014     2,959.6  45 18 40% 39% 
2016     3,199.6  45 22 49%  
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from OECD historical CPA records (OECD-DAC, 2014) and from 
CRS records (OECD-DAC, 2018d) 
Note: As suggested by OECD, we consider only donors above USD 0.25 million. CPA contributions for 2016 are 
calculated based on donors’ Forward Spending Plan data from CRS (OECD, 2018). 
 
A close look at the contribution of donors to the fragmentation level in Ethiopia (Table 2) 
shows that much of the aid fragmentation was from small-sized bilateral donors of both DAC 
and non-DAC countries. In 2004 and 2014, the bilateral donors constituted, on average, nearly 
two-thirds (65%) of the total average number of donors. But they accounted for 42% of an 
average CPA contribution. In contrast, the multilateral donors, which covered 57% of the 
average CPA, made a relatively low contribution to the aid fragmentation even though their 
number increased more than two-fold in a decade. In 2004, for example, none of the multilateral 
donors were fragmenters in the aid architecture. 
For further analysis on aid fragmentation at the sector level in Ethiopia, we use OECD’s narrow 
definition as reported by Bürcky (2011), which measures ‘insignificant’ relations of donors in 
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a sector by analyzing the total number of donors whose cumulative CPA contribution is below 
10% as a percentage of the total number of donors in the sector. The logic is that as the number 
of small-sized donors in a sector increases, transaction cost of the aid-recipient partner would 
increase, even if they concentrate their support in the sector (OECD, 2009a; Bürcky, 2011; 
OECD, 2011d). Accordingly, the analysis (Table 3) shows that the average fragmentation of 
aid at the sector level was even high at 60%. As the average number of CPA donors increased 
43% from 15 donors per sector in 2004 to 21 in 2014, the average total number of insignificant 
relations increased by 54%. However, the sector level average fragmentation ratio for the 
period was stable at 60%. 
Table 2: Summary of in-country aid fragmentation by donor group in 2004 and 2014 
Donor Group 
Donor's Group 
CPA Share (% of 
total CPA to 
Ethiopia) 
Total No. of 
CPA Donors 
Insignificant 
Relations 
Fragmentation 
Ratio 
2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 
DAC Countries 37.7% 45.6% 16 23 8 8 35% 18% 
Multilateral Donors 62.2% 52.8% 7 17 0 6 0% 13% 
Non-DAC Countries   0.4%   4   4   9% 
Private Donors   1.6%   1   0   0% 
Total 100% 100% 23 45 8 18 35% 40% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from OECD historical CPA records (OECD-DAC, 2014) 
As suggested by the 2009 OECD report, if there are 15 or more CPA donors with ‘insignificant’ 
relations in a sector, the fragmentation level would be critical and the transaction cost of 
coordination would be high (OECD, 2009a). In that sense, in 2014 the level of aid 
fragmentation was critical, as in almost all the sectors there were 15 and more donors whose 
cumulative CPA contribution combined was below 10%. Sectors including ‘education’, 
‘population policies and reproductive health’, health, and ‘other social infrastructure’ were 
among the donor ‘darling’ sectors that experienced a substantial increase in aid fragmentation. 
The education sector, for example, had 29 CPA donors, though 23 of them were fragmenters. 
Meanwhile, sectors including the ‘economic infrastructure’ and ‘government and civil society’ 
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sectors, which together accounted for 36.1% of the total CPA to Ethiopia, as well as the ‘other 
production sector’, ‘environment’ (with only 0.3% CPA share), and ‘general budget support’ 
sectors, showed from slight to significantly high reduction in aid fragmentation. 
Table 3: Sector-level aid fragmentation in Ethiopia (2014) 
Sector 
Sector's Share 
of Total CPA 
Total No. of 
CPA Donors 
in a Sector 
No. of Donors 
Below 10% 
Cumulative 
CPA 
Fragmentation 
Ratio 
Difference 
2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 
 
Water Supply and Sanitation 2.5% 7.05% 17 21 6 15 35% 71% 36% 
Population, Reproductive Health 6.9% 12.7% 15 22 7 18 47% 82% 35% 
Education 9.0% 13.3% 20 29 11 23 55% 79% 24% 
Health 8.9% 15.8% 16 25 9 15 56% 60% 6% 
Other Social Infrastructure 4.8% 9.63% 17 17 14 15 82% 88% 6% 
Multi-sector 4.7% 4.52% 16 26 9 15 56% 58% 1% 
Agriculture 7.0% 11.2% 15 25 9 15 60% 60% 0% 
Economic Infrastructure 18.0% 15.3% 14 24 10 17 71% 71% -1% 
Other Production Sectors 4.4% 1.39% 9 18 8 13 89% 72% -17% 
Government and Civil Society 18.1% 4.64% 18 23 14 14 78% 61% -17% 
Environment 0.3% 1.74% 10 20 4 2 40% 10% -30% 
General Budget Support 15.8% 2.80% 7 1 4 0 57% 0% -57% 
Total   174 249 105 162 61% 60%  
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from OECD historical CPA records (OECD-DAC, 2014) 
Note: ‘Other production sector’, according to the definition by OECD, includes sub-sectors sectors like ‘forestry’, 
‘fishing’, ‘industry’, ‘mining’, ‘construction’, ‘trade policy’, and ‘tourism’ (OECD-DAC, 2014). All donors, 
including those with contributions less than USD 0.25 million, are considered because at the sector level that 
amount is significant. 
 
However, the contribution of individual donors to the aid fragmentation in the sectors was not 
even. The United Kingdom and Japan, for example, were involved in 12 sectors each in 2004, 
but of those, only two for each country were significant relations. Most of the small-sized 
donors, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, and the Czech Republic, had no significant 
relations in 2014. But over time, some donors increased their fragmentation level while others 
decreased. From among the first 10 ‘important’ donors that constituted 90% of the cumulative 
CPA to Ethiopia in the years 2004 and 2014, United Kingdom, France, Japan, the Netherlands, 
and Canada decreased their sector level fragmentation from significantly high to slightly low, 
in that order. The World Bank was one of the top CPA providers to 10 sectors in Ethiopia, but 
it had any insignificant relations in any of the sectors where it was involved in the period. In 
contrast, the United States, the EU institutions, African Development Bank (AfDB), UNICEF, 
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and Norway were among the lead donors in Ethiopia whose aid fragmentation level increased 
during the period. The Global Fund and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization 
(GAVI), which were not CPA contributors in 2004, had relatively low sector-level 
fragmentation in Ethiopia in 2014 (See Appendices B, C, and D).  
The presence of non-DAC donors also increased the diversity and size of the aid architecture 
in Ethiopia. In 2014, non-DAC donors disbursed 10.87% of the total CPA to Ethiopia. More 
than 95% of this non-traditional CPA assistance was covered by GAVI (35%), the Global Fund 
(32%), the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (15%), and Korea (13%) (See Appendix C). 
However, except for Korea, none of these non-traditional donors were involved in the DAG-
Ethiopia donor coordination platforms. It also appeared that China and India, which have been 
seen as major non-traditional donors in Ethiopia, were missing from the CPA system. 
3.5 Donor coordination platforms: DAG coordination 
3.5.1 Early initiatives of coordination and results of the PD monitoring surveys 
Ethiopia was one of the forerunners in institutionalizing operative donor coordination 
initiatives based on contemporary aid effectiveness principles, even earlier than the Paris 
Declaration agenda in 2005. For example, it introduced SWAp in its major government 
functions, including the health and education sectors, in the late 1990s. Ethiopia was an active 
contributor in the first High-level Forum (HLF) of the Rome Declaration on Harmonization in 
2002 (OECD, 2003) and it prepared its own draft harmonization manual in 2004 (Government 
of Ethiopia, 2004). Ethiopia was among the few which took part in the global Harmonization 
Survey in 2004. The survey result generally concluded that Ethiopia had been able to establish 
a functional model for government-donor dialogue earlier, and it represented a good case of 
joint donor coordination and policy dialogue (OECD, 2004). 
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DAG, for example, was established in 2001 as a principal platform for joint donor coordination 
in support of effective aid and development cooperation endeavors in Ethiopia (DAG, 2018a). 
According to one of the top officials we interviewed from MoFEC, DAG itself evolved from 
the pioneer push by the Ethiopian government towards the aid effectiveness agenda at the 
earlier time. The government had promoted coordination of a rural development agenda while 
international financial institutions, particularly the IMF, were pushing the ‘Expanded Structural 
Adjustment Program’ in the late 1990s. 
Table 4: Results of OECD monitoring surveys on Paris and Busan Declarations for Ethiopia (2005-2013) 
No. Indicators 2005 
(Baseline) 
2007 
(2008 Report) 
2010 
(2011 Report) 
2010 
(Target) 
2013 (Post-
Busan Survey) 
All 
Countries 
ETH All 
Countries 
ETH All 
Countrie
s 
ETH All 
Countries 
ETH All 
Countries 
ETH 
1 Operational development strategies (PRS) 19% C 24% B 52% B 75% ‘B’ or ‘A’   
2 Reliable PFM systems 31% 3.5 36% 4.0 38% 3.5 50% 4.0  3.5 
3 Aid on budget/alignment to priorities 44% 74% 48% 62% 46% 48% 85% 87% 63% 66% 
4 Aligned/coordinated capacity development 49% 27% 60% 67% 51% 86% 50% 50%   
5a Use of country PFM systems 40% 45% 45% 47% 48% 69% 55% 63% 49% 51% 
5b Use of country procurement systems  43%  41% 44% 55% No Target No Tar.   
6 Parallel PIUs 1696 103 1601 56 1158 49 565 34   
7 In-year aid predictability 42% 96% 46% 73% 43% 86% 71% 98% 84% 89% 
8 Untied aid 87% 66% 88% 76% 89% 86% >87% >66% 79% 87% 
9 Use of common arrangements/PBAs 43% 53% 47% 66% 48% 61% 66% 66%   
10a Coordinated/joint missions 20% 27% 21% 29% 22% 25% 40% 40%   
10b Coordinated country analytical works 41% 50% 44% 70% 44% 52% 66% 66%   
11 Result-oriented assessment frameworks 7% C 9% C 22% B 38% ‘B’ or ‘A’   
12 Mechanisms for mutual accountability 44% Yes 26% Yes 50% Yes 100% Yes  Yes 
 
Source: Based on Surveys on Monitoring the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2006b, 2006a, 2008b, 2008a, 2011b; 
OECD and UNDP, 2014) 
 
These early initiatives may have helped Ethiopia make some positive achievements in the Paris 
Declaration monitoring surveys. Results of the 2011 Monitoring Survey showed that Ethiopia 
achieved five targets of the total aid effectiveness indicators (i.e., 38.5% of the total aid 
effectiveness measured performances), while countries worldwide attained on average only 
one out of the 13 indicators against the 2005 targets (OECD-DAC, 2011; OECD, 2011a). Even 
for the targets it failed to attain in 2010, Ethiopia performed above the global average in almost 
all the targets (Table 4). In addition, Ethiopia continued to perform above the global average 
in the post-Busan development cooperation effectiveness evaluation in 2013 (OECD and 
UNDP, 2014).  
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Particularly, Ethiopia showed satisfactory performance in strengthening its country ownership, 
for it persisted in establishing operation development strategies and reliable systems pertinent 
to government-led cooperation (OECD, 2011b). The survey results also showed that donors 
respect the strategies, and they fully aligned their support and development cooperation 
frameworks with the development strategies (the Growth and Transformation Plans [GTPs] in 
particular) of the country. Generally, at the OECD evaluation (2006a, 2) noted about the earlier 
period that ‘Donors and Government in Ethiopia have a strong record of working together to 
increase the effectiveness of aid, including program-based aid and budget support’ (OECD, 
2006a: 2). 
However, Ethiopia failed to achieve targets related to harmonization principles (9, 10a, and 
10b in Table 4) and more than half of the targets for alignment. For some targets relevant to 
alignment and harmonization, the results in 2010 were less than what Ethiopia had 
accomplished in the base year (2005) and in 2007. The withdrawal of donors from direct budget 
support in 2005 could set back aid predictability (OECD, 2006a); and the ‘fatigue’ for 
coordination might also hamper the use of common arrangements and joint coordination 
missions and studies, as some studies suggested (Odén and Wohlgemuth, 2011; Wood et al., 
2011). 
3.5.2 DAG coordination structure 
DAG is an umbrella donors’ coordination platform in Ethiopia that organizes joint policy 
dialogue and coordination, including the HLF and GTP Annual Progress Review (APR). HLF 
has been the apex in the policy dialogue structure, in which donors jointly with the government 
(MoFEC and National Planning Commission [NPC]) discuss strategic policy issues and review 
the progress of national development planning, implementation, and evaluation based on aid 
and development effectiveness principles. The HLF meets bi-annually and discuss high-level 
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 94
 
 
84 
 
policy issues and broader donor coordination agendas, and it is attended by the Prime Minister, 
chaired by the Minister for MoFEC, and co-chaired by chairs of the DAG ExCom. The HLF is 
open to all DAG member heads of agencies and their respective implementing organs, officials, 
and experts from the MoFEC and the NPC, and ministers and experts from other government 
agencies relevant to the agenda item. 
Figure 1: Upper-level DAG-Ethiopia coordination structure (2015/16) 
 
Source: (DAG, 2016) and interviews 
 
DAG is organized into the DAG Heads of Agencies (HoA), Executive Committee (ExCom), 
Working Groups (WGs), and the Secretariat. HoA comprised all heads of development 
cooperation agencies who are DAG members (30 members in 2016). The HoA ordinarily meets 
monthly and organizes the coordination of working groups (WG) under DAG. It is co-chaired 
by two heads of agencies representing both the multilateral and bilateral donors on a yearly 
rotation basis. The ExCom is the executive organ of the HoA assembly that works on the day-
to-day management. It consists of some permanent members from the multilaterals, including 
the AfDB, UNDP, and the World Bank, and some big donors, including DFID, EU, and 
USAID, with temporary positions offered to mid- and small-sized bilaterals on a rotation basis. 
The DAG Secretariat, hosted in UNDP, facilitates DAG meetings, disseminates and follows 
up on DAG decisions, and administers the DAG pooled fund in coordination with MoFEC and 
the NPC.  
The WGs under DAG are organized into donor-only technical thematic working groups 
(TWGs) and government-donor (G-D) sector working groups (SWGs) (See Figure 1 and 
High-Level 
Forum (HLF)
Other Working 
Groups
Health, Population 
& Nutrition 
(UNICEF)
Education 
(MoE, USAID)
DAG
DAG ExCom
DAG 
Secretariat
DAG Technical Working Groups 
(4 Donor Only TWGs)
EDCTF/MoFEC Sector Working 
Groups (11 G-D SWGs)
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Appendix F). The SWGs are chaired jointly by government officials from relevant sectors and 
donors represented by HoA, while the TWGs are co-chaired by the donors only. SWGs are 
joint structures under the auspices of the Effective Development Cooperation Taskforce 
(EDCTF), while the TWGs are under the ExCom of the HoA. EDCTF is a joint coordination 
entity led by MoFEC that reinforces aid and development cooperation principles at a country 
level, like what the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) does 
globally. There is no standard frequency of ordinary meetings for the SWGs. But most of the 
SWGs are set to meet monthly and sometimes quarterly, where they deliberate on sectoral level 
donor coordination and technical as well as policy issues that could also be raised to the HLF 
discussions. Most of the SWGs are chaired by the State Ministers of the respective ministries 
and co-chaired by a representative of donor agencies. 
The SWGs are seen as the main coordination platforms at an operational level, which would 
strengthen the implementation of ‘good practices’ of government-led donor coordination in 
Ethiopia. On top of that, the SWGs facilitate information sharing and policy consultation and 
instrumentation for small-sized donors as well. According to Prizzon & Rogerson (2013), 
donors use the donor-only TWGs to discuss technical matters exclusive to their mission. 
Donors who were interviewed noted that some TWGs are not as effective as the joint SWGs in 
policy dialogue. One of the respondents said, ‘… to have all kind of discussions without the 
presence of representatives of the country that you operate… I don’t think that is a good 
approach. I am not going to spend my time on that’ (Participant BMG_4, personal 
communication, February 24, 2016). On the other hand, some donor-only TWGs are more 
active than their counter SWGs, in which the government is assumed to be ‘less interested’ to 
negotiate. For example, some donors perceived that they are more actively involved in the Civil 
Society Support Group (CSSG), which is the donor-only TWG, than the Civil Society Working 
Group (CSSWG) co-chaired by the government. 
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Through time, the DAG structure expanded, as it was seen as either inadequate or not clearly 
structured to cover the full range of sectors in the areas of the government priorities. There 
were only eight SWGs in 2011 (Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013), but their number grew to 11 in 
2016/17. It was also noted that some of the donor-only TWGs evolved into joint SWGs under 
the EDCTF (Table 5).  
Table 5: Duplicated working groups in the DAG-Ethiopia structure (2016) 
Technical Working Groups (TWG) 
Chair/Co-
chairs 
Sector Working Group 
(SWG) 
Chair/Co-
chairs 
Civil Society Sub-group Canada Civil Society Working Group ChSA, EU 
Macroeconomic Sub-group World Bank 
Macroeconomic Discussion 
Forum 
MoFED, 
World Bank 
Public Financial Management Sub-
group 
World Bank 
Public Financial Management 
(PFM) Working Group 
MoFED 
M&E Sub-group MoFED, DFID M&E Sector Working Group MoFED, DFID 
Donor Group on Gender Equality 
UN Women, 
Sweden 
Joint Gender Working Group MoWCA 
Private Sector Development & Trade USAID, EU Private Sector Development MoTI 
 
Source: (DAG, 2016) 
 
The DAG pooled fund and the Aid Management Platform (AMP) are the other forms of joint 
structures that leveraged the coordination activities in accordance with the PD aid effectiveness 
principles. The pooled fund was established in 2001 and has been jointly administered by 
MoFEC, DAG, and the secretariat (UNDP). It finances the facilitation and capacity building 
programs of both parties in the process of policy formulation and management of results within 
the framework of development effectiveness principles (DAG, 2018a). AMP also incorporated 
aid data from the non-DAC countries that have been very important donors in Ethiopia, 
including China. AMP was seen as an ideal model for government-led joint coordination that 
strengthens joint decision-making, monitoring, and evaluation of the PD and Busan agenda and 
dissemination of information and improves aid predictability (OECD, 2011b).   
3.5.3 Donors’ participation in the coordination platforms 
In 2015/16, DAG had 30 members; and according to their ODA disbursement in 2016 in 
Ethiopia, 60% of them were small-sized donors, while 23% and 17% of them were large-sized 
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(AfDB, EU, Germany, USA, UK Aid) and medium-sized donors, including, Canada, Japan, 
The Netherlands, and Norway (Appendix G). In the period, there were 21 DAC countries and 
seven multilateral donors along with a few non-DAC countries, including India and Israel.  
The level of participation of DAG members in DAG coordination architecture generally 
seemed contingent upon their level of aid investment and internal capabilities to coordinate. It 
was noted that the big players actively participated in and contributed across the DAG 
coordination structures. In 2015/16, for example, on top of their leading role in the ExCom and 
HLF platforms, the World Bank co-chaired five main working groups and sub-groups under 
DAG while USAID, EU, and DFID co-chaired at least three working groups. As commonly 
concluded by many interviewees, the World Bank has been the most important and influential 
lead donor in the whole aid and coordination architecture in Ethiopia. Their internal capacity 
and in-house coordination expertise could leverage the big donors, who are more actively 
involved and stretched in the DAG coordination than the small-sized donors, as presumed by 
many interviewees. For example, during the interview period, USAID had more than 200 staff 
members in its development cooperation agency, and DFID and EU had 66 and 45 people, 
respectively, while the remaining small- and medium-sized donors had, on average, five to six 
staff members. 
Nevertheless, most donors – particularly, the small- and medium-sized ones – also perceived 
that the big donors, mainly the United States/USAID, the Germans, Japan/JICA, and 
sometimes the United Kingdom/DFID often go their own way and influence decisions, which 
they think hampered DAG as a decision-making body. Although the USAID mostly engaged 
in parallel arrangements through international NGOs and private contractors, many of their 
peer donors who were interviewed perceived that the USAID had been active and vital in the 
DAG platforms as a good model of pragmatic coordination. From the government side, the 
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 98
 
 
88 
 
parallel approaches and respective bureaucratic structures of the United States seemed 
unwelcomed.  
Red tape is their [USAID’s] big problem…We have just left them to do whatever 
they want. Of course, even the US government cannot control them. It is just 
minimal that we benefit – it is very small proportion, [although] I know there are 
some projects that are helpful. (Participant GOF_1, personal communication, April 
05, 2017)  
The small-sized donors with limited resources found the DAG platforms useful, at least to get 
access to information continuously and get their voice heard. But small donors offering 
superior technical expertise or exceptionally innovative options in the sectors were seen to 
influence decisions in the respective working groups in which they were involved. Our 
interviewees noted that the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, and Austria were among the medium- 
and small-sized donors who actively participated in the DAG coordination structures. 
However, India and Israel, as non-DAC members, had minimal participation in the platforms. 
As South Korea and Japan increased their participation in DAG coordination after the Busan 
HLF, China, the important partner for Ethiopia, seemed less interested in joining the platform.  
3.5.4 Policy dialogue, ownership, and country-led coordination 
DAG coordination structures, in general, created an opportunity for coordination, information 
sharing, and dialogue among donors, and also with the government. But the question is how 
donors and the government perceived the quality of policy dialogue and coordination via the 
platforms. In the eyes of the donors interviewed, there were working structures for dialogue in 
the DAG fora (particularly in the HLF), and there were dialogues that were very frequent on 
many different sectors, different groups, and authorities at different positions and levels. Both 
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parties equally contributed issues for dialogue. At the HLF, DAG and MoFEC recommend two 
agenda items each, and then one topic from each of them is selected for discussion.  
However, the respondents reflected mixed reactions on the quality of policy dialogue in the 
coordination platforms. Overall, they shared that there was no mutual understanding on the 
scope of ‘policy dialogue’. For some donors, policy dialogue should go beyond the exchange 
of policy statements and should be ‘real’ to the extent of influencing one another’s policy 
position. One of the interviewees from among the large-sized donors said, ‘I can’t say that 
“there is no” dialogue. But one party says one statement and the other party replies with the 
statement under the line of the policyholder. This is a kind of dialogue that is frequent in 
Ethiopia’ (Participant MLG_1, personal communication, February 23, 2016). 
For some of the government officials, policy dialogue would not necessarily mean change in 
policy at the expense of country ownership. Some policy areas like land, telecommunications, 
banks, and commercial relationships with other important partners like China, as well as some 
other sensitive governance and political issues, seem deadlocked for dialogue from the 
government side. As one of the government officials stated: 
For some partners, what they call ‘dialogue’ is as long as they help policymaking 
or change policy. But for us, the dialogue is discussing on an equal footing with 
them, accepting what we accept and rejecting what we don’t want. They want and 
try to lobby for opening the telecom sector; we told them, ‘no, we are not selling 
it; and if you want to attach it to your aid, you can go back with your aid’. It can 
be the same with the financial sector and land reforms. (Participant GOF_1, 
personal communication, April 05, 2017) 
For some donors in the middle, policy dialogue in Ethiopia worked in some circumstances. For 
example, as mutual trust between the two parties developed, the policy dialogue became 
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productive: ‘If they trust you, then you can almost say everything you want without them feeling 
sorry for what you have said, though it is not easy to get that trust’ (Participant BMG_4, 
personal communication, February 24, 2016). The commercial presence of some donors (The 
Netherlands, for example), among other reasons, gave them the opportunity to develop mutual 
trust and then better access for policy dialogue. Again, the dialogue in the DAG platforms was 
unproductive in more sensitive issues, especially around civil society, human rights democracy, 
and governance on top of the financial policies of the country, in the eyes of our interviewees. 
But it was commonly concluded that policy dialogue in Ethiopia took a long time before it 
reached a commitment. Some believed that this could be linked to the nature of the ‘democratic 
centralism’ principle of ‘developmental states’ that the EPRDF government is practicing. Some 
also thought that dialogue, in general, is not the strongest point of the Ethiopian society because 
of an authoritarian tradition that has been cultivated in the government system.  
On the other hand, donors’ divergent interests and the reluctance of large-sized donors (the 
World Bank and African Development Bank, for example) towards policy dialogue in some 
political and other sensitive issues appeared to impede the quality of ‘real’ policy dialogue in 
Ethiopia. Some of the donors substantiated that there was no strong policy dialogue at the 
development cooperation level in response to the social unrest while the situation was 
deteriorating, and at the time about 200 people died (during the first-round interview in 2016) 
because of riots throughout the Oromia and Amhara regions. They noted that most of the policy 
dialogues were on technical and lower-level issues. In this sense, some donors said that the 
small- and some medium-sized donors were more concerned about raising sensitive issues for 
policy dialogue: ‘We are small, but what I usually say is that even though we are small in 
volume, we have refused to become small in voice’ (Participant BMG_6a, personal 
communication, February 25, 2016).  
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However, how did the GoE play its policy dialogue role in the context of country-led 
coordination? In this case, Ethiopia is known for its strong country ownership and for the 
government being in the ‘driver’s seat’ in development coordination (Borchgrevink, 2008; 
Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013). Most of our interviewees perceived that the GoE took a position 
in the ‘driver’s seat’ in country-led aid and development coordination in Ethiopia. They 
believed that the ‘home-grown’ development strategy documents, particularly the GTP, got the 
most acceptance from donors and have been the principal entry points for policy dialogue and 
acted as coordinating instruments for development cooperation in Ethiopia. The government 
firmly stands for its development strategies and national priorities, according to our 
interviewees. ‘Unlike most African countries with good experience, the GoE is assertive, and 
it holds strong country ownership and leadership, and mostly don’t bend to the interest of the 
donors only’ (Participant BMH_1b, personal communication, March 20, 2017). 
On top of that, the government chaired all the SWGs in the DAG coordination structure, which 
instigated the practices of country-led joint donor coordination and policy dialogue in Ethiopia. 
Our interviewees substantiated that the agencies of the GoE were principal players in the 
country-led joint donor coordination processes with a strong sense of country ownership. The 
leading role that MoFEC and NPC played at the high-level fora for policy dialogue and at the 
EDCTF in coordinating and reinforcing the SWGs was seen as a vital input for country-led 
donor coordination in Ethiopia. 
One of the strengths of the government lay in its directing role towards the division of labor of 
donors in government programs or sectors, although the preferences of donors also sometimes 
affected decisions. Some donors perceived that the government approached the division of 
labor more as ‘filling of boxes’ in a way to add more value. As one of our interviewees 
witnessed: ‘I was quite interested to see how the government reacted when we formally 
consulted with MoFEC that we want to add ‘health’ as one of our focal areas. The response 
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was direct: "Well, we would like you to stick in your focal areas"’ (Participant BMG_2, 
personal communication, February 29, 2016). 
The GoE was also seen as one of the delivering partners in Africa. Donors believed that they 
continued supporting the government programs because they need to see results and had hope 
for results from the government. As witnessed by one of the biggest donors in Ethiopia:  
They [the GoE] are very good in delivery as well, as they are strong in the Africa 
region. Every year, we measure disbursement ratio, which is the amount of our 
outstanding portfolio disbursed in every year, and Ethiopia is top in everything we 
measure. They have the ability to absorb our financing and are using it well. 
(Participant MLG_2, personal communication, March 27, 2017) 
It was noted at large that the GoE was strong in leadership in the development cooperation and 
committed to donor coordination on its own terms as long as it is aligned to the development 
strategies (the GTPs) and national priorities. However, there was uneven coordination capacity 
across the government agencies, the ministries, as perceived by our interviewees. MoFEC 
(NPC included) has been the main organizing body at the apex of donor-government 
coordination in Ethiopia. It chairs the HLF and the GTP APR at the top and leads, together 
with DAG, the operative coordination of the joint SWGs through EDCTF (formerly called the 
Aid Effectiveness Task Force). MoFEC was perceived as accessible to donor coordination and 
relatively well equipped. MoFEC was therefore one of the strong government agencies in the 
donor coordination process in Ethiopia. From among the implementers, the Ministry of Health 
was perceived as the strongest and best-established organization. The Ministry of Agriculture 
and Natural Resources and the Ethiopian Road Authority were also among the ministries with 
functional coordination structures and leadership capacity, in our interviewees’ view. 
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On the other hand, the Ministry of Mines, Petroleum, and Natural Gas; the Ministry of 
Environment, Forest, and Climate Change; and the Ministries of Water and Irrigation were 
perceived among the Ministries that lack the capacity to translate country ownership to direct 
country-led joint donor coordination. However, one common problem for all the agencies was 
that their coordinating capacity diminished when things reached to the regional and local level 
coordination structures. 
Government leadership in fighting corruption is one dimension of measuring country 
ownership (OECD, 2008c). In that sense, many of the donors interviewed perceived that 
corruption (mainly petty- and middle-level corruption) was very much fought by the 
government. Periodically, it has been observed that some high officers were sent to prison and 
questioned on their morality. From this point of view, the government set a high moral standard 
in the anti-corruption fight, managing to periodically check and send high officers, even party 
officers, to prison, which was seen as exceptional compared to other African countries that 
lacked any control by the government or needed more. 
3.5.5 Practices of Program-based Approaches (PBAs) 
Development cooperation in Ethiopia has progressively benefited from program-based joint 
coordination methods (Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013; DAG, 2015), which imply that the 
approaches would counterbalance the negative effect of the increasing level of aid 
fragmentation in the country. According to the monitoring survey results of the Paris 
Declaration, over half, two-thirds, and three-fifths of aid to Ethiopia in 2005, 2007, and 2010, 
respectively, were utilized through PBAs, higher than any average country evaluated during 
the period (Table 4 in section 5). The evaluation result further shows that from among the big 
donors, aid from the Global Fund (100%) and the United Kingdom (95%) flow through the 
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PBAs, while the contribution of the World Bank (42%), the UN (39%), and AfDB (29%) was 
minimal (OECD, 2011b).  
Particularly, donors were actively contributing to the multiple donor basket/pooled funding 
approaches in response to the strong preference of the GoE for PBAs (OECD, 2011b). The 
common multi-donor programs in Ethiopia that have been financed mainly through respective 
pooled trust funds included the Agricultural Growth Program (AGP), the Productive Safety 
Net Program (PSNP), and the Sustainable Land Management Program (SLMP) in the 
agriculture sector; the General Education Quality Improvement Program (GEQIP) in the 
education sector; and other cross-sector programs like the Protection (now ‘Promotion’) of 
Basic Services (PBS); the Democratic Institutions Program (DIP); and the Public Sector 
Capacity Building Program (PSCAP). These programs, particularly the PBS, were advanced 
as a response to the walkout of donors from general budget support (GBS) following the 
deteriorating situation in democratic political practices by the Ethiopian government 
particularly during the 2005 election (Furtado and Smith, 2007; Nebebe and Bosch, 2015; 
DAG, 2016; Mascagni, 2016a). In 2005, the GBS in the form of CPA dropped sharply by two-
thirds compared to the previous year (OECD-DAC, 2018f).  
Table 6: Actual disbursement in million USD by donors using the multi-donor programs in Ethiopia (2007/08-2015/16) 
Donor 
Program 
Total 
Donor's 
Share 
Cumulative 
Share DIP PBS SLMP PSNP AGP PSCAP GEQUIP 
IDA/World Bank   1955.0 70.0 1435.0 189.0 84.8 212.0  3,945.8  48.1% 48.1% 
UK/DFID  8.2 957.0   563.0   150.3 283.0  1,961.5  23.9% 72.1% 
AfDB   586.0     54.0     640.0 7.8% 79.9% 
EU Institutions  4.1 291.0   278.0   11.6   584.7 7.1% 87.0% 
Canada/CIDA  8.3     262.0 22.0 2.5   294.8 3.6% 90.6% 
Irish AID  0.5 55.0   116.0       171.5 2.1% 92.7% 
Netherlands   1.0   78.0 90.0     169.0 2.1% 96.6% 
Germany    67.0 85.0         152.0 1.9% 94.6% 
UNDP  53.3       25.0 0.2   78.5 1.0% 97.6% 
Italy    12.0     7.0 4.3 28.0 51.3 0.6% 98.2% 
Finland             43.0 43.0 0.5% 98.7% 
Austria  0.6 21.0 16.0         37.6 0.5% 99.2% 
Sweden/SIDA        35.0       35.0 0.4% 99.6% 
Norway      27.0         27.0 0.3% 99.9% 
Spain 4.3             4.3 0.1% 100% 
Total 79.3 3,945.0  198.0 2,767.0  387.0 253.7 566.0  8,196.0  100% 
 
Program Share 1.0% 48.1% 2.4% 33.8% 4.7% 3.1% 6.9%     
 
 
Source: Based on MoFEC Aid Management Platform (AMP) 
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As shown in Table 6, from 2007-2015, the flagship programs mobilized above one-third 
(37.5%) of the total CPA (USD 21,859 million, 2015 constant price) to Ethiopia during the 
period. However, the funding was skewed to PBS and PSNP, which engrossed nearly half 
(48.1%) and one-thirds (33.8%) of the total disbursements in the programs during the period, 
respectively. PBS is the largest multi-donor pooled fund even in the world (Khan et al., 2014; 
Mascagni, 2016a), and it finances the major pro-poor programs of the GoE in the areas of 
education, health, agriculture, water supply and sanitation, and rural roads. The health and 
education programs were the biggest in the PBS program (Khan et al., 2014). The support from 
the PBS was channeled mainly to finance salary expenditures of woredas (district-level 
administration in Ethiopia) for teachers, health sector workers, and agriculture development 
agents.  
The approach gives opportunities to both the large and small donors to be involved in the 
flagship programs, although the participation level of donors was limited and dominated by a 
few large-sized donors. In the given period, over 90% of the total disbursement was funded by 
five lead donors, including the World Bank, United Kingdom/DFID, African Development 
Bank (AfDB), the EU institutions, and Canada/CIDA, with almost half of the contribution 
made by the World Bank. These lead donors were most concentrated in the PBS and PSNP 
programs while the small ones were dispersed over the other flagship programs. Absenteeism 
of some other large-sized donors like the United States and low levels of contribution from 
Germany, Norway, and Sweden would imply missing advantages from the joint coordination 
of the programs. 
If not, these coordination arrangements as a function of PBAs promoted the ‘good practices’ 
of the aid and development effectiveness principles of the Paris Agenda in Ethiopia, basically 
by solidifying internal capacity and country ownership of the GoE, as perceived by most of our 
interviewees. Apart from these flagship programs, donors interviewed perceived that Ethiopia 
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exercised good practices of donor coordination from other more self-directed, multiple-donor, 
pooled fund programs like the Sustainable Development Goals Performance Fund (SDG PF) 
in the health sector. SDG PF, which was formerly called MDGs PF, was one of the SWAp 
models in place in Ethiopia. Distinctively, unlike the other multi-donor trust funds administered 
under the World Bank, the Ministry of Health managed the joint financing arrangement which 
further leveraged the effective donor and development coordination in the sector. 
Our interviewees from both the donors and the government agencies suggested that some 
humanitarian organizations, including most of the UN agencies working in Ethiopia, including 
the WFP and UNHRD [United Nations Humanitarian Response Depots], which the 
respondents think have been sensibly moved to the social protection agenda, could sustainably 
optimize the benefits from investing in related flagship programs with a similar mission to the 
PSNP. Instead, it appeared that there was competition between a group of donors who wanted 
to promote a developmental approach and those who preferred a humanitarian one. This 
resulted in two parallel systems working in the same community, which was inefficient, created 
confusion, and was unfair, in the eye of our interviewees. For that matter, there was no 
coordination structure in DAG for humanitarian support for the developmental approach. The 
respondents believed that coordinating humanitarian support through a single system would 
leverage the aid and development effectiveness endeavors in the country. One of the practical 
options seemed to be coordinating using the PSNP. That’s because the PSNP was the 
government development program with a safety net component in it and was being coordinated 
based on the Paris and Busan principles while also responding to the food and security issues 
of the country. During drought or humanitarian situations, the PSNP could be scaled up and 
would increase efficiency in terms of safety net approaches with this humanitarian fund. 
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 107
 
 
97 
 
3.6 Other coordination structures: Joint programming and One UN fund systems 
The EU and United Nations have been serving as umbrella organizations and coordination 
facilitators for their member states and individual multilateral organizations under their 
jurisdiction outside the DAG coordination platforms. But how did the EU+ joint programming 
and United Nations ‘One Fund Systems’ co-exist with the DAG coordination structures and 
support in-country coordination of development cooperation in Ethiopia? 
3.6.1 The EU+ joint programming 
The EU+ joint programming in Ethiopia represented 21 member states on top of the EU, 
Norway, and Switzerland. The EU+ endorsed a Joint Cooperation Strategy in 2013 to reinforce 
the role of members in the aid and development effectiveness agenda of DAG coordination in 
Ethiopia. The strategy was designed in line with the first Growth and Transformation Plan 
(GTP-I from 2011 to 2015) of the country and was expected to facilitate the effective in-country 
division of labor among its members for effective donor coordination and reduced aid 
fragmentation (EU, 2013). But what would be the value added for the EU+ joint programming 
while there existed the DAG coordination in Ethiopia?  
Most of the interviewees from the EU member states agreed that the EU+ joint programming 
would add value for more coordinated and synergetic intervention among its state members as 
long as it avoids duplications and parallel structures with the DAG structures, which was seen 
as an effective and comprehensive coordination platform already in place. 
It makes sense and somewhere it adds value. But we don’t need to have an EU+ 
coordination group on health, nutrition, or agriculture where there are the DAG 
platforms. However, if there is an area where we can use EU policy position or 
engagement, then, we should not be shy about having an EU position. (Participant 
BMG_3, personal communication, February 25, 2016)  
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Therefore, it was commonly perceived that EU+ joint programming would strengthen common 
positions and ensure interventions of member states in accordance with European values and 
standards without interfering with the DAG functions. Strong joint programming was seen as 
important to boost the negotiating power of individual members in donor coordination 
platforms at various levels. ‘I would like to see that we get things clear at EU and then we 
become strong in DAG. When we work with the USAID, the World Bank, the UN organization, 
at least we have a common understanding’ (Participant BSG_1, personal communication, 
March 04, 2016. 
On the one hand, some donors believed that even the GoE was hesitant about the joint 
programming and preferred to be engaged with the DAG coordination structures: 
They [the GoE] are not so much in favor of the way the donors organized 
themselves. On the one hand, of course, they find it useful to have something like 
the DAG Executive Committee; but they always are a bit hesitant and they do not 
say so much if we do something together in the [EU] context. They don’t see 
immediately the benefit of the joint programming. (Participant BMG_4, personal 
communication, February 24, 2016) 
Some of the member donors also suggested that member states should not be too reliant on the 
EU and the best thing would be if they could work with DAG all together. On the ground, the 
performance in the EU+ joint programming was not as desired as it appeared to be, and the 
leadership and commitment from most member states were missing, in the eye of our 
interviewees. Also, some donors believed that the divergent interests and approaches among 
themselves decreased the success of the joint programming process. It was also noted that the 
EU+ joint programming was not leveraged by some PBAs like the pooled funds mechanisms, 
which could have leveraged the joint coordination efforts of its members. Despite some 
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attempts towards in-country division of labor among the EU+ members, little had materialized 
in the areas of resource and sector mapping of EU+ members, support for ‘real’ policy dialogue 
on the basis of European values, reducing fragmentation of aid, and championing the ‘good 
practices’ of the aid and development effectiveness agenda of the PD in Ethiopia.  
Practically, there was no evidence that the EU+ joint programming positively contributed to 
the effective division of labor in Ethiopia. For example, the EU+ members constituted half of 
the total donors in Ethiopia in 2014; but they all together contributed 32% of the total CPA to 
Ethiopia in the period. (see Appendix C). From among the total 14 CPA contributors whose 
cumulative CPA average share to Ethiopia was more than 90% in the year, four of them were 
EU member states. Meanwhile, from the 34 CPA contributors whose cumulative CPA average 
share to Ethiopia was below 10% in 2014, half of them were EU member states and were 
among the fragmenters. Overall, on average, 60% of the total sector-level relations for EU 
members states in Ethiopia in 2014 was insignificant, though the sector-level fragmentation 
ratio for the member states varied from 78% for Austria to 22% for the Czech Republic. Does 
this imply that the EU joint programming was limited to improving division of labor and to 
reducing the aid fragmentation level among its member states, and that it co-existed with the 
DAG structures simply with a duplication of effort? 
3.6.2 One United Nations process 
The One UN process set up a joint coordination platform outside the DAG structures to 
complement the support of the UN agencies towards the aid and development effectiveness 
agenda in Ethiopia and to help them deliver results as one. It was introduced in 2008 on the 
basis of ‘One Program’, ‘One Fund’, ‘One Leader’, ‘One Office’, and ‘One Voice’ principles 
(UNDP, 2010). This initiative had a joint programming component in it, and it defined joint 
programs in the areas of ‘developing regional states’, ‘maternal and newborn health’, and 
‘gender equity and women’s empowerment’ for the period 2012-2015. The realization of the 
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One UN process is guided by a series of the UN Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF) that was 
supposed to be in line with the Ethiopian GTP and endorsed by the GoE. (UN, 2012).  
The coordination platforms in the One UN process seem to promote country-led joint 
programming, unlike the EU+ joint programming that was exclusive to the EU+ members. 
Consequently, the High-level Steering Committee at the apex in the joint coordination, a body 
responsible for the overall direction of the process, was co-chaired by MoFEC. The joint 
flagship programs were also co-chaired and coordinated by arrangements that comprise 
representatives from the respective Ministry and UN agencies (UN, 2012). The One UN 
process under its ‘One UN Fund’ segment has its own Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) to 
support program activities of the process in Ethiopia. However, the budget size of the Fund 
seemed insignificant. Thirteen of the UN agencies could expend only 13.8 million USD from 
the years 2011 to April 2018 (UN, 2018). 
Despite all the positive initiatives, including the joint coordination of the UN programs and the 
multi-donor fund system, the reality on the ground in relation to the division of labor in Ethiopia 
seems different. The UN agencies were small-sized donors and were dispersed over the sectors. 
In 2014, for example, only five of the UN agencies provided CPA to Ethiopia, but none of them 
had significant sector-level relations and were among the fragmenters. The sector-level 
fragmentation ratios were: UNICEF (75%), UNDP (60%), WFP (50%), WHO (50%), 
UNAIDS (33%), and UNFPA (0%) (see Appendix C). Again, what value is added in stretching 
coordination efforts in supporting and coordinating some component areas like ‘maternal and 
newborn health’ and ‘gender equity and women’s empowerment’ while there existed not only 
similar but also effective joint coordination platforms related to health and gender in the DAG 
working groups? A study by Baumann (2018) also concluded that the joint One UN system’s 
coordination and programming in the study areas was not productive but merely added an 
administrative burden for the donor and its recipient partners, and it did not practically 
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strengthen country ownership as the UN agencies were not subject to ‘real’ mutual 
accountability in the joint coordination efforts. 
3.7 Conclusions 
In the past two decades, Ethiopia has become the destination of almost all the traditional and 
non-traditional donors and has received huge amounts of aid because of its geopolitical 
advantage in Eastern Africa and because of its strong government that proved its success in 
achieving sustained and broad-based economic growth for more than a decade and attaining 
most of the MDGs, guided by its own visionary development strategies. In the period, the 
number of donors in Ethiopia almost doubled and the size of aid increased by two-thirds; also, 
the presence of non-traditional donors increased and affected the structure of the aid and 
coordination landscape of the country. This all, in the absence of a strong commitment to the 
‘good practices’ in accordance with the PD aid effectiveness principles, would mean a greater 
challenge to effective donor coordination as it would increase aid fragmentation, transaction 
cost, and administrative burdens for Ethiopia as a recipient partner.  
However, Ethiopia, as a pioneer in the contemporary donor coordination principles, has also 
shown a solid commitment in response to the realization of the Paris and Busan aid and 
development effectiveness agenda via establishing and maintaining country-led donor 
coordination systems. The DAG structure, which is almost 5 years older than the Paris 
Declaration, evolved in Ethiopia as a vital coordination system and policy dialogue forum in 
the country, whereby both the GoE and donors were mutually committed to the ‘good practices’ 
of the Paris and Busan coordination principles. The DAG structure has been the main and most 
functional and inclusive coordination system in Ethiopia. The structure has evolved for almost 
two decades and has become a ‘home’ to all kinds of donors in Ethiopia and an ‘umbrella’ for 
their coordination. Most of the donors in Ethiopia were actively involved under the DAG 
coordination. However, the persistent support and dependable reliance of the lead donors, 
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including the World Bank, African Development Bank, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States (though they operate in parallel structures), kept the DAG platforms more functional and 
stronger in the coordination business. The government agencies and their officers were also 
actively engaged in chairing and facilitating the coordination of the joint sector working 
groups. The donor-only working groups were also complementary and supportive with regard 
to the functioning of the SWGs.  
These cumulative and strong commitments from both the donors and the government for 
country-led donor coordination in Ethiopia has shown positive outcomes. Results of the four 
consecutive surveys on monitoring the Paris and Busan agenda conducted in 2005, 2007, 2010, 
and 2013 confirmed that Ethiopia had shown itself to be a good model for functional donor 
coordination in accordance with the Paris and Busan principles. According to the 2011 
Monitoring Survey of PD, Ethiopia achieved more than one-third (38.5%) of the total aid 
effectiveness measured performances while the world attained on average only one out of the 
13 indicators (OECD-DAC, 2011). Particularly, Ethiopia was largely successful in building 
strong country ownership, as the government was able to develop operational development 
plans and was committed to defending the national priorities. The government was also able to 
establish robust financial and budget systems, result frameworks, and mutual accountability 
systems that donors could use to align their supports.  
In general, the culture of strong country ownership in Ethiopia, which is mainly reinforced by 
its developmental state ideology, has been substantiated in the country-led donor coordination 
structures in the DAG system. The government and its partners consistently coordinated their 
efforts through the PBAs, which are seen as the ideal form of donor coordination. Although it 
was below the target, more than half of donors’ support to Ethiopia was channeled through the 
PBAs, which was encouraging. The operation and use of AMP in Ethiopia has been one of the 
best models for ‘good practices’ for donor coordination. Donors also seemed to develop some 
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hope and thus continued providing support through the government systems because the GoE 
has demonstrated its commitment to fight corruption.  
Generally, the lead role that the EPRDF government plays in the joint coordination platforms 
and the practices of multi-donor basket/pooled funding arrangements around the flagship 
programs in Ethiopia reinforce strong country ownership and contributed to the fairly effective 
implementation of the corresponding policy assumptions of the Paris Agenda. Nevertheless, 
though there was room for improvement in opening space for dialogue on some sensitive 
issues, there were limited practices in the policy dialogue between the government and its 
partners under the DAG structures. The level of aid fragmentation and the lack of ‘real’ policy 
dialogue in the coordination architecture are the major flip sides of coordination in Ethiopia 
that might affect the sustainability of ‘good practices’ in coordination. 
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Abstract 
 
The government of Ethiopia is seen as a strong owner of its national programs and policies and 
thus also as a strong coordinator of the foreign aid it receives. This study shows that this seems 
also to be the case in the agricultural sector in Ethiopia, where the Ministry of Agriculture has 
shown leadership in the last two decades and set a complex but functional government-led 
coordination structure in place. However, agriculture in Ethiopia is complex, and investing in 
the sector appears to be difficult for donors. In this paper, we present first the analysis of the 
different plans for agriculture development over time, followed by an analysis of foreign aid 
and aid projects in agriculture in the last two decades. In the last part, we look at donor 
coordination and at the results of investments in agriculture and livestock. 
 
 
Keywords: Official development assistance (ODA); aid effectiveness; agriculture; donor 
coordination; Ethiopia 
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4.1 Introduction 
Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa, with the highest proportion of rural 
people (more than 80% of its total population) in Eastern Africa (FAO, 2015, 2017). Likewise, 
agriculture is a dominant sector in the economy, producing more than 40% of GDP, accounting 
for half of total employment, and supplying 84% of total merchandise exports in 2015 (ATA, 
2015). Agriculture, then, has been prioritized as an investment area by the government, despite 
the deficiency it has encountered in sustainably financing the sector (World Bank, 2016b). 
Support from the donor community has also been increasing, particularly since the mid-2000s. 
But how do the government and donors play their role of coordination in the sector? There are 
limited sector-level empirical studies on the mechanics of government-led development 
coordination and aid effectiveness in low-income countries (Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015; 
Haque et al., 2017). The purpose of this study is, therefore, to document evidence on what 
sector-specific factors explain donor coordination and country ownership in the agriculture 
sector and how it works in a context of the ‘developmental state’ in Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia is an interesting case, for it has been one of the poorest agriculture-based economies 
and has been heavily dependent on aid – and, hence, a destination for many donors. In 2016, 
half of the 46 donors in Ethiopia were engaged in the agriculture sector (OECD-DAC, 2017c), 
and Ethiopia was one of the top five agricultural aid recipients in the world in 2015 (OECD-
DAC, 2017a). Ethiopia has also been seen as a country of ‘home-grown’ agricultural 
development strategies, which strengthen its country ownership (Mosley et al., 2004; 
Borchgrevink, 2008; Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013). 
4.2 Investing in agriculture in Africa: A difficult and complex sector 
Agriculture has been a dominant and important but undeveloped sector in Sub-Saharan African 
countries (SSA). In 2016, 61.7% of the SSA population lived in rural areas, and the agriculture 
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sector employed more than half (55%) of the total population in the region (World Bank, 
2018e). The reality, however, is that the agriculture sector in Africa has been underdeveloped 
and the continent is not benefiting from the full potential of its agriculture (World Bank, 2007; 
Barrett et al., 2017). Periodic droughts, hunger, food insecurity, undernourishment, and 
extreme poverty are often the faces of African agriculture.  
Some studies show that lack of proper policy attention and ineffective aid coordination in the 
1980s contributed to the failure of the agriculture sector in the continent. The first major aid 
effectiveness study by Cassen et al. (1986) and the second study on aid to agriculture (Lele, 
1991) concluded that generally speaking, agriculture showed little to no growth in the 1980s. 
Stand-alone projects funded by donors without (clear) government strategies and plans for the 
agriculture sector and a lack of necessary structures and human resources were major sources 
for the failure (Lele, 1991). Other more specific studies confirm this general picture, in 
particular on the negative effect of Structural Adjustment Programmes on agriculture (e.g., 
Commander, 1989; Duncan and Howell, 1992). Remarkably, the World Bank in its World 
Development Report on ‘Agriculture for Development’ (2008) does not mention this in its 
reasons for the neglect of agriculture.1 
On the other hand, this sector in the region was overlooked for several decades and had low 
investment from governments and the donor community (World Bank, 2007; Africa Progress 
Panel, 2014; FAO, 2015). In the early 2000s, the global average of government spending on 
agriculture as a percentage of total public expenditure declined to 4% (World Bank, 2007). 
Likewise, aid to the sector fell considerably from 18% of total Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) in 1979 to 3.5% in 2004 (World Bank, 2007) until it gradually started to rise in the mid-
                                                          
1 The reasons the report gave are: 1. falling international commodity prices, 2. competition from other sectors, 
especially social sectors, 3. emergency responses, 4. opposition from farmers in some donor countries, 5. 
opposition from environmental groups (World Bank, 2007: 42). This means the WDR also did not mention 
failure of projects. The WDR does not present any references for this section, so it has to be guessed where 
reasons 4 and 5 in particular come from. See also (Havnevik et al., 2007) 
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2000s following global commitments to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) initiatives by the 
African leaders. Agriculture is seen much more now as a strategic sector for economic 
development and for food security after the food crisis of 2008 and as the most important sector 
in the reduction of poverty (Eicher, 2003; Byerlee et al., 2009; De Janvry, 2010; Diao et al., 
2010; Dethier and Effenberger, 2012). Despite that, the share of aid to agriculture has been low 
and the sector has continued to be underserved in the aid market. For example, for the year 
2014-2015, the share of total net ODA commitments to the production sector, of which 
agriculture is part, was only 6.6%, compared a 35.9% share to the social sector, whereby 
education and health took 19.4% and 16.5% of the total net ODA, respectively (OECD-DAC, 
2016).  
Donors’ minimal support and unsatisfactory results from African agriculture could also be 
linked to the difficult and complex nature of the sector, which in effect assembles several, quite 
different sectors (e.g., agriculture, forestry, fishing, and livestock) in diverse agro-ecological 
settings with quite different types of producers and different markets (Brown et al., 2001; 
Foster et al., 2001; Eicher, 2003). Unlike other socio-economic areas, a massive number of 
smallholders in Africa have operated the production sector.  
This underlines the need for more coordinated intervention from the government and its 
Development Partners (DPs). Aid effectiveness debates suggest that for aid to be effective in 
the agriculture sector, there should be strong ownership by government over its poverty 
reduction and development strategies and programs (Foster et al., 2001; Guillaumont and 
Chauvet, 2001; OECD, 2008c; Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017) reinforced by strong 
political commitment and leadership capability at the top (Goldberg and Bryant, 2012; Watson-
Grant et al., 2016; Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017) with strong support from donors 
aligned with national priorities (OECD, 2008c). The practicability of alignment and 
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harmonization of donors’ support lies in the functionality of government-led agricultural 
development coordination structures. Effective coordination platforms play important roles in 
optimizing joint efforts by government and its DPs for improved results (Balogun, 2005; 
OECD, 2008c; Bigsten et al., 2011; Gore, 2013; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015). 
4.3 Methods and materials 
This is a critical case study based on thematically organized semi-structured interviews 
conducted with 32 respondents drawn from donors residing in Ethiopia and from selected 
government agencies including the Ministry of Agriculture, along with an analysis of other 
relevant government documents. Apart from the head of agencies and program officers directly 
responsible for coordinating development cooperation, 8 agriculture specialists from donor 
organizations participated in the interviews. These interviews were administered in two rounds: 
the first in February and March of 2016 and the second in March and April of 2017.  
A systematically organized interview guide, developed based on the international literature on 
aid effectiveness and coordination, was employed to assess donors’ agriculture programs and 
portfolios in Ethiopia and the level of their alignment to the agricultural programs and 
priorities, as well as their views regarding the government agricultural policies and plans, 
government leadership and role of donors, and functionality of the coordination platforms in 
the sector. Almost all the interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim, and analyzed 
using framework analysis method.  
Data on trends in agriculture financing and expenditures in Ethiopia were extracted from 
reliable database sources published in a timely manner, including the Credit Reporting System 
(CRS) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development−Development 
Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), World Development Indicators of the World Bank, and 
from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) database (FAOSTAT). Data related to 
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the flagship programs of the sector were taken from the Aid Management Platform (AMP) of 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MoFEC).  
Overview of interview data 
Organization 
Organization 
Type 
Number of 
Respondents 
Respondent Background 
Date 
Interviewed 
Austria Bilateral 1 Generalist* 
2016.03.04 
2017.03.21 
Denmark Bilateral 2 
Generalist 
2016.02.25 
2017.02.24 
Generalist 2016.02.25 
EU Delegation Multilateral 
1 Generalist 
2016.02.23 
2017.02.30 
1 Agri. Specialist 2017.03.24 
Finland Bilateral 1 Generalist 
2016.03.01 
2017.03.29 
France Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.03.02 
German Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.29 
Ireland Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.25 
Italy 
Bilateral 1 Agri. Specialist 2017.03.21 
Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.25 
Netherlands Bilateral 1 Generalist 
2016.02.24 
2017.04.05 
  1 Agri. Specialist 2017.03.20 
Norway Bilateral 2 
Generalist 2016.02.25 
Generalist 
2016.02.25 
2017.03.22 
Sweden Bilateral 2 
Generalist 2016.02.24 
Generalist 2017.03.28 
UK (DFID) Bilateral 2 
Generalist 2016.03.01 
Generalist 2017.03.23 
World Bank Multilateral 1 Agriculture specialist 
2016.03.02 
2017.03.27 
Japan (JICA) Bilateral 2 
Generalist 2017.03.23 
Agriculture specialist 2017.03.23 
MoANR Government 2 
Director, PPD 2017.05.04 
Secretariat, RED&FS 2017.03.29 
Spain Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.28 
UNDP Multilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.30 
USA (USAID) Bilateral 4 
Generalist 2017.03.31 
Agri. Specialist 2017.03.31 
Agri. Specialist 2017.03.31 
Agri. Specialist 2017.03.31 
MoFEC Government 1 Int. Devpt. Cooperation 2017.05.05 
Canada Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.22 
 
*Generalist means that the respondent is either a Head of Agency or Program Officer 
4.4  Plans for agriculture development in Ethiopia (2000-2020) 
Agriculture Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI), which is the long-term strategy of the 
government, set up a broader policy framework for the agricultural and rural development 
strategies in Ethiopia. ADLI envisioned a structural transformation of the agrarian economy 
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into industrialization. Accordingly, Ethiopia developed its own ‘Rural Development Policies 
and Strategies’ for the agricultural sector in 2003. The policy and the consecutive development 
and poverty reduction plans of the government of Ethiopia, aligned with the global and regional 
initiatives, aimed to reduce poverty and ensure economic development mainly through 
agricultural growth (Table 1). 
Table 1: The agriculture sector development plans of the government of Ethiopia (2005−2020): Context and priority areas 
Plan Goals, Priority Areas National Policy Context 
Regional/Global 
Policy Context 
Development 
Partners 
IPRSP 
(2000-
2001) 
x Reducing poverty x ADLI (in the 1990s) 
x MDGs (2000) 
x Genoa Summit of the G8 
(2001) 
x World Bank 
x USAID 
SD
P
R
P
 
(2
00
2-
20
04
) 
x Reducing poverty 
x Maintaining macroeconomic 
stability 
x Rural Development Policies 
and Strategies (2003) 
x Maputo Declaration, 
CAADP (2003) 
x Rome Aid Effectiveness 
for Harmonization 
(2003) 
x World Bank 
x USAID 
A
gr
i. 
Se
ct
or
 
P
A
S
D
E
P
 
(2
00
5-
20
10
) 
x Reducing poverty 
x Accelerating transformation 
from subsistence to 
commercialized smallholder 
agriculture 
x Production and productivity 
x National PASDEP (2005-2010) 
x Rural Development Policies 
and Strategies (2003) 
x Food Security Program (2005) 
x Harmonization Action Plan 
(2004-2006) 
x L’Aquila Declaration 
(2009) 
x Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005) 
x World Bank 
x USAID 
x AfDB 
P
ol
ic
y 
an
d 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
F
ra
m
ew
or
k 
(2
01
0-
20
20
) 
Goal: 
x To contribute to Ethiopia’s 
achievement of middle-income 
status by 2020 
x To achieve 8% annual growth 
in agricultural productivity per 
annum 
Strategic Themes/Objectives 
x Productivity and production 
x Agricultural commercialization 
and agro-industry development 
x Natural resource management 
x Disaster risk management and 
food security 
x GTP-I [2010-2015) 
x GTP-II [2015-2020) 
x Agricultural Transformation 
Plan (ATP) [2010-2015]) 
x Climate-Resilient Green 
Economy Strategy 
x Ethiopia CAADP Compact 
(2009) 
x Economic Corridors Strategy 
(2008) 
x National Nutrition Strategy 
x Livestock Master Plan (2015), 
x Ethiopia’s Drought Resilience 
and Sustainable Livelihood 
Program (DRSLP) 
x Busan HLF-IV (2011) 
x G8 Cooperation 
Framework: New 
Alliance for Food 
Security and Nutrition 
(2012) 
x AUC CAADP 
(political support) 
x CAADP Pretoria 
Office (Technical 
support) 
x COMESA 
x Major financing: 
GoE (60%); 40% 
donors like 
Global 
Agricultural and 
Food Security 
Program 
(GASFP) 
x FAO 
x Total budget: 
USD 15.5 billion 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on the PIF, agriculture sector PASDEP, GTP-I and II, and other related 
government and New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)/CAADP documents 
Note: IPRSP = Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; SDPRP = Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Reduction Program; PASDEP: Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (2005-2010); 
GTP = Growth and Transformation Plan, GoE = Government of Ethiopia 
 
The government and donors show a strong commitment to agricultural growth during the 
implementation of PASDEP and succeeding development plans. Likewise, while some 
indicators related to agricultural public expenditure in Ethiopia start showing constant growth 
above the SSA average since the early 1990s, change was dramatically high from the mid-
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2000s onward subsequent to the execution of PASDEP in 2005. As shown in Table 2, the total 
average agriculture expenditure, share of agriculture expenditure in total expenditure, share of 
agriculture expenditure in total GDP, and per capita agriculture expenditure in Ethiopia in the 
period from 2005 to 2009 were 294%, 225%, 157%, and 241% higher than the levels in the 
period from 2000 to 2004, respectively. 
Table 2: Average public expenditures on agricultural development in Ethiopia from 1980 to 2012 
Year 
Agriculture 
expenditure in 2005 
USD billion 
Percentage of 
agriculture 
expenditure in total 
expenditure 
Percentage of 
agriculture 
expenditure in total 
GDP 
Per capita agriculture 
expenditure in 2005 
USD Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) 
Ethiopia SSA Ethiopia SSA Ethiopia SSA Ethiopia SSA 
1980-84 0.07 0.09 7.12 9.83 1.22 2.21 7.62 31.64 
1985-89 0.12 0.09 10.03 9.29 1.90 2.25 10.85 25.09 
1990-94 0.10 0.06 10.18 7.14 1.58 1.62 7.89 14.61 
1995-99 0.14 0.07 9.59 6.07 1.81 1.27 9.61 14.53 
2000-04 0.15 0.08 5.58 5.08 1.51 1.08 8.48 15.32 
2005-09 0.58 0.14 18.14 5.93 3.87 1.37 28.93 22.52 
2010-12 0.22 0.15 4.55 5.09 1.01 1.28 9.99 19.72 
 
Source: Based on data set by International Food Policy Research Institute (2015) 
However, according to our interviewees, the Ministry had no official medium-term sector-level 
agricultural transformation and growth plans in line with the Agricultural Sector Policy and 
Investment Framework (PIF) and national GTPs. PIF is merely a 10-year (2010-2020) strategic 
agricultural plan developed based on the CAADP framework aiming at 8% agricultural growth 
per annum (ATA, 2015). However, in the eyes of our interviewees, the PIF itself was not even 
a well-organized policy document. ‘PIF was basically done by the consultants and put into a 
drawer. There was no real strategy to be monitored year after year that could help to measure 
results, guide the donors and the government, allocate resources’ (Participant MLA_1, 
personal interview, March 24, 2017). Notwithstanding the critique of the PIF, the agricultural 
priorities in the national development strategies were seen by our interviewees as principal 
yardsticks for donors’ alignment and coordination with the government of Ethiopia. 
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4.5 Aid to agriculture and level of aid fragmentation 
Ethiopia was one of the top agricultural aid recipients globally in 2015, next to Vietnam, India, 
Bangladesh, and Pakistan. It received 16% of the total ODA that flowed to SSA and 7% of the 
ODA to all developing countries (OECD-DAC, 2017a). In the same year, aid to the agriculture 
and rural development (ARD) sector in Ethiopia was composed of a proportionate share of 
grants (48%) and ODA loans (45%), while the remaining 7% was from other official finance 
(OOF), which was non-export credit (OECD-DAC, 2018a). The share of concessional loans in 
the sector appeared exceptionally high despite the fact that ODA loans at the national level, in 
the same year, was 27% of the total net ODA (OECD-DAC, 2018b). 
The trend shows (Appendix C) that aid to the ARD sector in Ethiopia increased almost 10 times 
from its lowest level at USD 76 million in 2000 to a peak of USD 787 million in 2015. Aid to 
the sector steadily increased from the mid-2000s (OECD-DAC, 2017a) following donors’ 
reclaim of the importance of agriculture, which was reinforced by increased commitments by 
aid-recipient countries to fight poverty in coordination with the donor community.  
Analysis of the 5-year average ODA flows from 2011 to 2015 to the Ethiopian ARD (Appendix 
D) indicates that a few donors dominated the aid architecture. The first three big donors, namely 
the World Bank, the United States, and Canada, covered more than half (52%) of the average 
total ODA to the ARD. The World Bank was unparalleled as the largest aid provider to the 
sector, contributing 34% of the total ODA to the sector during the period. But how the big 
donors did affect the level of aid fragmentation in the sector? The following section presents 
the level of aid fragmentation in the sector. 
From among the other methods to analyze aid fragmentation, we consider a methodology 
proposed by OECD-DAC that considers country programmable aid (CPA) in measuring the 
significance of a donor’s support in a country or in a sector. In its broader sense, a donor’s 
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support for a sector is ‘non-significant’ or ‘fragmented’ if the donor neither ‘concentrates’, 
which means the CPA share of the donor as a percentage of the total CPA to the sector is lower 
than its overall CPA share for all sectors in the country, nor the donor is ‘important’ in the 
sector, which means that the donor is among the small-sized donors whose cumulative CPA 
contribution to the sector is less than 10% (OECD, 2009b, 2011d). 
This study compares the status of aid fragmentation in the agriculture sector in Ethiopia in 2004 
and 2014 based on the latest available actual CAP disbursement data by OECD-DAC. The data 
includes only aid to ‘general agriculture’ as the OECD-DAC classification considered 
‘fishery’, ‘forestation’, and other related sub-sectors in the category of ‘other production 
sectors’ and ‘rural development’ in ‘multi-sectors’. This would underestimate the level of 
fragmentation in the sector. 
Table 3: Status of aid fragmentation in the agriculture sector in Ethiopia (2004 and 2014) 
Donor Group 
Total CPA to 
Agriculture 
(Constant, 2013 
USD million) 
Donor Group’s 
CPA Share (as % 
of CPA to Agri.) 
Total No. of 
Donors 
Non-
significant 
Relations 
Fragmentation 
Ratio 
(B as % of A) 
A B C 
2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 
DAC Countries 22.6 216.4 25.3 65.2 13 20 7 6 47 26 
Multilaterals 66.8 89.7 74.7 27.0 2 2 0 2 0 9 
Non−DAC Countries 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Private 0 25.7 0.0 7.7 0 1   0 0 0 
All Donors, Total 89.4 331.8 100 100 15 23 7 8 47 35 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on historical actual CPA disbursement (OECD-DAC, 2014) 
 
As shown in Table 3, the total number of donors in the sector increased by more than half 
(53%) and the volume of CPA grew almost four times from 2004 to 2014. However, the overall 
aid fragmentation level in the sector was reduced by 25% from nearly half (47%) of the total 
CPA in 2004, a year before the Paris Agenda declaration, to 35% in 2014. The bilateral donors 
(DAC countries) were generally responsible for the aid fragmentation observed in 2004 (47%) 
and in 2014 (26%), while at the same time, they were also the cause for the improved level of 
aid fragmentation in 2014.  
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Even so, some of the large donors countrywide were fragmenters in the sector. In 2004, for 
instance, apart from three small-sized donors, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the EU institutions were proliferated and fragmenters in the sector. (See Appendix E). 
Similarly, in 2014, the United Kingdom, AfDB, and the EU institutions had non-significant 
relations and were fragmenters (Appendix F), while small donors, including Spain, Finland, 
Australia, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic, had significant relations because they 
‘concentrated’ their support in the sector.  
Compared to the other top 10 agricultural ODA recipients in SSA, fragmentation ratio for the 
Ethiopian agriculture sector in 2014 was lower at 35% with 23 CPA providers, while the 
highest was for Egypt at 56% with 16 CPA donors. Meanwhile, the fragmentation ratio for 
Mozambique and Kenya was half smaller than for Ethiopia with 25 and 22 CPA providers, 
respectively.  
Table 4: Fragmentation ratio of top 10 agricultural ODA recipients in SSA in 2014 
Recipient 
CPA (current, 
USD million) 
Number of 
donors 
Non-
significant 
Fragmentation 
Ratio 
A B B as % A 
Egypt 472 16 9 56 
Ghana 128 15 6 40 
Senegal 146 18 7 39 
Tanzania 127 19 7 37 
Burkina Faso 129 17 6 35 
Mali 157 20 7 35 
Ethiopia 305 23 8 35 
Mozambique 102 25 4 16 
Kenya 150 22 3 14 
 
Source: (OECD-DAC, 2018d) 
4.6 Donor coordination in the agriculture sector 
Rural Economic Development and Food Security (RED&FS) has been the principal sector 
working group under the Development Assistance Group (DAG), which aims to serve as a 
coordination platform and policy dialogue forum between donors and the two ministries: 
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MoANR) and Ministry of Livestock and 
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Fisheries (MoLF) in Ethiopia. RED&FS was established in 2008 to oversee the overall 
coordination and harmonization of donors’ support for the PIF and flagship programs based on 
the Paris Declaration (PD) principles. Analysis of data from the interviews pointed out the 
following about the coordination structures, the government leadership and role of donors in 
the coordination process: 
4.6.1 Complex but practical coordination structure 
Most of the interviewees believed that RED&FS is a complex but functional coordination 
system in the sector, as precisely expressed by one of the respondents: ‘It is very complex, but 
it is in place. That is a good thing’ (Participant BMG_2, personal interview, February 29, 
2016). This is mainly because the sector itself is huge and multifaceted with parallel programs 
and projects under the two ministries. The platform involves at least five technical committees 
(TCs), 17 task forces (TFs) and four project implementation committees related to the flagship 
programs (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Structure of RED&FS (2015/16) 
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Nonetheless, in the eye of our interviewees, RED&FS has created a setup for the DPs to align 
and harmonize their programs with the priorities of the Ministry based on aid effectiveness 
principles. The RED&FS, the flagship programs, in particular, were seen as ‘best examples’ of 
coordination structures compared to other similar systems in Africa.  
The RED&FS platform was presented at the CAADP level. It was one of the best 
practices for the other African countries. You need the critical mass, expertise, 
funding, and programs to coordinate that you do not find in most of the African 
countries. (Participant MLA_1, personal interview, March 24, 2017) 
4.6.2 Strong government-led coordination 
The interviewees also substantiated that strong country ownership and political commitment 
by the government leadership in the sector have given more leverage to the coordination for 
some reasons. First, it was noted that there has been a shared ‘agricultural development’ agenda 
in place with strong top-level leadership committed to results: ‘They have great leadership and 
they really try to come up with progress through the national agricultural development 
strategies’ (Participant BMA_1, personal interview, March 20, 2017). Second, the leadership 
consistently defends its agricultural policies and priorities: ‘Here, there is a clear written 
strategy. If you are ready to align with the government, you are welcome. Otherwise, you can 
take the money and you can go elsewhere. The government has no problem in pushing back’ 
(Participant MLA_1, personal communication, March 24, 2017).  
Third, despite many other weaknesses, the leadership of the Ministry has been relatively good 
in delivery, compared to peer aid-recipient African countries. As stated by one of the strategic 
donors in the sector, ‘they have a clear vision and commitment and they know what they want. 
They are strong in the Africa region’ (Participant MLG_2, personal communication, March 02, 
2016). Fourth, the Ministry has played a strong role in country-led donor coordination in the 
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RED&FS structure, particularly in the flagship programs: ‘Because of that leadership from the 
government, we are all coordinating with the government and trying to support the government 
on its objectives. For me, the best examples are these flagship programs’ (Participant MLA_1, 
personal interview, March 24, 2017). For instance, the Executive Committee (ExCom) at the 
apex of the RED&FS, the technical committees, and the task forces are jointly chaired by 
ministers of the two ministries, state ministers, and directors of directorates and co-chaired by 
DPs, respectively.  
4.6.3 ‘Good practices’ of program-based approaches 
Most of the interviewees think that 
donors’ coordination at the flagship 
programs is relatively strong and 
reinforces a coordinated program-
based approach (PBA) in the sector 
through the exercise of sector budget 
support and multi-donor pooled funds. 
To achieve the strategic goals of the 
PIF and the respective CAADP pillar objectives, the Ministry of Agriculture launched three 
integrated multi-donor flagship programs: Agricultural Growth Program (AGP), the 
Sustainable Land Management Program (SLMP), and the Productivity Safety Net Program 
complemented by the Household Asset Building Program (HABP). Details are presented in 
Appendix H. 
Financing of the flagship programs has been coordinated by two types of multi-donor pooled 
funds (MDF): the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)-MDF, which is administered by the ministry 
and aims to finance mainly the AGP; and a trust fund administered by the World Bank based 
Box 1: Description of the flagship programs 
AGP aims to increase agricultural productivity and 
production as well as commercialization of smallholder 
agriculture in selected potential woredas (districts). PSNP is 
the country’s regular social safety net and the largest flagship 
program countrywide, focusing on beneficiaries in 
chronically food-insecure woredas who cannot produce or 
buy enough food for themselves even during a normal 
production year. SLMP is mainly meant for land 
administration and land use development programs, 
including rural land certification and natural resource 
management in potential woredas. 
Source: Interviewees 
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on its financing, procurement, reporting, and auditing procedures, and focused on financing 
mainly the PSNP and the SLMP.  
Table 5: Actual aid disbursements by donors to multi-donor trust pooled funds in the agriculture sector in Ethiopia from 
2007/08-2015/16 (current prices, USD million)  
Donor 
Program 
Total 
Donor's 
Share (%) 
Cumulative 
Share (%) AGP PSNP SLMP 
World Bank    172.3 1,435.0    69.7    1,677.0  50.3 50.3 
United Kingdom/DFID     563.0       563.0  16.9 67.2 
Canada/CIDA       22.1  262.0  
 
   284.1  8.5 75.7 
EU Institutions    278.0       278.0  8.3 84.1 
Netherlands      90.2    78.0       168.2  5.1 89.1 
Irish Aid     116.0       116.0  3.5 92.6 
Germany  
  
  84.5       84.5  2.5 95.1 
AfDB      53.8          53.8  1.6 96.8 
Sweden/SIDA      35.0         35.0  1.1 97.8 
Norway        26.6       26.6  0.8 98.6 
UNDP       23.2          23.2  0.7 99.3 
Austria 
  
 15.8       15.8  0.5 99.8 
Italy       7.5          7.5  0.2 100 
Total    369.1  2,767.0    196.6    3,332.7  100   
Program Share 11% 83% 6% 100%     
 
Source: Based on the Aid Management Platform (AMP) of MoFEC 
The MoA-MDF has been a preferred joint financing approach by the government of Ethiopia, 
as it appeared more in line with the aid effectiveness principles and ‘good practices’ of PBAs, 
leveraging ownership, flexibility, and smooth flow of funds to the flagship programs with low 
transaction costs, according to our interviewees. The transformation agenda of the agriculture 
sector that Ethiopia is pursuing lies under the AGP, as our interviewees acknowledged. Yet, 
the share of the MoA-MDF (11% of the total disbursement by the three programs combined) 
was incomparable to the share of the PSNP (83%), which was more than seven times larger 
(Table 5). Moreover, a large share of the funding was mobilized from a few large donors, 
including the World Bank and the United Kingdom, which together accounted for two-thirds 
of the total disbursements to the programs. On the other hand, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and partially the EU institutions used parallel structures 
and channels where the funds would go directly to projects, via affiliated NGOs or private 
contractors; this was administrated, in the USAID case, by the USAID office in Ethiopia. 
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4.6.4 Limited participation of private sector and civil society in the coordination platforms at the top 
Most of our interviewees regularly concluded that the ‘developmental state’ ideology of the 
government provides little room for the private sector and the civil society in the coordination 
structure at the top: ‘They have a kind of tendency to think the government can do things best. 
I see it as a motive of undermining the role of the private sector’ (Participant MLG_2, personal 
interview, March 02, 2016). Even if CSOs/NGOs are not represented in the formal RED&FS 
coordination structures at the top, at the local level, under the regional states, the Consortium 
of Christian Relief and Development Association (CCRDA) coordinates its member NGOs, 
which support the flagship programs, at the woreda (district) level, aligned based on the 
guidelines of the Ministry, according to our interviewees. The Broad RED&FS Platform 
(Figure 1) also offers an inclusive platform where all DPs and representatives of the private 
sector and civil society can participate in policy dialogue and consultative forums at a high 
level with the ministries. 
4.6.5 Mixed reactions about the quality of policy dialogue in the coordination platforms 
Donors had different visions on the quality of the policy dialogue in the coordination platforms. 
On the one hand, some donors in some sub-sectors, such as in livestock development, perceived 
that there was less room for policy dialogue. Some perceived that a macro-policy dialogue was 
missing in the donors’ coordination fora and therefore, in their eyes, there was no real dialogue 
(but mostly technical) between the government and the development partners on wider policy 
issues. 
On the other hand, Mosley & Suleiman (2007) showed that policy dialogue in Ethiopia between 
the government and donors has a long tradition, from the early and mid-1990s, with poverty 
reduction at the center of the agenda. In line with that, some of the interviewees argued that the 
platforms gave an opportunity for policy dialogue, in particular if it was evidence-based. These 
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respondents saw, for example, that there was adequate consultation between the government 
and donors in the platforms to endorse the disaster management policy in 2014 and the 
livestock policy/roadmap including the development of the GTPs. Some more evidence shows 
that through the New Alliance for Food Security initiatives, the previous seed policy was 
amended by a new seed proclamation, enacted in the year 2012/13 and endorsed by parliament 
to widen the room for private sector engagement in seed development, multiplication, and 
distribution. As a result, a new task force for issues related to private sector development was 
added to the RED&FS structure. It was noted, however, that the policy dialogue process had 
been slow and long, and it took a long time before it led to action.  
The role of the big donors in policy dialogue has been substantial, in the eyes of our 
interviewees. The World Bank, for example, by virtue of its lead-donor role in the sector, 
particularly in the flagship programs, and the quality of its technical support, has been very 
influential in getting all the other donors involved in the joint coordination practices and in 
mobilizing funds from other sources, like from the Global Agriculture and Food Security 
Program (GAFSP). This gives the Bank leverage in policy dialogue with the government 
through the mutual trust that has been established. An interviewee concluded that: 
The World Bank is the leading development partner here in Ethiopia. When the 
ministries face a specific institutional agenda or priority, they go bilaterally 
through the World Bank to have that voice heard in the policy dialogue platforms. 
(Participant MLG_2, personal interview, March 02, 2017) 
The US/USAID, even though it employed parallel systems to a large extent, has also been 
active and important in the policy dialogue, because of its substantial support in the areas of 
marketing, agri-business, innovation, technology, ICT, and private sector engagement, which 
have been some of the weak areas of the Ministry itself, as well as in its livestock projects, 
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which was an unaddressed area. Overall, the small-sized donors have actively participated and 
contribute to the coordination platforms, voicing some sensitive issues; but their influence in 
the policy dialogue was seen as minimal. As well, the presence of the UN agencies in policy 
dialogue has not been very strong, as most of their money goes into humanitarian assistance. 
4.6.6 Implementation capacity disproportionate to the ambition and depth of the problem 
The interviewees saw the implementation capacity and professional capabilities of the 
leadership as unfit for the complex nature of the ministry. Among other factors, ‘high’ turnover 
of key employees, including high ranking officials, substantially affects the implementing 
capacity of the Ministry and disrupts the momentum, preventing them from working at the 
same pace as donors in the joint coordination processes: ‘There is also high staff turnover 
because of low salary. You train the people and they leave’ (Participant MLA_1, personal 
interview, March 24, 2017).  
4.7 Results from agricultural investment 
Some impact evaluations and findings of scientific research of agricultural programs in 
Ethiopia substantiate that the support of donors to the flagship programs under the RED&FS 
has been in line with the goals and priorities of the government and positively contributed to 
what Ethiopia has achieved in agricultural growth and food security in the past two decades. 
The 2017 IOB evaluation found that the AGP positively impacted agricultural productivity via 
scaling up innovative approaches appropriate for smallholder farmers in Ethiopia (IOB, 2017). 
The 2011 IOB evaluation also demonstrated that the soil and water conservation component of 
the SLMP increased agricultural production in the arid zones of Ethiopia and positively 
affected the environmental protection and safety net measures of the country (IOB, 2011). The 
AGP supported the agricultural extension services and capacity building systems, which was 
seen as the basis for positive results in the agriculture sector in Ethiopia (Bachewe et al., 2018), 
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via a Development Agents (DA) structure that has been one of the largest of its kind in the 
world (World Bank, 2016a). It is commonly concluded that the PSNP program of the 
government of Ethiopia has significantly contributed to improving food security and the 
livelihood of the poor and to supporting households resilient to drought shocks (IOB, 2017; 
World Bank, 2018d). PSNP has been the largest social protection program in SSA and a 
program solely under the support of donors (World Bank, 2018d). 
As shown in Graph 2, the Ethiopian economy grew by 8% to 11% in the last two decades after 
the implementation of the agriculture and rural development strategies from the mid-1990s, 
and it recovered from the deep economic stagnation (8.7% GDP decline in 1992) at the end of 
the socialist Derg regime. The agriculture sector has been the major driving factor for the 
growth, although the sector was very vulnerable to drought shocks (1984/85, 1992, 1994, and 
2003) and war (1998). On average, the GDP of the country grew at 0.52% (1982-1992), 5.6% 
(1993-2004), and 10.6% (2005-2014) mainly on account of the growth of the agricultural 
sector. 
Graph 2: Trend of annual GDP and agriculture sector growth of Ethiopia (1982-2016) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018e) 
 
From 2005 to 2015, the agriculture sector achieved above 8% average annual growth, which 
successfully met the 6% and 8% annual growth rate targets set by CAADP and PIF, 
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respectively (MoA, 2016). The productivity of main crops increased by 42%, from 12.1 to 17 
quintals (one quintal equals 100 kg) per hectare, and average production of major cereals (in 
metric tons per hectare) almost doubled from 1.16 in 2004 to 2.26 in 2014 (ATA, 2015). 
Table 6 shows that the proportion of rural people with access to improved sanitation facilities 
and water sources sharply increased from almost none (0% and 3%) in 1990 to more than one-
quarter and nearly half of the rural population with access in 2005 and 2015, respectively. The 
ratio of rural people with access to electricity also increased from 0.4% in 2000 to 12.2% of 
the total rural population in 2014. The structure of the economy began to change as the share 
of agriculture to GDP declined from 55% in 1995/96 to 39.2% in 2014/15. At the outcome 
level, per capita income of an average farmer increased by 71%, from USD 282 in 1995 to 
USD 483 in 2015. Ethiopia achieved the MDG on poverty and hunger by reducing the 
proportion of rural people living below the national poverty line by half, from 48% in 1995 to 
23.4 in 2015. Also, the rural poverty gap at the national poverty line declined by nearly 40%.  
Table 6: Progress on agriculture and related MDGs and selected indicators for Ethiopia (1990-2015) 
Indicator Name 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 2015
Rural population (% of total population) 87.4 86.2 85.3 84.3 82.7 81.0 80.5
Proportion of rural people living below the national poverty line 
 
47.5 30.4 
 
23.4
Rural poverty gap at national poverty line (%) 
 
13.4 11.9 8.3 8.0 
 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 52.0 55.0 47.8 44.7 44.7 41.9 39.2
Agriculture value added per worker (constant 2010 USD)  282 277 304 392 463 483
Improved sanitation facilities, rural (% of rural population with access) 0 0 6.1 13.5 20.9 26.7 28.2
Improved water source, rural (% of rural population with access) 3.0 9.0 18.9 28.8 38.7 46.7 48.6
Access to electricity, rural (% of rural population) 
 
0.4 1.9 6.6 12.2 
Forest area (% of land area) 15.2 14.4 13.7 13.0 12.3 12.5 12.5
 
Source: Based on World Development Indicators, Millennium Development Goals Indicators, UNDP MDGs 
Report 2014 
 
Despite the positive results that its agriculture sector has achieved, Ethiopia has been one of 
the most food-insecure countries in Africa (World Bank, 2016a; IOB, 2017). As a result, 
donors’ support appeared gradually shifted to social protection programs rather than to 
agricultural production and productivity in the country.  
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4.8 Conclusions 
The government of Ethiopia is one of the few in Africa that has shown strong political 
commitment and leadership to put agriculture and rural development high on the agenda in its 
economic policies and to develop internally initiated agricultural strategies, including the 
ADLI, which is ‘unique in Africa’ according to Mosley & Suleiman (2007). The policies and 
strategies have been commended as consistent and relevant to the context of the sector, as well 
as aligned to CAADP pillar goals and integrated with the poverty reduction targets of MDG.  
The government has also shown a strong commitment to financing its agricultural strategies. 
Public expenditure on the agriculture sector in absolute terms and percentage of agriculture 
expenditure in total government expenditure as well as in total GDP in Ethiopia have been 
above the SSA average since the EPRDF government took power in 1991, with substantial 
growth from the mid-2000s following the transformational growth plans in Ethiopia. However, 
the PIF strategic goals and visions were not well operationalized into more measurable 
medium-term strategic plans and result frameworks. This missing component, consequently, 
resulted in difficulty in optimizing the benefits from the ‘good practices’ of government-led 
donor coordination in Ethiopia. 
Aid from donors has also been a major funding source for the agricultural development plans 
and particularly for the flagship programs in Ethiopia. From the mid-2000s, in particular, 
agricultural aid has grown high. However, the aid fragmentation level in the sector has also 
decreased from its high level before the PD in 2004, albeit the number of donors and volume 
of aid increased substantially. Compared to other SSA nations, fragmentation level in the sector 
was relatively lower. Nevertheless, large-sized donors, including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the EU institutions, African Development Bank, and Japan, were among the 
fragmenters and proliferators in the sector consistently before and after the PD, despite being 
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important donors countrywide in Ethiopia. This shows that agriculture and rural development 
has not been a priority sector of these important donors. On the other hand, despite agriculture 
being large and a principal sector of the Ethiopian economy, which logically demands huge 
investment, the percentage of agricultural aid by all donors combined has been considerably 
less than in the social sectors in Ethiopia. This reluctance by donors to finance the sector led 
the government to use an increased level of concessional loans to fill the financing shortage of 
its agricultural development plans, unlike what has been observed in the social sector. 
Moreover, support of DPs for the flagship programs was skewed to the food security and 
drought resilience measures. Aid investments have been low in the areas of agricultural 
production and productivity, sustainable natural resource management, and agricultural 
commercialization. The reality is that Ethiopia is still one of the most food-insecure countries 
in Africa. 
On the other hand, the government of Ethiopia and its DPs put in place a complex but functional 
government-led sectoral donor coordination system – the RED&FS. The coordination platform 
reinforced alignment of the agricultural development strategies with the flagship programs, 
which attracted more resources and support from the donor community and brought some 
positive results in the sector. Principally, the flagship programs created strong leverage for 
alignment and good practices of PBAs in the sector. However, the coordination was lacking 1) 
productive policy dialogue, which was dominated by a few big donors; 2) the private sector 
and civil society organizations at the apex; 3) strong coordination capacity in a different part 
of the sector. 
Generally, agriculture in Ethiopia is complex, and investing in the sector appears to be difficult. 
The sector is characterized by smallholder farming and traditional agricultural practices on 
highly fragmented farmland and at high ecological variations. The livelihood of the 40% rural 
poor is connected to the sector, but it is characterized by heavy dependence on rainfall, 
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vulnerability to recurrent drought shocks, and a less developed agricultural market. Moreover, 
the Ministry is large and complicated, while the support and focus of the DPs regarding the 
sector have been disproportionate to the level of problems in the sector. This suggests the need 
for more support and more genuinely coordinated efforts for sustainable results in the sector. 
Acknowledgement: We are grateful to all who participated in the interviews and to the 
language editor, Shannon Morales. 
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*An adapted version of this chapter was published as: Teshome, S.B., and Hoebink, P. 2018. "Aid, 
ownership, and coordination in the health sector in Ethiopia." Development Studies Research 5 
(1):132-147. doi: 10.1080/21665095.2018.1543549. 
Abstract 
The government of Ethiopia is seen as a strong owner of its national programs and policies and 
thus also as a strong coordinator of the foreign aid it receives. This is also the case in the health 
sector in Ethiopia, where the Ministry of Health has shown strong leadership in the last two 
decades. National health plans have been clear-cut and had ambitious objectives, to which the 
international donor community has adhered. The government-led coordination structures and 
joint health financing arrangements have been instrumental for improved donor coordination 
and aid effectiveness in the sector. This has led to impressive results, looking at the poor state 
of health that the government inherited from former regimes. However, the sector has at once 
been heavily dependent on foreign sources and characterized by high aid fragmentation. In this 
paper, we describe the health plans and health financing between 1990 and 2015. We also look 
at health leadership, donor coordination, and the results of investments in health. 
 
Keywords: Health aid, donor coordination, aid effectiveness, Ethiopia 
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5.1 Introduction 
In the aid ‘reformist’ debate, the argument most pronounced at present is that foreign aid did 
not bring desired results because it was an exogenous push in the absence of a strong 
partnership and sense of ownership by recipient partners for their development agenda (OECD, 
2008c; Riddell, 2009; OECD, 2011c; Goldberg and Bryant, 2012; Gore, 2013). Since the 
introduction of the sector-wide approach (SWAp) in the 1990s, donors and recipient 
governments have promoted the need for country-owned and -led development cooperation. 
However, the debate on aid effectiveness is inconclusive, and there is limited empirical 
evidence showing aid effectiveness as a result of country-led development cooperation in low-
income countries (Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015; Haque et al., 2017). The Ethiopian health 
sector is no exception.  
Ethiopia is an interesting case to study aid effectiveness at the sectoral level, because it is one 
of the African countries that has shown remarkable progress in the health sector in the context 
of a consistent health policy environment (IHP+ Results, 2010, 2015, 2016). The sector has 
been one of the top aid investment destinations for several bilateral and multilateral donors. 
According to OECD-DAC data (2018c), from 2013 to 2015, there were, on average, 26 donors 
and more than USD 1 billion flowed annually to the health and reproductive health sectors in 
Ethiopia. The average annual share of bilateral ODA to the health sector in the years 2015 and 
2016 was one of the highest, at 22% of total net ODA disbursement, second only to 
humanitarian aid at 25%.  
5.2 Background 
5.2.1 Aid effectiveness in the health sector 
A series of multiple attempts to reform the landscape of the traditional aid approach finally 
took formal shape in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. Based on the new 
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model of aid effectiveness, the International Health Partnership and other related initiatives 
(referred to together as IHP+) (the Universal Health Care 2030 [UHC2030] since 2016), which 
is one of the international aid and development joint coordination platforms in the health sector, 
developed seven behavioral principles (UHC2030, 2018): 1) Support a single national health 
strategy; 2) Record all funds for health in the national budget; 3) Harmonize and align with 
national financial management systems; 4) Harmonize and align with national procurement 
and supply systems; 5) Use one information and accountability platform; 6) Support south-to-
south and triangular cooperation; 7) Provide well-coordinated technical assistance. The 
Busan High Level Forum recognized these principles as ‘effective development cooperation 
practices’, adding ‘private sector engagement’ to the list (OECD, 2011c). This clearly shows 
that six of the interconnected principles are anchored in ‘country ownership’. IHP+ describes 
country ownership specifically in the health sector as the existence of a single national health 
plan with a longstanding vision and clear health priorities, as well as medium-term expenditure 
and result frameworks that are jointly assessed and endorsed in a participatory approach under 
the guidance of strong leadership by the recipient partner in a ‘One Plan, One Budget, One 
Report’ approach. (IHP+ Results, 2010, 2015). A well-developed and country-owned health 
development plan ensures positive health results through reinforcing alignment and 
harmonization as well as guiding financing of health priorities and facilitating result-based 
coordination and mutual accountability for improved aid effectiveness in the health sector 
(Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Anar Ulikpan et al., 2014). 
Generally, some studies concluded that aid contributes to the development of a recipient 
country when development partners (DPs) support country ownership by building internal 
capabilities under a true partnership framework (Booth, 2012; Goldberg and Bryant, 2012; 
Sweeney and Mortimer, 2016) and when aid is invested in national development priorities 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000; World Bank, 2005; Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017), with a 
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considerable, stable flow of aid to pro-poor sectors like health (Mosley and Suleiman, 2007) 
and with strong backing for fighting corruption (OECD, 2008c). Most of all, a visionary and 
politically committed government leadership by a recipient partner that is capable of defining 
its priorities and creating proper health development coordination platforms makes a difference 
in ensuring an improved and sustainable health system (Balabanova et al., 2013; A. Ulikpan et 
al., 2014; IHP+ Results, 2015; Reich et al., 2016).  
In principle, country ownership includes government and non-state actors with respect to 
owning the policies and coordination endeavors (World Bank, 2005; OECD, 2008c; Carothers, 
2015), but practically, it would be difficult to consider country ownership in this broader sense 
in countries like Ethiopia, which are led by a ‘developmental state’ ideology, in which the role 
of civil society and the private sector is limited. Therefore, in this paper, country ownership 
narrowly refers to government-led health development cooperation. 
5.2.2 Organization of the Ministry of Health in Ethiopia 
The Ministry of Health at the federal level is led by a minister and directors of the directorates 
under the supervision of two state ministers, along with the heads of the federal hospitals and 
five agencies, including the Pharmaceuticals Fund and Supply Agency. At the regional level, 
the health system is organized in a hierarchy of regional health bureaus (RHBs), zones/sub-
cities (for some regions with a zone or sub-city administration), woreda (a district-level 
administrative unit in Ethiopia) health offices, health centers, and health posts. 
In 1997, the government of Ethiopia developed a 20-year health sector development plan 
(HSDP) to implement the 1993 health policy. Several platforms have been organized to 
coordinate the implementation of the HSDP. The coordination of the health sector involves two 
levels. The first is steering committees to coordinate with the regions and woredas. 
Accordingly, the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) coordinates the Ministry of Health and the 
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regional health bureaus (RHBs) at the central level; the regional joint steering committee 
(RJSC) at the regional level; the woreda joint steering committee (WJSC) at the woreda level; 
and the Health and HIV/AIDS Committee at the kebele (village-level administration) level. At 
the second level are the joint coordination structures between the Ministry of Health and the 
development partners (DPs), which is the focus of this study. 
5.3 Materials and methods 
This is a qualitative study based on thematically organized semi-structured interviews 
conducted with 35 respondents drawn from donors residing in Ethiopia and from the Ministry 
of Health, along with an analysis of other relevant government documents and health data. Of 
26 providers of health aid to Ethiopia in 2015, 17 of them participated in the interviews. Apart 
from the heads of agencies directly responsible for coordinating development cooperation, 10 
of the participants were health specialists from the donors. The participants were randomly 
selected to include the large, medium, and small-sized multilateral and bilateral donors. These 
interviews were administered in two rounds: the first in February and March of 2016 and the 
second in March and April of 2017.  
A systematically organized interview guide was employed to assess donors’ health programs 
and portfolios in Ethiopia and the level of their alignment to government health programs and 
priorities as well as their views towards the government health policies and plans, government 
leadership in the health sector coordination, the functionality of coordination platforms and 
practices in the health sector, quality of health policy dialogue, and role of big and small donors 
in the health coordination platforms. The interview and topic lists for the interviews were 
derived from and informed by the international literature on aid coordination like the principles 
of the Paris Declaration and its evaluations and related scientific articles. 
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Almost all the interviews were audio-recorded, and they were transcribed in verbatim and 
systematically coded and colored based on themes from the interview guide. We then applied 
framework analysis matrix using Excel sheets in order to organize, summarize, and analyze the 
interviews coded into themes and sub-themes. Framework analysis is one of the commonly 
used methods in qualitative research, particularly in the analysis of interview data collected 
based on structured themes (Smith and Firth, 2011; Gale et al., 2013). 
Data on development assistance for health (DAH) and trends in health financing and 
expenditure on the major health status indicators specific to Ethiopia, as well as to Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) countries, were extracted from reliable database sources published in a timely 
manner, namely the Credit Reporting System (CRS) of OECD-DAC, Development Assistance 
for Health Database by Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), Global Health 
Observatory (GHO) and Global Health Expenditure databases by the WHO, the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank open database, and UNdata. The interviews, the 
aid data, and the HSDP together with other relevant documents were triangulated and 
thematically analyzed. 
Overview of interview data 
Organization 
Organization 
Type 
Number of 
Respondents 
Respondent Background 
Date 
Interviewed 
Austria Bilateral 1 Generalist* 
2016.03.04 
2017.03.21 
Denmark Bilateral 2 
Generalist 
2016.02.25 
2017.02.24 
Generalist 2016.02.25 
EU Delegation Multilateral 
1 Generalist 
2016.02.23 
2017.02.30 
1 Health specialist 2017.03.28 
Finland Bilateral 1 Generalist 
2016.03.01 
2017.03.29 
France Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.03.02 
German Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.29 
Ireland Bilateral 
1 Generalist 2016.02.25 
1 Health specialist 2017.03.21 
Italy Bilateral 1 Generalist 2016.02.25 
Netherlands Bilateral 
1 Generalist 
2016.02.24 
2017.04.05 
2 
Health specialist 2016.02.24 
Health specialist 2017.03.20 
Norway Bilateral 3 Generalist 2016.02.25 
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Generalist 
2016.02.25 
2017.03.22 
Sweden Bilateral 2 
Generalist 2016.02.24 
Generalist 2017.03.28 
UK (DFID) Bilateral 
2 
Generalist 2016.03.01 
Generalist 2017.03.23 
1 Health specialist 2017.03.23 
World Bank Multilateral 
1 Generalist 
2016.03.02 
2017.03.27 
2 
Health specialist 2017.02.27 
Health specialist 2017.02.27 
MoH Government 2 
Health, Senior Expert 2016.02.23 
Director, PPD 2016.02.19 
Japan (JICA) Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.23 
Spain Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.28 
UNDP Multilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.30 
USA (USAID) Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.31 
MoFEC Government 1 Int. Devpt. Cooperation 2017.05.05 
Canada Bilateral 1 Generalist 2017.03.22 
UNICEF Multilateral 2 
Health specialist 2017.04.04 
Health specialist 2017.04.04 
[ 
*Generalist means that the respondent is either a Head of Agency or Program Officer 
5.4 Health plans: Hinges for country-led coordination 
Analysis of the consecutive health sector plans and relevant documents as well as our 
interviews show that the HSDPs had some distinct features that contributed to the strengthening 
of donor coordination and improved health results in the country. First, the HSDP was initially 
developed based on the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) principle, which was introduced into 
the health sector in Ethiopia in 1997 (Ministry of Health, 1998, 2002). This encouraged the 
practices of country ownership, in a broad partnership with the health DPs, from the start. 
Second, unlike in many other African countries, the HSDP was ‘home-made’ and the Ministry 
of Health played a stewardship role in the design and implementation of the program, as well 
as in defining national health priorities, as perceived by most of the interviewees. Third, the 
HSDPs were clear in portraying the national health goals and priorities, which have evolved 
from the rehabilitation and expansion of basic health services, emphasized during the first two 
phases of the HSDP, to health service quality and equity in the Health Sector Transformation 
Plan (HSTP), which started in 2015/16 and will run until 2019/20 (see Table 1). This has helped 
the Ministry to firmly ensure that, on the one hand, support from the DPs fits the health 
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priorities, and on the other hand, that all donors equally value the health priorities. As stated 
by one of the respondents, ‘Ethiopia has one state health sector strategy, we are required to 
align with it. The priorities of the government are really respected, even by USAID [United 
States Agency for International Development], which uses parallel systems’ (Participant 
MMH_1a, personal interview, April 04, 2017).  
On the other hand, the consultative engagement of health partners in the development of the 
HSDP, particularly during the last two phases of the HSDP, resulted in increased mutual trust 
and a sense of shared ownership of the HSDP, as verified by most of the interviewees. They 
said that this has made the alignment of their programs with the government’s health priorities 
easier and increased their level of confidence in investing more in the health sector, with 
sustained engagement in joint health development planning and coordination. 
Last year we were active together to shape the Health Sector Transformation 
Plan. The health part was really pleasant, really good. With 90% of the plan, we 
are very pleased, and we think it is going to be the right direction. (Participant 
BMH_1a, personal interview, February 02, 2016) 
Principally, the practice of woreda-based health sector planning with a ‘One Plan, One Budget, 
and One Report’ approach has empowered the Ministry to reinforce strong country ownership 
and country-led health development coordination, as stated by the interviewees. The Ministry 
introduced woreda-based plans during the HSDP-IV, and they have been operational since 
2013/14. Through this process, woredas prepare a woreda-based health sector core plan based 
on an indicative plan and the respective national priorities, as defined by the federal Ministry 
of Health. Then, the woreda plans are consolidated to form a national annual health plan. The 
core plan has a results framework and cost plan, and it is the only operational plan in the sector 
to which the government at all levels and all other health partner adhere. This helps local-level 
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implementing partners, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to align and jointly 
coordinate their programs with the health priorities of this single plan.  
Table 1: Health Sector Development Program (1997/98–2014/15): Priority areas and context 
Plan Goals, priority areas 
Policy alignment (national 
development plans and global 
aid effectiveness agenda) 
Outputs 
H
SD
P
-I
 (
19
97
/9
8–
20
01
/0
2)
 
Goals: Coverage and quality 
health services, decentralizing 
health service delivery, financial 
stability 
Components/priorities: 
Service delivery, rehabilitation 
and expansion, human resource 
development, pharmaceutical 
supply, information, education, 
and communication (IEC) 
materials, health management 
information system (HMIS), 
healthcare financing, monitoring 
and evaluation, and research 
x Interim Poverty Reduction 
Paper (IPRP) from 2000/01 to 
2002/03 
x Health SWAp (1997/98) 
x Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) agenda 
x Global Health Initiative (during 
the early 2000s) 
x African Union Abuja 
Declaration (2001) 
x From 6- to 4-tier healthcare delivery system 
x Coordination platforms: Joint Steering 
Committee (JSC); Joint Consultation Forum 
(JCF); Joint Core Coordination Committee 
(JCCC); Health, Population, & Nutrition (HPN) 
donor group; Joint Review Mission (JRM); and 
Annual Review Meeting (ARM) 
H
SD
P
-I
I 
(2
00
2/
03
–
20
04
/0
5)
 
Same as for HSDP-I plus those for 
the Health Extension Program 
(HEP) 
x Sustainable Development and 
Poverty Reduction Program 
(SDPRP) (2002/03–2004/05) 
x Monterrey Conference (2002) 
x Rome Declaration on 
Harmonization (2003) 
x HEP (2003) 
H
SD
P
-I
II
 (
20
05
/0
6–
20
09
/1
0)
 
Goals: Improving maternal health, 
reducing child mortality, 
combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
tuberculosis (TB) and other 
diseases 
Priorities/components: Same as 
for HSDP-I and HSDP-II 
x Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustainable Development to 
End Poverty (PASDEP) 
(2005/06–2009/10) 
x Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005) and the 
Accra Agenda for Action 
(2008) 
x IHP+ (2007) 
x Woreda-based health sector planning (WBHSP) 
x HSDP Harmonization Manual (2007) 
x Country IHP+ Compact (2007) with ‘One Plan, 
One Budget, One Report’ scheme 
x HMIS (2008) 
x MDG Performance Fund (2009) 
x Healthcare Financing Strategy (community-
based health insurance and social health 
insurance) 
x National Reproductive Health Strategy (2005–
2015) 
x 3-tier healthcare delivery system 
x Woreda joint steering committee (WJSC) 
established 
H
SD
P
-I
V
 (
20
10
/1
1–
20
14
/1
5)
 
Goals/strategic themes: 
Excellence in health delivery and 
quality, leadership and 
governance, health infrastructure 
and finance 
Priorities: Maternal and new-
born health, child health, 
HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria, nutrition 
x Growth and Transformation 
Plan-I (GTP-I) (2009/10–
2014/15) 
x Busan Global Partnership for 
Development Cooperation 
(2011) 
x Maternal, neonatal and child health flagship 
program 
x Public-private partnership in health (2013) 
H
ST
P
 (
20
15
/1
6–
20
19
/2
0)
 Goals/strategic themes: Same as 
for HSDP-IV + excellence in 
health system capacity 
Transformation agenda: 
Quality, equity, universal health 
coverage (UHC) 
Priorities: Reproductive health, 
maternal and newborn health, 
child health, adolescent health, 
nutrition 
x GTP-II (2009/10–2014/15) 
x Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG) agenda (2015) 
x Addis Ababa Action Agenda 
(2015) 
x National Healthcare Quality Strategy (2016–
2020) 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on HSDPs and other related government documents 
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Implementation of the HSDPs has also benefited from global initiatives including the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Paris Agenda on aid effectiveness, as well as 
from the national development policy context. HSDP-III, for instance, was employed under the 
ambitious national plan, known as the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to 
End Poverty (PASDEP). Global dynamism from the Paris Agenda on Aid Effectiveness 
inspired the implementation of HSDP-III with a wider scope of country-led health development 
cooperation. During this period, the Ministry endorsed the HSDP Harmonization Manual and 
the IHP+ Country Compact along with the Joint Financing Agreement (JFA) for the 
Millennium Development Goals Performance Fund (MDG PF). The Healthcare Financing 
Strategy, which recognized community-based health insurance, social health insurance, and 
other core strategies in the health sector, was introduced and implemented in HSDP-III.  
The context that drove the momentum gained by HSDP-III continued during the 
implementation of HSDP-IV. The HSDP finished in 2014/15 and has been replaced by another 
20-year health sector strategy called ‘Envisioning Ethiopia’s Path to Universal Healthcare 
through Strengthening of Primary Healthcare’ (Ministry of Health, 2015b). The first phase of 
this strategy is the HSTP. 
5.5 Leadership of the Ministry of Health: Government in the ‘driver’s seat’  
The health sector in Ethiopia has had successive leadership at the top that demonstrated 
professional capability and political commitment to lead in the ‘driver’s seat’. This started with 
former minister Dr. Tedros Adhanom, who introduced, in the eyes of our respondents, 
significant changes in the health sector. According to the WHO (2017a), ‘the transformation 
he led as Ethiopia’s Minister of Health improved access to healthcare for millions of people. 
Under his leadership, Ethiopia invested in critical health infrastructure, expanded its health 
workforce, and developed innovative health financing mechanisms’. Tedros, who has a PhD in 
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community health, is a malaria expert and former head of the Tigray Regional Health Bureau, 
led the Ministry from 2005 to 2012 and was elected as Director General of WHO in 2017. 
The successor of Tedros, as Minister of Health, was Dr. Kesetebirhan Admasu (2012–2016), a 
medical doctor and a public health specialist. He was a state minister from 2010 to 2012 under 
the supervision of Tedros. He sustained the momentum of the health sector reform agenda and 
showed remarkable leadership in family planning and maternal and child health, and in 
directing the Health Development Army (HDA), especially the women’s HDA, according to 
our respondents. The minister during the interview period, Prof. Yifru Berhan Mitke, is a 
medical doctor by training and a university professor. He led the medical schools of some of 
the distinguished universities in Ethiopia. The state ministers and most of the directors are also 
health professionals and have, in the eyes of our respondents, a clear vision on the health sector. 
Further analysis of the interviews shows that the Ministry of Health has been one of the strong 
ministries in Ethiopia with a ‘practical’ country ownership, which has played a leading role in 
the joint health development coordination process. Some of the strengths identified by the 
interviewees were: First, the Ministry has enough political determination to say ‘no’ when 
support from a DP is against the national health priorities and the principles of ownership in 
development coordination. 
They are quite capable and strong enough to defend their strategic goals and 
strategies. This is good, especially for the DPs using the country system, budget 
support, and the pooled fund. If you did not have such a strong ministry, it would 
be a crisis. (Participant MLH_1, personal interview, March 28, 2017) 
Second, the top leadership has demonstrated technical and professional ability to coordinate 
resources from the health partners towards the goals of the sector: ‘They have the experience, 
they work with different donors, and they have the expertise. Most of the Directorate heads are 
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medical doctors and capable people that are bright, risk takers and committed’ (Participant 
BLG_1a, personal interview, March 01, 2016). Also, the leadership has shown that it has the 
practical experience to deliver consistently on the aid effectiveness principles: ‘When we go to 
the other countries, they are aware of the IHP+ framework of all these donor coordination 
preambles and statements to be made, but Ethiopia has made quite good use of that framework’ 
(Participant MLH_2a, personal interview, February 02, 2017). 
Third, the level of corruption in the health sector was perceived as low, and the leadership has 
shown the political commitment to fight and reduce corruption in the health sector. One of the 
interviewees from a large multilateral organization said: ‘The perception of the public was that 
corruption in the health sector has been one of the lowest in all the ministries’ (Participant 
MLH_2a, personal interview, February 02, 2017). Generally, most of the health partners 
interviewed acknowledged that stability of the health plan and strong country ownership of the 
health leadership in Ethiopia has inspired DPs to provide increased and stable DAH for 
strategic results in the sector. This is elaborated in the following section. 
5.6 Health sector financing and aid fragmentation in Ethiopia 
Donors have increased their support to the health sector in Ethiopia, with a rise in health and 
reproductive health aid to over a billion USD in 2014, which makes the country one of the top 
five DAH recipients in SSA next to Nigeria, Tanzania, and Kenya (Appendix A). DAH steadily 
increased following the health sector reforms and execution of the HSDP in the late 1990s. The 
average growth rate of DAH to Ethiopia before HSDP (1990–1996) was only 4%; however, it 
grew by 68%, 65%, and 129% during implementation of HSDP-I (1997–2001), HSDP-II 
(2002–2004) and HSDP-III (2005/06–2009/10), respectively. 
A sharp rise in DAH to Ethiopia was observed during HSDP-III. This can partly be attributed 
to an increase in vertical funding by the Global Alliance for Vaccine and Immunization (GAVI) 
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and Global Fund (Ministry of Health, 2014a), as well as an increase in global commitments 
and support following the Paris Agenda on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, the relatively better 
policy environment, and the presence of strong leadership at the top during that period.  
Graph 1: Total DAH flow to Ethiopia from 1990 to 2015 (constant, 2015 USD million) 
 
Source: Authors’ presentation based on data by the Financing Global Health Database 2016 (IHME, 2017) 
However, a closer look at the health financing in Ethiopia shows that the sector has faced two 
fundamental challenges, which indicates the need for effective coordination of DAH in the 
country. The first one is that the sector has been heavily dependent on external sources; and 
the second one is that aid fragmentation in the sector has been high, even higher than in the 
other top DAH recipient SSA countries and the level of fragmentation increased after the Paris 
Declaration. On the other hand, the government has shown a strong commitment to increasing 
public health expenditure and has coordinated the use of program-based approaches like pooled 
funding to minimize the effect of aid fragmentation in the sector. The following sections show 
details of this analysis.  
The financing structure of the HSDP gradually changed from domestic sources to largely 
external financing (see Appendix E). Particularly, HSDP-I and HSDP-II were highly dependent 
on domestic financing. At the beginning of HSDP-II, for example, donors contributed only 
10.3% of total health financing, while the share of domestic financing was 89.7%. Because of 
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the Ethio-Eritrea war, most of the donors declined to support Ethiopia during that period. 
However, from the beginning of HSDP-III, the level of external financing increased more than 
three-fold. From only 15.2% at the beginning of the HSDP in 1997, it reached half (50.1%) of 
total health funding in 2010 and then declined to 41.7% at the completion of the HSDP. This 
carries substantial risk in terms of the sustainability of health service provision in the country, 
in the event that, for whatever reason, major donors were to walk out on financing the sector. 
One of the interviewees from among the lead donors in the sector expressed the concern as 
follows:  
It is a sector where we have a commitment from the government side, but it is a 
good example of where donors have contributed to creating distortions, as about 
50% of the funding of the sector comes from donors and lenders, which is an 
external source. (Participant MLG_1, personal communication, 23 February 
2016) 
An analysis of average annual DAH flow to Ethiopia over the 5 years from 2011 to 2015 also 
shows that the top three of the 26 donors contributed two-thirds of the total health aid in those 
years (Appendix B). This resulted in high aid fragmentation in the sector, as analyzed in Table 
2. Of the different methods to measure in-country aid fragmentation, we use the OECD-DAC 
approach, which utilizes country programmable aid (CPA) disbursement to evaluate the level 
of significance of donors’ relation in a country or in a sector. According to the broader 
definition of this method, a donor’s relation in a sector is ‘non-significant’ if the donor’s 
support is neither ‘important’, which means that the donor is in the bottom list of small-sized 
donors that cumulatively represent less than 10% of total CPA to the sector, nor ‘concentrated’, 
which implies that the CPA share of the donor to the sector is below its average CPA share 
countrywide (OECD, 2009a, 2011d). In a narrow sense, aid fragmentation in a sector can be 
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measured by analyzing the number of donors whose cumulative CPA contribution to the sector 
is below 10%. Our analysis takes the broader approach. 
Table 2: Aid fragmentation ratios in the health sector in Ethiopia in 2004 and 2014  
Donor Group 
Total CPA to Health, 
ETH 
(USD million, 2013 
prices) 
Total No. of 
Donors 
Non-
significant 
Relations 
Fragmentation 
Ratio 
(B as % of A) 
A B C 
2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 
Health 122.2 466.5 16 24 6 10 38% 42% 
Population Policies and 
Reproductive Health 
94.5 374.9 15 21 6 14 40% 67% 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on CPA historical disbursement data from OECD-DAC (2014) 
From 2004 to 2014, the total number of donors in the health and reproductive health sub-sectors 
in Ethiopia increased by 50% and 40%, respectively. Also, the total CPA contribution of both 
sectors in 2014 was nearly four times the amount in 2004. Subsequently, the aid fragmentation 
ratio for the health and reproductive health sub-sectors during the period increased by 10.5% 
and by 67.5%, respectively. A study by Alemu (2009) also substantiated that the aid landscape 
in the health sector of Ethiopia in the mid-2000s was characterized by high aid fragmentation 
and showed no substantial improvement despite the global aid effectiveness declarations. The 
fragmentation in the reproductive health sub-sector was high in both periods. A closer analysis 
of the sources of aid fragmentation shows that support from the bilateral donors (DAC 
countries) in the sub-sectors was more fragmented than that of the multilaterals in both periods. 
(see Appendix I). 
Compared to the top 10 DAH recipient SSA countries from 1990 to 2014 (Table 3), the 2013 
and 2014 average fragmentation ratio for Ethiopia was the highest (59%) followed by South 
Africa (55%), Kenya (54%), Zambia (54%), Mozambique (53%), and Uganda (51%) that over 
50% of the CPA they received was fragmented. The high level of fragmentation in Ethiopia 
was due to high fragmentation in the population and reproductive health sub-sector, in 
particular in 2013. The average total CPA Ethiopia received during this period was the second 
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largest after Nigeria. However, Nigeria was able to mobilize larger CPA from a relatively low 
number of donors with more significant relations. As a result, the fragmentation ratio for 
Nigeria was relatively low, which implies that Ethiopia needs to increase the number of 
significant relations or to optimize the resources of all CPA providers without decreasing their 
number, by using program-based approaches like pooled funding. How then does Ethiopia 
manage these program-based approaches? 
Table 3: Aid fragmentation ratio of top 10 aid-recipient SSA countries (2013 and 2014 average) 
Country 
CPA (USD million, 
current prices) 
No. of Donors 
Non-significant 
Relations 
Fragmentation Ratio 
Health 
Pop. & 
RH 
Health 
Pop. 
& RH 
Healt
h 
Pop. & 
RH 
Health 
Pop. & 
RH 
Averag
e 
Ethiopia 547.0 407.0 25 20 13 13 53% 65% 59% 
South Africa 61.0 583.5 15 16 6 11 40% 69% 55% 
Kenya 232.5 641.0 22 21 7 17 30% 79% 54% 
Zambia 162.5 326.5 14 15 5 11 36% 72% 54% 
Mozambique 281.5 318.5 26 20 10 13 38% 67% 53% 
Uganda 199.5 401.5 21 19 8 13 36% 66% 51% 
Tanzania 355.0 544.5 23 23 7 15 30% 63% 47% 
Malawi 171.5 199.0 20 16 7 9 33% 58% 46% 
Congo, DR 471.5 119.5 23 16 10 8 42% 48% 45% 
Nigeria 560.5 626.0 14 15 4 8 29% 55% 42% 
 
Source: Based on data from OECD-DAC (2018d) 
Given this level of aid fragmentation, Ethiopia institutionalized joint health financing 
arrangements and coordination practices, which appeared to reduce the adverse effects of aid 
fragmentation on health aid effectiveness. The Sustainable Development Goals Performance 
Fund (SDG PF), which was established in 2009 as the Millennium Development Goals 
Performance Fund (MDG PF), has been a SWAp implementing tool and one of the pooled 
funding and coordination mechanisms through which the DPs have committed to supporting 
‘One Plan, One Budget, One Report’ principles in Ethiopia. The fund was initiated by two 
donors with USD 10.6 million; this grew to 11 contributors with total funds of around USD 
235 million in 2014. DFID has been the largest (providing 61% of the total fund in 2014) and 
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most consistent contributor to the fund, and the World Bank is second, followed by The 
Netherlands and Irish Aid (based on 2015 figures). 
The share of the fund in terms of CPA disbursements grew sharply from 2% in 2009 to 28% in 
2014 (Table 4). But support from other principal donors like USAID and the Global Fund has 
been missing, despite the fact that the fund has been one of the preferred financing modalities 
of the Ministry of Health (Ministry of Health, 2008). The fund is administered by the Ministry 
of Health itself and, hence, the Ministry has the flexibility to channel the resources through its 
own systems, which has also been good in terms of strengthening the health system, according 
to our respondents.  
The Fund has helped to mobilize resources, including from smaller contributors (Australia, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO), and to fill funding gaps in priority areas in the 
HSDP with less harm from aid fragmentation and donor proliferation. The SDG PF has also 
been used to finance some health priority areas left underfunded by donors because donors 
have been more involved in reproductive health like HIV/AIDS programs (see Appendix J). 
For example, in 2014/15, the fund was used for public health commodity procurement (68.4%) 
and health system strengthening (22.2%), (MoH, 2015). The pooled fund is also used to 
strengthen the health systems of regional states by distributing resources in kind and technical 
support based on their woreda-based annual plans, according to an interviewee from the 
Ministry.  
Table 4: Proportion of MDG PF (% of CPA disbursement) in the health sector in Ethiopia (2009–2014) 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
MDG PF total disbursement (in million USD) 10.6 23.9 53.3 105.3 129.1 234.7 121.1 
CPA disbursement (in million USD) 570.7 751.8 821.4 764.4 1,094.8 841.4 817.9 
MDG PF (% CPA disbursement) 2% 3% 6% 14% 12% 28% 15% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Health (2014b, 2015a) 
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The SDG PF is one of the effective funds with ‘real’ country ownership by the Ministry of 
Health built on mutual trust with its DPs, as described by our interviewees. One of the 
interviewees from a large bilateral donor and an important contributor to the fund described it 
by saying: ‘I have seen many pooled funds in many sectors, but this is one of the better ones 
and more effective than the pooled funds with which we worked over the years’ (Participant 
BLH_1, personal interview, March 23, 2017). 
Analysis of the health sector financing trends in Ethiopia also shows that health expenditure of 
the government and the financing role of donors during the implementation of the HSDPs has 
gradually increased. As indicated in Graph 5, the government of Ethiopia persisted in 
increasing its health expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure throughout the 
HSDP period. Prior to the introduction of the HSDP, domestic health financing was dominated 
by private health expenditure. Private health expenditure includes resources from out-of-pocket 
payments by patients, non-profit institutions, and private insurance and other related finance. 
However, out-of-pocket as a percentage of total private health expenditure in Ethiopia was 
nearly 80% during the HSDP implementation period. In that sense, the burden on individual 
citizens’ health expenditure, dropped from 46.4% in 1997 to 32.3% at the close of the HDSP 
in 2014. To further decrease the pain of out-of-pocket payments and the level of dependence 
on external sources, the government recently introduced social and community-based health 
insurance schemes. According to Ali (2014), these insurance schemes ‘increased health care 
utilization, access to medicines, and quality of services’. The health expenditure by non-profit 
institutions also steadily increased, despite the fact that its share of total health expenditure was 
still quite small. 
Evidence further shows that the proportion of health expenditure as part of total government 
expenditure and as a percentage of the national GDP has increased since the implementation 
of the HSDP. For example, general government health expenditure (GGHE), as a percentage 
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of total general government expenditure increased from 7.3% in 1997 to 15.75% in 2014, 
putting Ethiopia at third place in SSA compared with Malawi (16.8%) and Swaziland (16.6%), 
(Appendix F [column 2] and Appendix K). 
Graph 2: Health expenditure by expending agents in Ethiopia (1995–2014) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Global Health Expenditure Database by the WHO (2017b) 
 
 
Total health expenditure of Ethiopia as a percentage of its GDP increased from 3.2% at the 
beginning of the HSDP in 1997 to 4.9% at its completion in 2014 (Graph 6). This was mainly 
due to an increase in the GGHE, which constituted the major part (59% in 2014) of it, even if 
the share of out-of-pocket expenditure by patients remained high during this period. The 
increase in the GGHE as a percentage of GDP was partly linked to an increase in external 
resources. The share of external resources grew more than three times during HSDP-III and 
nearly seven times in HSDP-IV compared to the level in HSDP-I. Ethiopia’s GGHE as a 
percentage of its GDP (2.9%) in 2014 was among the top 10 spending countries in Africa 
(Appendix K), but it was far below the minimum 5% target recommended by the WHO (2001).  
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Graph 3: Health expenditure by financing sources as a percentage of GDP in Ethiopia (1995–2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Global Health Expenditure Database by the WHO (2017b) 
As indicated in Graph 7, total per capita health expenditure for Ethiopia at the completion of 
HSDP in 2014 (USD 26.7) was six times higher than the per capita expenditure in 1997 (USD 
4.4). Even if it was low compared to the WHO’s recommended minimum per capita target of 
USD 34 (WHO, 2001), the growth in per capita expenditure during the HSDP was remarkable. 
It grew steadily but remained low during HSDP-I and II for all spending agents until it 
dramatically increased during HSDP-III and IV. In 2014, the per capita GGHE (USD 15.6) was 
among the highest in SSA countries and worldwide, despite the per capita expenditure on health 
for Ethiopia, in general, being one of the lowest (WHO, 2017b).  
Graph 4: Per capita health expenditure (USD) in Ethiopia (1995–2014) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Global Health Expenditure Database by the WHO (2017b) 
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5.7 Donor coordination 
5.7.1 Platforms 
The coordination landscape in the health sector in Ethiopia comprises the Joint Consultation 
Forum (JCF), Joint Core Coordination Committee (JCCC), Joint Review Mission (JRM), 
Annual Review Meeting (ARM), and SDG PF (formerly the MDG PF). 
The JCF is the highest coordination and dialogue forum, in which the Ministry organizes policy 
discourse and oversight of coordination jointly with health partners. The JCF comprises the 
Minister, state ministers, all directors of the Ministry of Health, heads of agencies, Population, 
Nutrition (HPN) Donor Group, two NGO consortiums, and members of the private sector as 
well as representatives from health professional associations. The JCF is chaired by the 
Minister of Health and co-chaired by one of the HPN Donor Group co-chairs.  
 
Figure 1: Health development coordination platforms in the Ethiopian health sector 
Note: DAG = Development assistance group–Ethiopia; KH = Kebele health and HIV/AIDS committee; 
TF = Taskforce; TWG = Technical working group  
The JCCC is the technical arm of the JCF and operates using technical task forces and ad hoc 
sub-committees. It involves technical people from the Ministry of Health and the HPN Donor 
Group, and is chaired by the Director of the Policy and Planning Directorate of the Ministry of 
Health. The JRM and ARM are the common monitoring and evaluation platforms in which the 
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government and its health partners track the annual progress of HSDP implementation. The 
JRM is a joint mission whereby groups of representatives from the health partners, government, 
and other stakeholders visit selected samples of regional states, districts, and health facilities 
to assess HSDP implementation issues and to verify on the ground health-related data coming 
through the Health Information Management System. The consolidated report from the 
discussion of different joint missions serves as input for the ARM and JCF. The ARM is an 
annual gathering with representatives of the health partners, regional states, districts, hospitals, 
and health facilities, as well as health extension workers. It reviews and endorses the woreda 
core annual plan. Based on input from the JRM, issues like the performance of the sector, next 
plan priorities, and other policy issues are thematically discussed.  
The HPN Donor Group is a donors-only sector working group for the health sector under the 
Development Assistance Group (DAG) and has more than 26 members, including the 11 
contributors to the SDG PF, which some of our respondents called the ‘home of health’. It 
provides technical support to the JCCC through its technical sub-groups and facilitates policy 
dialogue through its role in the JCF.  
5.7.2 Assessment of donor coordination in the health sector 
Most of our interviewees believed that these platforms have facilitated the participation of 
donors in the joint planning, implementation, and evaluation of the HSDP and subsequent 
medium-term strategic plans, although our interviewees indicate that this is still weak at the 
regional and local levels. According to our interviewees, large and small donors, bilateral and 
multilateral, have played a role in the coordination process, with different expertise, 
approaches, and levels of engagement, which was generally seen as productive to the health 
sector. The World Bank, for example, has been one of the active players in the health sector, 
especially in the financing area where most of its expertise lies. It has been among the major 
contributors to the SDG PF through a performance-based financing approach and has been 
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 162
 
152 
 
active in the JCF meetings and the HPN Donor Group. The interviewees noted that the 
European Union Delegation has also been actively involved in the HPN Donor Group, the SDG 
PF, and in the JCF and JCCC.  
The role of the UN agencies has varied across the agencies. But their role in the coordination 
platforms and their contribution in general, and in the SDG PF financing, in particular, has not 
been satisfactory, according to the majority of interviewees. The WHO, for example, was not 
an active actor in the coordination fora and policy dialogue, as it should have been. UNICEF, 
however, was relatively active in the coordination platforms and was strong in coordinating 
technical assistance in program areas like the Expanded Program on Immunization, maternal 
health, epidemics, and follow up support, in the eye of our interviewees. On the other hand, the 
presence of emerging vertical donors, including the Global Fund and GAVI, in the coordination 
platforms was perceived as weak by the interviewees. GAVI coordinated its projects from 
Geneva and was irregularly present at the meetings, while the Global Fund has become more 
active in the coordination platforms in recent years.  
Among the bilateral donors, DFID was one of the largest and strongest partners in the health 
sector with the biggest, most consistent contribution to the SDG PF, as perceived by 
respondents. The Netherlands is a medium-sized donor who was active in the sector, 
contributing a significant amount to the SDG PF with consistent technical support over a long 
period. USAID is the biggest donor in the health sector, with its special implementing 
structures and a funding system parallel to the system of the Ministry. Although USAID uses 
parallel systems, it has been efficient and active in the health sector coordination platforms, 
according to its donor counterparts.  
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5.8 Major results in the health sector in Ethiopia 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the health status in Ethiopia was one of the poorest, even among 
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. However, these days Ethiopia is  seen commonly as one 
of the ‘success stories’, because of its achievements in the health sector (for example, IHP+ 
Results, 2012; Balabanova et al., 2013; Spicer et al., 2014; IHP+ Results, 2015; Reich et al., 
2016). Its overall health status is still lower than the global average, but most of its health 
indicators are now rapidly improving, due to the effective implementation of the HSDPs under 
strong country leadership. A health specialist interviewee from one of the large bilateral donors 
noted the progress as follows: 
They have done much better than any other country in this part of the world with 
resources less than what they have spent. However, the counter-argument is that because 
they were low at the start, they still have a long way to go. (Participant BLH_1, 
personal interview, March 23, 2017) 
Data from the Global Health Observatory of the WHO (2017c) shows that during the 
implementation of the HSDP, life expectancy in Ethiopia increased, the fertility rate decreased, 
and the country achieved most of the health and health-related MDGs. Life expectancy at birth 
started to rise above the SSA average at the beginning of the HSDP in 1997/98. It increased at 
a rate of 28.4% to reach an average of 64.5 years in 2015 from 50.3 years in 1997. The fastest 
growth rate (9.1%) in life expectancy and a decrease in the fertility rate compared to the SSA 
average was observed during HSDP-III (2004/05–2009/10). (see Appendix G). According to 
Abajobir et al. (2017), this improvement was ‘beyond expectation’, given the level of economic 
development in the country.  
The success that Ethiopia achieved in attaining the health and health-related goals of the MDGs 
could explain Ethiopia’s remarkable achievements in its health sector. According to the 2014 
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UNDP MDGs report (2015), ‘Ethiopia has successfully achieved six of the eight MDGs’. The 
majority of the MDGs achieved were health and health-related goals as shown in Appendix L, 
and the major ones are discussed as follows:  
Ethiopia reduced the under-five child and infant (less than 1 year) mortality rate (<5MR and 
IMR) per 1,000 live births by 71% and 65%, respectively, from the year 1990 to 2014, and met 
the 67% (two-thirds child mortality) target of MDG 4 early in 2012/13 (see Appendix L and 
Graph 8). During the HSDP implementation period (1997 to 2014), <5MR was reduced by 
62% and IMR by 57%, while the highest reduction for <5MR was recorded during HSDP-III 
(26%) and HSDP-IV (25%). Subsequent to the introduction of the HSDP in 1997, Ethiopia had 
gradually reduced child mortality and had the lowest average <5MR (68) and IMR (46) per 
1,000 live births in SSA (which had averages of 95 and 62, respectively) and for low-income 
countries (which had averages of 90 and 60, respectively) at the completion of the MDG period. 
The achievements in the reduction of the child mortality rates were attributed to family 
planning interventions in Ethiopia (Yigzaw et al., 2015) and the intensification of primary 
health service coverage, which covered 94% of the population in 2013/14 (UNDP, 2015). 
Graph 5: Child mortality rate per 1,000 live births in Ethiopia vs. SSA and low-income countries (1990–2015) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data by UN/DESA and World Bank (2017) 
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Maternal mortality rates per 100,000 live births for Ethiopia dropped by 71% from the year 
1990 to 2015, although the country did not meet the respective MDGs target of three-quarters 
reduction (UNDP, 2015). However, the MMR, which was higher (1,250) than the MMR 
average for SSA (987) and for low-income countries (1,010) in 1990, dropped to 353 and fell 
far below the SSA average (547) and the average for low-income countries (496) at the 
completion of the MDG period in 2014/15. Throughout the HSDP period, the MMR for 
Ethiopia decreased by 65% on average, with the highest rate of reduction recorded (52%) 
during HSDP-III.  
Graph 6: Maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births in Ethiopia vs. SSA and low-income countries (1990–2015) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data by UN/DESA (2017) and World Bank (2018e) 
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Graph 7: Incidence of tuberculosis per 100,000 live births for Ethiopia vs. SSA and low-income countries 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from World Development Indicators by the World Bank (2018e) 
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and 16,440 health posts (Ministry of Health, 1997/98-2014/15, 2015b; Reich et al., 2016). This 
increased access to primary health services at the grassroots level in a flexible and equitable 
health delivery approach (Balabanova et al., 2013; McIntyre and Meheus, 2013) that 
contributed to healthcare access and health service quality ‘beyond what was expected’.  
5.9 Conclusions 
Ethiopia, through its visionary HSDPs, has achieved fast progress and impressive results in the 
health sector. This is largely due to the joint and consistent efforts of the Ministry of Health 
and its health partners as part of country-owned and government-led health development 
coordination. This study provides evidence that the accomplishments in the health sector can 
be credited to the synergetic concurrence of health plans, the leadership of the Ministry of 
Health, health development assistance from the DPs, and the joint efforts of both parties 
through coordination platforms.  
First, the HSDP set the foundation for strong country ownership. Principally, the woreda-based 
planning exercises in Ethiopia, as part of ‘One Plan, One Budget, One Report’ principles, 
further boosted country ownership, which extends from the Ministry at the federal level to the 
local and community level (through the HEP). In addition, the health sector goals and its clear 
priorities were the basis for alignment of the health DPs with the government’s priorities and 
essential to the country-led health development coordination. At the same time, these health 
priorities and targets set result frameworks for the partnership between the DPs and the 
government, so that the DPs committed to bring about changes in the health sector.  
Second, given the conducive health policy and program, the Ministry was strong enough to 
take the ‘driver’s seat’ in the designing and implementation of its own health development 
agenda. The political commitment and professional capability of the top leadership and its firm 
commitment to exercise country ownership of health development played a significant role in 
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bringing about results. The government also showed strong ownership by increasing public 
health expenditure, as well as a strong commitment to the priorities of the health sector. The 
total health expenditure for Ethiopia increased throughout the implementation of the HSDP; 
the share contributed by the government in terms of per capita expenditure and as a percentage 
of total health expenditure, as well as a percentage of GDP, have risen constantly. The low 
level of corruption in the Ministry, which has been exceptional in Africa, also contributed to 
the strengthening of trust in country ownership in the sector. 
Third, looking at the principles of the Paris Declaration (ownership. alignment, harmonization), 
the commitment of the DPs to support the sector with a substantial amount of health aid and 
their high level of engagement in the health development coordination platforms were 
indispensable and imperative to the remarkable results achieved by Ethiopia in the health 
sector. Given its level, aid was also of a ‘high quality’, because it was consistent and well 
aligned with the goals and priorities of the health sector programs. The DPs shared the 
ownership of the health programs and showed a strong commitment to align and harmonize 
their support with local demands through the preferred financing channels, like the MDG PF, 
which gave more leverage for the Ministry to develop solid ownership over its health 
development agenda.  
Fourth, the coordination platforms have also been essential units in multiplying the joint efforts 
of the Ministry and the DPs in the country-led health development coordination process. These 
platforms were essential to sector-level policy dialogue and joint decisions in relation to 
financing and coordinating all the efforts in the health sector. The good results in the health 
sector attracted both big and small donors to the coordination platforms, making the health 
sector a ‘donor darling’ sector in a ‘donor darling’ country.  
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 169
 
159 
 
However, there are also challenges in Ethiopia’s health sector that call for improved 
coordination. Primarily, there is the high level of dependence by the health sector on external 
financing, which is distorting the structure of health financing in Ethiopia, even though it is 
low compared to some SSA countries like Malawi. The other major challenge is that aid 
fragmentation, which increased after the Paris Declaration, is high in the sector. This is mainly 
due to small-sized bilateral donors involved in the population policies and reproductive health 
sub-sector. On top of that, almost half of the donors’ contributions, like that of the Global Fund, 
goes through different competing channels, which creates parallel structures in the Ministry of 
Health, and, in turn, creates parallel accounting and power centers. However, the coordination 
platforms and the joint financing arrangements contributed to reducing the effects of aid 
fragmentation and increasing aid effectiveness in the sector. Ethiopia can thus be seen as an 
example of the fact that aid fragmentation should not be a major problem when most of the aid 
is aligned with strong local ownership and coordinated in joint financing arrangements in ‘One 
Plan, One Budget, One Report’ practices. Private sector and civil society participation in high-
level health development coordination platforms, however, is also almost absent, and the 
coordination capacity declines as it goes down to the regional and local levels. Also, here 
improvements could be found. 
The HEP has been exemplary in promoting a community-based and innovative primary health 
service delivery approach, which brought about significant change in the health sector and has 
changed the health system structure (Burki, 2016; Mullan, 2016) and helped the country to 
realize national and international health development goals and targets (McIntyre and Meheus, 
2013; Admasu et al., 2016; Reich et al., 2016). The role of the leadership in achieving these 
results, with less investment than anticipated, has attracted more backing for the health sector 
from the DPs and increased the level of country ownership in the health sector. Generally, a 
lesson can be drawn that aid works if anchored in country and community ownership and when 
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donors increase their commitment in a strong partnership and managed according to the aid 
effectiveness principles. This combination of 1) strong and professional leadership (also in 
combating corruption), 2) visionary plans which are also based on the lowest level inputs, 3) 
alignment of the donors with plans and financing instruments, and 4) an emphasis on Primary 
Health Care with capacity building at the lowest levels should or could be an example for other 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The politics of development and the effectiveness of aid in developing countries, in particular 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, is a hotly debated issue, looking at titles of books alone, like ‘The 
Trouble with Africa’ (Calderisi, 2006), ‘The Trouble with Aid’ (Glennie, 2010), even ‘Dead 
Aid’ (Moyo, 2009). Empirical findings in this array of ‘radicalistic’ or ‘reformist’ literature 
and assumptions on aid effectiveness are thus inconclusive. In response, partly to these debates 
and in the formulation of an aid effectiveness agenda, the international donor community at 
least theoretically commends the increased stewardship role of the aid-recipient agent in the 
aid architecture instead of exogenous control as in the traditional principal-agent approach. The 
motives of this global reform of development cooperation are clearly articulated in the 2005 
Paris Declaration. In that case, the principal policy assumption of the Paris Agenda emphasizes 
the role of recipients as stewards of their development agenda, which implies strong country 
ownership and the promotion of country-led and -owned development coordination reinforced 
by alignment and harmonization of donors’ support that in turn should achieve the mutual 
objectives of aid effectiveness (OECD, 2008c, 2011c).  
The Paris Declaration agenda influences the development assistance policies of donors and the 
attitudes of the recipients, and it reshapes donor-recipient relationships in the aid and 
development coordination architecture (Gore, 2013; Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017). 
However, evaluation surveys on the Paris Agenda show that, overall, little has been achieved, 
and they even find stagnation in some areas in translating the policy objectives and 
commitments into practice, although there were also differences seen in performance among 
recipient countries (Odén and Wohlgemuth, 2011; OECD, 2011a; Wood et al., 2011). Ethiopia, 
for example, achieved five out of the 12 indicators set by the OECD to measure progress in 
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implementing the Paris Declarations, while the global average was achieving only one of the 
12 (OECD, 2011b, 2011a).  
This may explain that the differences in performance in the implementation of the Paris Agenda 
principles could be on account of in-country context specificities. This sounds right because 
the vast portion of related literature suggests that aid effectiveness and the dynamics of donor-
recipient relationships would best be understood with due consideration of the political 
economy context of the recipient partner, also because aid is mainly a political tool and 
development is a political process (Morgenthau, 1962; Mosley, 1985; Hout, 2004; Dreher et 
al., 2011; Hout, 2012). In that case, for example, studying country ownership and donor 
coordination dynamics in a ‘developmental state’ setting should tell a particularly important 
story. In this analysis, Ethiopia is selected as a good critical case to explain specific problems 
and questions in the aid-effectiveness discourses. 
For the last 30 years, since the early 1990s, Ethiopia has been recognized as a ‘developmental 
state’ in Africa with a fast-growing economy. The Ethiopian ‘developmental state’ is one of 
the well-defined models in Sub-Saharan Africa (Routley, 2014; Clapham, 2018). However, 
with a high centralization of power together with the tacitly entrenched motives of the Marxist-
Leninist-Maoist ideology, along with a political elite in the ‘driver’s seat’, Ethiopia gradually 
became an ‘authoritarian developmental state’ (Matfess, 2015). In contrast to the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ prescriptions of neo-liberal reforms and liberal democracy, the EPRDF 
government leaned on its ambitious agriculture-based transformative development objectives, 
even at the expense of the basic human and democratic rights of its citizens. Nonetheless, in 
the past two decades starting in the 2000s, the international community increased its support, 
and Ethiopia has become one of the top aid recipients in Africa, with an increase in donors in 
its aid landscape despite the repressive and authoritarian nature of the government. This 
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paradox of aid politics towards Ethiopia has become a growing issue for human rights 
organizations and academics as well (Easterly and Freschi, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
With these controversies and big increases in aid and the number of donors, the aim of this 
dissertation was, therefore, to produce empirical evidence on how policy assumptions of the 
Paris Agenda are translated into practices in the aid architecture, and how ownership and 
effective coordination are explained in the context of ‘developmental state’ regimes, taking 
Ethiopia as a critical case. This analysis on a national level was further substantiated by micro-
level analysis in two selected sectors in Ethiopia: the health sector, which is one of the ‘donor 
darling’ sectors (next to education), and the agriculture sector, which is the mainstay of the 
economy but seen as a ‘difficult’ and ‘neglected’ aid investment area in Ethiopia. The following 
sections present the major findings and discussions of each of the studies as well as the 
theoretical and policy implications of the studies. 
6.2 Main findings and discussions 
In this section, the findings of the specific studies are presented and discussed in such a way as 
to answer the principal questions addressed in the studies. This presents an opportunity to 
recount the empirical findings with the existing related literature and with the respective policy 
assumptions, as well. Likewise, the main findings from the studies are discussed to draw 
implications and contributions to the existing literature. 
6.2.1 How do aid and development politics affect donor-recipient relations? 
It is commonly said that development is mainly a political process and donors largely use aid 
as an instrument in that political process. In that line of argument, a set of literature contends 
that foreign aid has been ineffective, as the ‘aid rationale’ by bilateral donors (which mainly 
relates to security, political and diplomatic influence, commercial benefits, and maintaining 
colonial ties, but also humanitarian objectives and finding legitimacy from the taxpayers at 
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home for the ‘value of their money’) has been imperative in determining the size and 
composition of aid in the donor-recipient relationship (Morgenthau, 1962; Mosley, 1985; 
Boone, 1996; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dreher et al., 2008, 2011; Werker, 2012). On the other 
hand, as substantiated by the stewardship theory, it is argued that the internal political context, 
the capability and motivation of the political elite and the bureaucracy in a recipient 
government, along with its policy choices and sense of ownership are also important in defining 
the relationships (Leftwich, 1994, 1995; Booth, 2012, 2015; Evans and Heller, 2015; 
Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017). In between, it is argued that both the donor and its 
recipient partner strengthen the coordination of their mutual efforts and increase the 
effectiveness of aid when their objectives converge, principally in poverty reduction (World 
Bank, 2001; Martens, 2005; Werker, 2012). Therefore, this study assumes that the combined 
effect of the motives of donors, the political context and nature of the aid-recipient regime, and 
other intermediary factors (like additional sources of finance other than ODA and relations with 
‘new’ donors) shape the donor-recipient relationships, which are mirrored in the size and 
composition of aid flows and the effectiveness of aid. Therefore, the study in Chapter Two aims 
to contribute to the debate by posing the following question. 
How does the political economy context in Ethiopia influence the magnitude, sources, 
and composition of foreign aid flows throughout the evolution of donor-government 
relations across the three regimes in Ethiopia? 
The first study in Chapter Two shows that the magnitude and composition of foreign aid to 
Ethiopia have changed in the last two decades since 2000, compared to its status under the 
preceding two governments during the Haile Selassie and Derg governments, when aid was 
low and composed mainly of humanitarian and food aid due to the large-scale famines during 
the mid-1970s and 1980s. Ethiopia, a ‘pariah’ during the 1980s, has become a ‘donor darling’, 
specifically from 2000, and this has changed the aid system in Ethiopia in several ways.  
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First, aid has become more developmental since the share of country programmable aid (CPA) 
has increased remarkably, despite the fact that the portion of humanitarian aid and debt relief 
is still significant. Second, finance from other external sources, including FDI, remittances by 
Ethiopian migrants, and aid from INGOs and private organizations is rising from the early 
2000s, but ODA is still the main source of external finance for Ethiopia, and the level of the 
economy’s dependence on foreign aid is increasing.  
Third, support from traditional donors, particularly from the large-sized donors, is still 
dominant in the aid architecture in Ethiopia. However, the presence of non-traditional donors 
(mainly China), vertical donors (like the Global Fund and GAVI), and private aid providers in 
the aid landscape is growing. This has increased the complexity of the aid landscape in Ethiopia 
and changed the nature of it. For example, aid from China is mainly composed of loans that 
flow more to the economic and production sectors (the transportation infrastructure and energy 
development), unlike the support of the traditional donors, who are inclined to give more aid 
to the social sectors as well as to humanitarian and food aid and to debt forgiveness. This 
upsurge in aid from multiple sources has also increased the negotiation power of the Ethiopian 
government with the donors from both the South and the West with high leverage in its 
development agenda and priorities. 
The findings support the idea that the dynamics in the political economy context explain the 
changing aspects of donor-recipient relations as expressed in the magnitude and composition 
of aid. In the case of Ethiopia, for example, in the period before and during the Cold War, the 
political and strategic interests were more important in aid-giving decisions for most donors, 
in particular for the US. The absence of colonial alliances (Ethiopia was never colonized), the 
joining of the Derg regime to the band of communist ideology, and social and political 
institutions that discouraged the receiving of foreign aid had limited the relationships only to 
humanitarian support in the years of famine, mainly resulting from altruistic motives. 
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The study also substantiates that donor-recipient relations from the late 1990s were fortified 
mainly by goal convergence around poverty reduction. Both the donors and most aid-recipient 
governments labeled poverty as a crucial source of national security (World Bank, 2001; 
Werker, 2012). The large size of aid flows observed from the early 2000s is mainly associated 
with the motives of the international community to reduce security risks, either directly by 
supporting governments in a strategic alliance in the fight against terrorism (Ethiopia is a good 
example) or indirectly supporting poor countries to successfully implement their poverty 
reduction strategies in meeting the MDGs, although some donors might see this objective of 
poverty reduction not as a security risk but in the light of international human rights 
conventions. The 9/11 act of terrorism, for example, reinforced the idea of strengthening 
relationships with state governments and the use of government structures in the 
implementation of development projects (Howell, 2006; Azam and Thelen, 2008). This implies 
that countries who invest more in the pro-poor sectors, in turn, optimize the utility of donors 
that aim their aid towards reducing national security risks. This gets more support from some 
of the traditional donors, like the US.  
This partly explains the substantial increase in development assistance to Ethiopia from the 
2000s, even though Ethiopia was seen as an ‘authoritarian’ developmental state, known for the 
violations of human and democratic rights in the last three decades. This supports the existing 
literature that donors are often more concerned with optimizing the value of their aid in meeting 
their interests or objectives than with accomplishing the human rights and good governance 
standards they theoretically promote (Mosley, 1985; Boone, 1996; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; 
Hout, 2004; Dreher et al., 2011), even if for other donors, like the Scandinavian countries, the 
Netherlands, and Ireland, the emphasis on poverty reduction and successes in the social sectors 
were an important driver to provide more development assistance. 
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The findings also suggest that due to changes in the political economy of aid recipients and 
global reforms in aid effectiveness, the nature and complexity of the aid architecture is 
changing. For example, the negotiation power of the EPRDF government increased as its 
sources for external finance increased by strengthening its relations with the ‘new’ donors from 
the Global South (mainly China) and with the vertical global donors (Global Fund and GAVI), 
as well as by expanding its choices for other sources of finance besides ODA, including FDI, 
remittances, and INGOs. These together with increased autonomy and power of the political 
elite resulting from the ‘developmental state’ form of governance reinforced the stewardship 
role of the government, and changed the nature of the traditional principal-agent kind of donor-
recipient relationships in the aid architecture. This establishes a context for understanding 
coordination and ownership in the aid architecture during the process of translating theoretical 
and policy assumptions in the discourse into realities on the ground. 
6.2.2 Putting policy assumptions of the Paris Agenda into practice in a ‘developmental 
state’ context 
The traditional principal-agent approach of development cooperation, which is mainly 
reinforced by conditionality and control by donors, is assumed to decrease aid effectiveness 
(White and Morrissey, 1997; Paul, 2006; Gore, 2013; Brolin, 2017). The traditional approach 
is deemed to undermine the agency of the recipient and the role of ownership as well as mutual 
trust in the development cooperation. In response, from the 1990s, markedly since the 2005 
Paris Declaration, the global community promotes reform on aid effectiveness with a strong 
emphasis on coordination anchored on country ownership (OECD, 2008c, 2011c). The 
assumption is that foreign aid that supports country ownership and is coordinated in country-
owned and -led coordination arrangements with strong agency of the recipient increases aid 
effectiveness. However, the literature is thin with regard to how these policy assumptions 
following the Paris and Busan principles turn out in practice in a ‘developmental state’ context 
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and what then explains country ownership in the coordination architecture. The study in 
Chapter Three aims to contribute to the related discourse in the literature by posing the 
following question: 
How do policy assumptions according to the Paris and Busan principles turn into 
practices in a ‘developmental state’ context like in Ethiopia, and how is country 
ownership explained in this process? 
The second study, in Chapter Three, concludes that Ethiopia, as a pioneer in institutionalizing 
contemporary donor coordination principles, has shown encouraging results in implementing 
and sustaining practical, country-led donor coordination. This was principally due to the strong 
agency of the government, as reflected particularly in the Development Assistance Group 
(DAG) sector working groups, while donors were also mutually committed to strengthening 
country ownership. Specific findings from the study further revealed the following: 1) Donor 
coordination has well-defined structures in Ethiopia and is led by the relevant ministries, but a 
real dialogue is often absent, which means that donor coordination is sometimes mainly 
technical. 2) Not all donors adhere to the principles of the Paris Agenda. The like-minded 
donors and the large donors, including the Nordics, the United Kingdom, and The Netherlands, 
are very active in the coordination platforms, but some of the large donors, like the World Bank 
and the United States, sometimes go it alone and at the same time have more influence. 
Newcomers like China are absent in the coordination fora. 3) Aid is still fragmented, and 
fragmentation is high at the sector level in Ethiopia; but the ‘good practices’ of Program-Based 
Approaches (PBAs) in the flagship programs, which are showing impressive results in 
Ethiopia, reinforce donor coordination. 4) Other parallel coordination structures, including the 
EU+ and One UN Systems of joint programming, appear to be a duplication without much 
added value for donor coordination in Ethiopia. 
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The findings show that putting the policy assumptions of the Paris Agenda into practice and 
constructing ownership in the coordination landscape in the context of developmental states 
like Ethiopia is complicated and that the results are mixed. On the one hand, it appears that 
strong ownership and coordination by aid-recipient governments like Ethiopia and Rwanda are 
tied to the attributes of their developmental states model. In such models, the strong 
commitment of the political elite to developmental objectives would reasonably strengthen 
their commitment in defending their development agenda and priorities against the influence 
of donors with substantial negotiation powers in the development cooperation architecture, as 
is observed in the experience of some East Asian developmental states (Kim et al., 2013). In 
that sense, the EPRDF government showed high resistance to the influence of donors’ 
conditionalities and demonstrated strong ownership of its development agenda and insistence 
upon doing development its own way (see also Borchgrevink, 2008; Alemu and Scoones, 2013; 
Dittgen and Demissie, 2017). 
Even so, the development model in the emerging developmental states in Africa, as in the case 
of Ethiopia and Rwanda, which is characterized by ‘authoritarian developmentalism’ (Matfess, 
2015; Mann and Berry, 2016), gives excessive power and autonomy to the central government, 
which results in top-down coordination in the development coordination (Grimm, 2010). This, 
in turn, increases a tendency for the governments to exclusively retain developmental 
responsibility and to leave out the civil society and the private sector in the coordination 
architecture. The centralized control of development coordination in the developmental state 
regimes could also limit the practice of ‘real’ policy dialogue in the coordination landscape, as 
is clearly reflected in the case of Ethiopia. This implies that the tendency to practice ownership 
through excessive power and autonomy by the government, as prescribed by the developmental 
state theory, limits the translation of the policy assumptions in the Paris Agenda, which define 
‘ownership’ in a broader scope to include also ‘civil society organizations’.  
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On the other hand, the findings show that the increased level of commitment by the lead donors 
in the joint coordination structures in a technocratic approach, along with the strong political 
commitment from the government to the aid effectiveness agenda, as also demonstrated by 
Rwanda (Grimm, 2010), led to ‘good practices’ of Program-Based Approaches (PBAs) and 
country-owned and -led coordination that reinforce joint ownership in the coordination 
architecture. The Ethiopian practices of multi-donor basket/pooled funding arrangements to 
finance and coordinate the national flagship programs, especially the joint financing 
arrangement in the case of the Sustainable Development Goals Performance Fund (SDG PF) 
in the health sector, which is exclusively administered by the Ministry, show best practices in 
the realization of policy assumptions in the spirit of the Paris Agenda. Such arrangements 
generally lead to the use of ‘one plan, one budget, one report’ (OECD, 2008c), which ideally 
reinforces the implementation of effective joint ownership and coordination.  
However, although the joint ownership and coordination practices are supposed to minimize 
the goal divergence and information asymmetry problems of the agency theory, this, according 
to Hayman (2009), may gradually conceal ownership of the recipient partner, as observed in 
the case of Rwanda. The problem is also partly reflected in the multi-donor trust fund flagship 
programs in Ethiopia, which sometimes limit the flexibility and control of the government over 
the aid that donors put in the basket. This shows that joint coordination structures, if not fully 
led by the government in the ‘driver’s seat’, may not truly reflect the true essence of ownership 
as suggested by the stewardship principles. Likewise, the findings from the Ethiopian case also 
show that donors could indirectly sponsor ‘authoritarian developmentalism’ by supporting 
PBAs that encourage the utilization of funds through government structures only, although 
approaches as stated in the Paris Agenda should be useful in strengthening broader ownership 
and coordination. For example, by financing the PBS program in Ethiopia, in which most of 
the funds flow through the government bureaucracy, donors are accused of contributing to the 
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increased level of human and democratic rights violations in Ethiopia, and also of inhibiting 
accountability of the government to the domestic constituency. 
The study also shows that, even in the context of relatively functional donor coordination 
platforms and centralized coordination structures, aid fragmentation, which mainly emanates 
from the bilateral donors, has continued as a major flip side of coordination and of the 
implementation of the Paris Agenda. This is mainly due to the divergent political and other 
independent motives of bilateral donors (Lawson, 2011; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013). This 
supports the literature that aid fragmentation increased even after the 2005 Paris Declaration 
(Lawson, 2011; Wood et al., 2011; Martínez-Álvarez and Acharya, 2012; Bigsten and 
Tengstam, 2015; Nunnenkamp et al., 2016; Habraken et al., 2017), particularly in SSA 
countries (Fløgstad and Hagen, 2017). The other major pitfall of coordination in these aid-
dependent countries in Africa is that China, which is also the one of the major actors in the aid 
architecture, is not included in the coordination platforms as commonly observed in Sub-
Saharan Africa, as in Ethiopia and Rwanda (Grimm, 2010). 
6.2.3 The sector-specific context that explains country ownership 
Based on the assumption that the traditional form of the principal-agent approach has 
practically failed to ensure aid effectiveness (White and Morrissey, 1997; Paul, 2006; Gore, 
2013; Brolin, 2017), the international community has advocated reforms in the aid relationship 
since the mid-1990s by substituting it with a new approach (Gore, 2013) that emphasizes 
coordination for aid effectiveness. However, there is not much research that addresses how 
coordination and ownership are explained in a sector-specific context of a developmental state. 
The studies in Chapters Four and Five contribute to the discussion by analyzing what sector-
specific factors explain effective coordination in developing countries: 
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 184
 
174 
 
How do sector-specific factors explain effective coordination in the health and 
agriculture sectors in Ethiopia, and to what extent do they affect results being 
achieved? 
The studies in Chapters Four and Five focused on the health and agriculture sectors with the 
aim of further understanding donor coordination in Ethiopia at the sectoral level. The studies 
show mixed results between the two sectors. In general, our studies disclose that the 
government of Ethiopia shows strong political commitment and country ownership in 
coordinating and financing its agricultural and health development plans jointly with its 
development partners. The health sector shows that strong leadership and good plans not only 
facilitate donor coordination and alignment, but also produce remarkable results. Meanwhile, 
in the agriculture sector, which is, of course, a more complex sector, it appears far more difficult 
to develop practical plans and to align donors. 
Detailed analysis of the two sectors further shows some incongruities in the execution of donor 
coordination. First, in the agriculture sector, the medium-term strategic plans were lost 
somewhere between the Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) and operational plans, 
making donor coordination difficult in practice. In contrast, in the health sector, the Health 
Sector Development Plan (HSDP), which was persistently implemented for more than two 
decades from 1997 through four consecutive medium-term strategic plans, has been the 
principal instrument for donor coordination and alignment in the sector. Principally, the 
woreda-based planning based on the ‘One Plan, One Budget, One Report’ principle established 
a ‘best practice’ of donor coordination with impressive results and great improvements in 
nearly all health indicators. 
Second, the big donors still neglect the agriculture sector in Ethiopia. The CPA share of the 
large-sized donors, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU institutions, 
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African Development Bank, and Japan, in the sector was insignificant and dispersed. 
Meanwhile, health has been a ‘donor darling’ sector, and the HSDP has consistently benefited 
from the generous support of the large and medium-sized donors – a condition that, on the other 
hand, resulted in a high level of dependence by the sector on external financing. 
Third, coordination in the agriculture sector has been complex, despite the fact that it has also 
been functional. This is partly because the sector is vast and involves agriculture, fishery, 
forestry, and livestock and is interlinked with many other related sectors, like industry and 
infrastructure. In that light, the health sector seems less complex, easier to manage, and maybe 
thus characterized by simple and functional donor coordination with active participation from 
almost all of its development partners. 
Fourth, the level of aid fragmentation in the agriculture sector is relatively low compared to 
other top agricultural aid recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and also to the health sector 
in Ethiopia. Most of the large-sized donors, however, are sources of aid fragmentation in the 
agriculture sector. Meanwhile, compared to other similar top DAH recipient SSA countries, 
aid fragmentation in the health sector in Ethiopia was high, and it even increased after the Paris 
Declaration. The level of fragmentation was substantially higher than that of the agriculture 
sector, and this was mainly due to the presence of small-sized bilateral donors involved in the 
population policies and reproductive health sub-sector.  
Fifth, donor coordination around the flagship programs and the use of joint financing 
arrangements, which are the common PBAs and preferred instruments of the government of 
Ethiopia, are encouraging in both the sectors. In the agriculture sector, with the exception of 
the Agricultural Growth Program (AGP) that is financed by a multi-donor fund administered 
by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and the Sustainable 
Land Management Program (SLMP) are financed by multi-donor trust funds administered by 
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the World Bank. This trust fund approach limits the flexibility of the government. On the other 
hand, the use of the Sustainable Development Goals Performance Fund (SDG PF), which is 
the multi-donor fund administered by the Ministry of Health, not only increased the quality of 
aid to the sector, it also reinforced strong country ownership and alignment of donors, and it 
reduced at the same time the negative effects of aid fragmentation on aid effectiveness in the 
sector. Finally, the participation and role of the private sector, civil society, and the traditional 
donors at the top levels in the coordination structures of the two sectors are almost absent.  
In general, our studies concluded that well-structured and functional coordination structures 
anchored in strong country ownership in Ethiopia reinforce aid effectiveness and have resulted 
in success in sectors like health. This supports the existing literature that strong country 
ownership is central for improved donor coordination and in turn for aid effectiveness (OECD, 
2008c; Goldberg and Bryant, 2012; Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017). Our study also 
demonstrated that aid fragmentation is high in Ethiopia, as in most of the other African 
countries. However, unlike the findings of similar studies in other African countries (Odén and 
Wohlgemuth, 2011; Leiderer, 2015; Nunnenkamp et al., 2016; Habraken et al., 2017), progress 
in realizing the Paris Agenda on aid effectiveness is encouraging, mainly because donors in 
Ethiopia do exercise ‘good practices’ of Program-Based Approaches (PBAs) and most of the 
donors, particularly the large and influential ones, are active in the government-led donor 
coordination structures in the context of strong country ownership. 
Findings from the comparative analysis of the two sectors, which are within a relatively 
different sectoral context, show what explains effective coordination and how it affects results 
of aid investment. The studies suggest that the main sector-specific factors that explain 
coordination and ownership include consistency of the sectoral development plans, capability 
of the leadership, functionality and complexity of the coordination structures, applicability of 
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 187
 
177 
 
the program-based approaches, and sector prioritization of donors. Each of the factors is 
discussed as follows: 
1) Long-term and aligned development plans: Visionary and well-periodized home-based 
national development plans are the primary instruments for ownership and coordination (World 
Bank, 1998; OECD, 2008c; World Bank, 2008; Brown, 2017; Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 
2017). This ownership of priorities gives more sense to the regimes of ‘developmental states’ 
who are attributed to their ‘developmental objectives’. In this sense, the Ethiopian Ministry of 
Health has operated as a keen example of an efficient and dedicated bureaucracy in Ethiopia, 
as a developmental state. The vision and consistency of the four consecutive Health Sector 
Development Plans (HSDPs) implemented through the woreda-based planning, based on the 
‘One Plan, One Budget, One Report’ principle on the one hand, and the broken link between 
the Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) and operational plans in the agriculture sectors, on 
the other hand, clearly explain successes and failures in donor coordination and the subsequent 
results, respectively.  
2) Capacity and motivation of the leadership: According to the stewardship approach, aid-
recipient governments that are determined to reach their developmental objectives and 
priorities would be better stewards of their national priorities. This requires leadership with a 
capacity to formulate its own development agenda and with a strong political commitment to 
achieve the national goals and to defend the priorities (Booth, 2012; Hasselskog and 
Schierenbeck, 2017). This increases legitimacy and strategic support from donors (Disch, 
1999; Borchgrevink, 2008) and prevents unwanted influence of donors during the formulation 
of the national agenda (Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017). In that case, because of the 
‘developmental state’ nature of the government of Ethiopia, the top leadership of both sectors 
did show strong political commitment to be the owner of the development agenda and 
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priorities. However, differences in the capacity of the top leadership and its institutions in the 
two sectors explain the differences in the quality of coordination and in the respective results. 
3) Functionality of coordination platforms: Effective coordination increases aid effectiveness 
and has positive effects on poverty reduction (Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015). Policy 
assumptions of the Paris Agenda and theoretical suggestions from the stewardship approach 
show that coordination structures that are owned and led by the aid-recipient government would 
be relatively functional. In that case, the leadership of both sectors showed their commitment 
to country-owned and -led coordination platforms. However, the level of complexity of the 
coordination structures affects the level of functionality of the coordination platforms. The 
simple and manageable size of the coordination structure in the health sector, unlike the case 
in the agriculture sector, resulted in functional donor coordination with active participation 
from almost all of its development partners.  
4) Increased use of Program-Based Approaches (PBAs): PBAs are vital instruments for 
effective coordination as they reinforce ownership as well as mutual trust and partnership 
(Foster and Leavy, 2001; Acharya et al., 2006; Bandstein, 2007; Martínez-Álvarez and 
Acharya, 2012; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015; Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017). The use of 
innovative modalities like the Sustainable Development Goals Performance Fund (SDG PF), 
which is the multi-donor fund administered by the Ministry of Health, not only increased the 
quality of aid to the sector, it also reinforced strong country ownership and alignment of donors 
and at the same time contributed to producing better results. The flagship programs, except the 
AGP that is minor in size, are coordinated through a multi-donor trust funds structure, and this 
approach might limit the control and flexibility of the government in administering the aid by 
donors. 
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5) Sector prioritization by donors: Development assistance policies of the traditional donors 
that commonly prioritize support to the social sectors also affect the commitment of donors to 
coordination, and that would result in development cooperation. The neglect of the agriculture 
sector in aid allocation in general is also reflected by a low CPA share to agriculture in Ethiopia 
and a significant contribution of the large donors to the level of aid fragmentation in the sector, 
despite its strategic contribution to the growth of the economy. In contrast, the health sector 
has been a ‘donor darling’ sector with generous support from many traditional donors. 
Analysis of the two sectors, as also reflected by the analysis at the country level, also shows 
that policy dialogue and a low level of participation of civil society and the private sector in 
the coordination architecture are major flip sides of coordination in Ethiopia. This is partly 
explained by ‘developmental state’ theory, which basically lets civil society and the private 
sectors play a ‘subordinate’ role in economic and social development. Particularly in 
‘authoritarian’ developmental state regimes like in the case of Ethiopia and Rwanda, the ruling 
party hegemony with the party-sponsored mass organizations leaves little room for civil society 
in development coordination. This ultimately might put the sustainability and the effectiveness 
of economic and social development, as well as the success of development cooperation and 
coordination, in question. Instead of this central control of coordination, as also analyzed by 
Feyissa (2011), the EPRDF government could have had more leverage for sustainable 
development and coordination by embedding state power in the ‘real’ civil society, as strongly 
recommended by Evans and Heller (2015) and by increasing the participation of the private 
sector in the coordination structures as is witnessed from the successes of East-Asian countries 
like South Korea (Kim et al., 2013) as well as from Rwanda, which is similar in its political 
economy context (Matfess, 2015). 
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6.3 Theoretical and policy implications 
6.3.1 Theoretical Implications  
The literature on aid effectiveness and the policy assumptions of the Paris Agenda assert that 
country ownership is fundamental for operative donor coordination and aid effectiveness 
(Balogun, 2005; OECD, 2008c; Booth, 2012; Goldberg and Bryant, 2012; Hasselskog and 
Schierenbeck, 2017). This appears to be supported by the developmental state theory, which 
by default gives more power and autonomy to governments and strengthens country ownership 
in development cooperation. The stewardship approach as stated in the Paris Agenda, unlike 
the traditional principal-agent approach, also gives more discretion to the recipient in the 
exercise of its country ownership. This implies that the spirit of the Paris Agenda in principle 
is better grounded in the stewardship theory than in the ‘traditional’ principal-agent theory. It 
turns out that in the studies of this thesis, country ownership from a stewardship theory 
perspective is best supported when leaning on the ‘developmental state’ theory. Country 
ownership is better explained by a political economy context, which includes the nature of 
regimes in a developmental state, and the politics of aid in a related context. Our study supports 
these findings by showing that the positive results in donor coordination and also in aid 
effectiveness in Ethiopia are partly linked to strong country ownership, which reinforces a high 
commitment by donors to align and to coordinate. This, in short, means that aid works if well-
coordinated in the context of strong country ownership. However, some authors indicate that 
the era of country ownership is fading, as general budget support (GBS) is declining 
(Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2017) and coordination is progressing slowly, leading to 
coordination ‘fatigue’ or insufficient results in the implementation of the Paris Agenda on aid 
effectiveness (Bigsten et al., 2011; Odén and Wohlgemuth, 2011; Wood et al., 2011; Martínez-
Álvarez and Acharya, 2012; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Leiderer, 2015). Nevertheless, evidence 
from the Ethiopian case partly shows that the increasing use of government-led PBAs in 
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Ethiopia has strengthened country ownership for effective donor coordination and improved 
results in the recipient partner, despite the fact that centralized control of development 
coordination due to the developmental state nature of the regime limits the benefits from ‘real’ 
policy dialogue and engagement of the civil society and the private sector in the coordination 
architecture. This reinforces the assumptions by the stewardship theory and the Paris Agenda 
principles that with strong country ownership, mainly with leadership in the ‘driver’s seat’ that 
is committed to developmental objectives, and within a functional development policy context, 
donors will align and coordination will be more effective. This alignment and coordination 
around functional development programs, in turn, will result in higher aid effectiveness in aid-
recipient countries. 
6.3.2 Policy Implications 
This study basically shows that country ownership and donor coordination around the flagship 
programs in Ethiopia are relatively robust and effective. Despite some flip sides, the 
functionality of the coordination platforms and the practices in the management of the flagship 
programs imply that enriching development cooperation policies in a way that strengthens the 
‘good practices’ of PBAs may be fundamental for sustained and better results in aid 
effectiveness in Ethiopia. Particularly, the practices of joint financing arrangements in the SDG 
PF in the Ministry of Health and the AGP in the Ministry of Agriculture ‒ both of them are 
administered by the respective ministries ‒ are PBA models that sound practical in the 
Ethiopian context, and they could be strengthened and applied successfully in the development 
cooperation policy environment of other similar African countries.  
In general, PBAs are seen as useful instruments for better country ownership, alignment, and 
harmonization for sustainable strategic partnership and result-based performance. In Ethiopia, 
where GBS and Sector Budget Support (SBS) support are absent or minimal and also aid 
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fragmentation is high, PBAs seem to function better than GBS and SBS elsewhere. This is also 
because budget supports have been used often, indiscriminately, as conditionality instruments 
(Molenaers, 2012; Nadia Molenaers et al., 2015; N. Molenaers et al., 2015). 
The other policy implication of this study is that the government of Ethiopia should try to 
involve the non-traditional donors and consortium of the civil society organizations in the 
existing DAG coordination platforms to strengthen the complementarity of South-South 
Cooperation (SSC) and the non-state actors for inclusive donor coordination, which could 
expand the scope of alignment, harmonization, and thus aid effectiveness. This is because the 
presence and support of non-traditional donors in Ethiopia is increasing and the role of non-
state actors in the development cooperation is substantial, as Ethiopia is becoming a relatively 
important strategic partner for donors from both the South and North. This, in turn, is changing 
the nature of the coordination landscape, and the future will definitely be different in this era 
of SSC. Reorganizing the coordination platforms in such a way would, therefore, benefit future 
coordination and the agenda for better results in the Paris Agenda and in the Global Partnership 
for Effective Development Cooperation. It should also enhance aid transparency and 
information on the debt burden, since part of the SSC still operates in the dark. 
Furthermore, if donors want to have a bigger impact on poverty reduction and sustainable 
development in Ethiopia, they should also invest more in the production and economic sectors 
and strengthen coordination in these respective areas, most importantly in the agriculture 
sector. Large donors can successfully contribute more to the poverty reduction efforts in 
Ethiopia by prioritizing the agriculture sector with increased CPA and reduced aid 
fragmentation. Donors can play a vital role in strengthening country ownership in this sector 
by building leadership capacity and supporting the institutionalization of operative agricultural 
plans. In general, both donors and the government should jointly strengthen their efforts in the 
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areas that increase synergy between the policy environment, the leadership’s capacities and 
commitment, and effective coordination of aid. 
This study might also be a useful input in the formulation of strategies for more effective 
development cooperation in Ethiopia, as the country currently does not have a formal aid and 
development cooperation strategy. Donors may also use the findings from this study to review 
and enrich their existing aid and coordination policies, as well as their country cooperation 
strategies, with the aim of sustaining some best practices, like the coordination of the flagship 
programs and the joint financing approaches in Ethiopia, which could also be scaled up to the 
other African countries. Overall, insights from this study might help donors and the government 
improve their policies and procedures in the areas of 1) division of labor and specialization of 
donors; 2) coordination approaches applicable among themselves and with the government; 
and 3) strengthening country ownership and practices of PBAs for improved aid effectiveness 
and better value of money.  
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Appendices 
 
Chapter 2 
Appendix A: Top 10 ODA recipient countries (5-year average net ODA disbursements, constant, 2016 USD): 1960-
2016 
Recipient/ 
Year 
1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
2005-
2009 
2010-
2014 
2015-
2016 
Bangladesh     -    -   5,109  13,352 13,583  13,439  11,868  7,259  7,365  7,064  9,092  5,087  
Indonesia 4,453  7,307  14,076  9,630  9,652  9,327  10,485   6,946  7,598 7,055 1,269  -259  
Iraq  140   171   332   949  641  248  1,679  1,410  8,817   56,203  8,098  3,800  
Tanzania 1,471  1,328 1,984  5,280  7,468  7,118  7,314  5,843  8,793  11,246  13,111  4,876  
Afghanistan 1,002  1,312  1,082  1,222    199  483  1,799  1,181  7,150  22,422  28,427  8,306  
Ethiopia   747  985  1,475  2,099  3,242  6,851  7,272  4,518    8,338  13,479  16,290  7,261  
Syria    473     307  5,417  16,092  14,527  4,561  3,279  1,273   765  485  8,606  13,654  
DRC  4,222  3,378  3,120  3,994  4,225  4,810  2,774    970  10,831  9,394  15,256  4,696 
Israel 4,411  3,063  2,385  12,177  11,207  14,165  11,983  -   -    -     -     -  
Source: (OECD-DAC, 2018e) 
Appendix B: Yearly average net ODA disbursement and share by donor group by regimes (constant, 2016 USD): 
1960-2016 
Donor/Year 
1960-73 1974-90 1991-2016 1960-2016 
USD 
million 
Share 
USD 
million 
Share 
USD 
million 
Share 
USD 
million 
Share 
DAC Countries 162.31 83% 421.99 51% 1,123.32 52% 678 53.3% 
Multilaterals 32.97 17% 384.49 46% 1,001.24 47% 579 45.5% 
Non-DAC Countries 0.00 0% 21.57 3% 19.57 1% 15 1.2% 
Private Donors 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 15.01 1% 7 0.5% 
All Donors, Total 195.28 100% 828.04 100% 2,144.13 100% 1,273 100% 
Source: (OECD-DAC, 2018b) 
Appendix C: Top 10 bilateral donors in Ethiopia from 1960 to 2016 (constant, 2016 USD million) 
Donor Total Yearly Average 
Share (% of total 
Net ODA Flow) 
Cumulative Share 
United States 13,779.18 241.74 19% 19% 
United Kingdom 5,227.62 91.71 7% 26% 
Italy 3,642.04 63.90 5% 31% 
Germany 3,134.00 54.98 4% 36% 
Sweden 2,076.22 36.42 3% 38% 
Canada 1,934.69 33.94 3% 41% 
Netherlands 1,799.49 31.57 2% 44% 
Japan 1,549.64 27.19 2% 46% 
Norway 1,255.99 22.03 2% 47% 
Ireland 805.63 14.13 1% 49% 
Total  35,204.50 617.62 49%   
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from CRS by OECD-DAC (OECD-DAC, 2018b) 
Appendix D: Top 10 multilateral donors in Ethiopia from 1960 to 2016 (constant, 2016 USD million) 
Donor Total 
Yearly 
Average 
Share (% of total net 
ODA Flow) 
Cumulative Share 
World Bank/IDA 13,158.44 230.85 18% 18% 
EU Institutions 6,830.02 119.82 9% 28% 
African Development Bank 3,480.09 61.05 5% 32% 
WFP 2,173.82 38.14 3% 35% 
Global Fund 1,826.39 32.04 3% 38% 
UNICEF 1,140.97 20.02 2% 39% 
UNHCR 1,059.63 18.59 1% 41% 
UNDP 1,015.31 17.81 1% 42% 
GAVI 776.59 13.62 1% 43% 
IMF 428.99 7.53 1% 44% 
Total 31,890.25 559.48 44%   
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from CRS by OECD-DAC (OECD-DAC, 2018b) 
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Appendix E: Net ODA disbursement by sector aggregate to Ethiopia from 2002-2016 (constant, 2016 USD millions) 
Sector/Year Total 
Share (% of 
Total ODA) 
Share (% of 
Sub-sector 
Total ODA) 
Total All Sectors 46,540.8 100% 
 
I. Social Infrastructure & Services 18,575.9 40% 100% 
Education 3861.3 8% 21% 
Health 3990.5 9% 21% 
Population Programmes & Reproductive Health 4308.0 9% 23% 
Water Supply & Sanitation 1501.9 3% 8% 
Government & Civil Society 2080.0 4% 11% 
Other Social Infrastructure & Services 2834.3 6% 15% 
II. Economic Infrastructure & Services, Total 5,592.0 12% 100% 
Transport & Storage 3223.5 7% 58% 
Communications 73.5 0% 1% 
Energy 1654.9 4% 30% 
Banking & Financial Services 379.8 1% 7% 
III. Production Sectors, Total 3,048.0 7% 100% 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2554.3 5% 84% 
Industry, Mining, Construction 330.4 1% 11% 
Trade Policies & Regulations 123.6 0% 4% 
IV. Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting, Total 2,125.4 5% 100% 
General Environment Protection 328.6 1% 15% 
Other Multisector 1796.7 4% 85% 
V. Commodity Aid/General Programme Assistance, Total 3,756.6 8% 100% 
General Budget Support, Total 1107.5 2% 29% 
Developmental Food Aid/Food Security Assistance, Total 2616.0 6% 70% 
Other Commodity Assistance, Total 33.1 0% 1% 
VI. Action Relating to Debt, Total 5,218.5 11% 100% 
VII. Humanitarian Aid, Total 7,661.7 16% 100% 
Emergency Response, Total 7457.8 16% 97% 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation, Total 48.5 0% 1% 
Disaster Prevention & Preparedness, Total 155.4 0% 2% 
VIII. Administrative Costs of Donors, Total 79.7 0% 100% 
IX. Unallocated/Unspecified, Total 456.9 1% 100% 
(OECD-DAC, 2018g) 
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Appendix F: Government expenditure on pro-poor sectors in Ethiopia from 2001/02 to 2015/16 fiscal years, yearly 
average, (current prices, birr in millions) 
Sector/Fiscal Year 2002-04 2005-07 2008-11 2012-14 
2015-
2016 
Total, 
Yearly 
Average 
Education 3,116.9  5,222.7  16,862.3   35,559.7  61,350.0  21,784.6  
Roads 2,154.2  2,125.3  13,731.7  33,954.0  42,200.0  17,164.0  
Agriculture 1,952.0  3,685.4  6,909.4  16,068.3  24,800.0  9,674.7  
Health 1,116.3  1,261.3  4,808.3  11,232.0  20,050.0  6,811.0  
Water 796.3  1,789.9  4,435.9    11,696.0  18,200.0  6,611.0  
Total Pro-Poor Expenditure 9,135.6  14,084.6  46,747.5  108,510.0  166,600.0  62,045.2  
Total Public Expenditure 19,322.2  23,990.7  71,114.7  154,639.0  252,900.0  93,785.7  
Average Share (% of Total 
Government Expenditure) 47% 58% 65% 70% 66% 61% 
 
Average share of expenditure on pro-poor sectors (as % total pro-poor expenditure) in Ethiopia from 
2001/02 to 2015/16 fiscal years 
Sector/Fiscal Year 2002-04 2005-07 2008-11 2012-14 
2015-
2016 
Total, 
Yearly 
Average 
Education 34% 37% 36% 33% 37% 35% 
Roads 24% 15% 29% 31% 25% 28% 
Agriculture 21% 26% 15% 15% 15% 16% 
Health 12% 9% 10% 10% 12% 11% 
Water 9% 13% 9% 11% 11% 11% 
Average Share of Pro-poor 
Expenditure (% of total government 
expenditure) 
47% 58% 65% 70% 66% 61% 
Sources: Annual Progress Reports of MoFEC and IMF Country Reports from 2001/02 to 2015/16 (IMF, 2016; 
MoFEC, 2018b) 
Appendix G: Donors’ contribution to protection/promotion of basic services (PBS) from 2007-16, current prices, USD 
million 
Donor Agency 
Total Grand 
Total 
Share 
(%) 
Cumulative 
Share Grant Loan 
IDA/World Bank 1,153 801 1955 49.0% 49.0% 
DFID/United Kingdom 957 0 957 24.0% 73.0% 
Africa Development Bank 223 364 586 14.7% 87.7% 
EU Institutions 291 0 291 7.3% 95.0% 
Germany 67 0 67 1.7% 96.7% 
Irish Aid 55 0 55 1.4% 98.1% 
Spain 43 0 43 1.1% 99.1% 
Austria 21 0 21 0.5% 99.7% 
Italy 12 0 12 0.3% 100% 
Netherlands 1 0 1 0.0% 100% 
CIDA Canada 0 0 0 0.0% 100% 
Total 2,823 1,165 3,988 100%   
Source: Ethiopian Aid Management Platform (MoFEC, 2018a) 
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Appendix H: Yearly average net ODA disbursements by regimes in Ethiopia (constant, 2016 USD million) 
Regime Range of Years 
Yearly Average Share, 
Total 
Regime Yearly 
Average 
Haile Selassie Imperial 
Regime 
1960-64 149.45 
195.28 1965-69 197.01 
1970-73 250.39 
Derg Socialist Regime 
1974-78 424.08 
828.04 
1979-83 554.06 
1984-88 1,322.55 
1989-90 1,286.67 
EPRDF Government 
1991-95 1,382.30 
2144.13 
1996-2000 886.24 
2001-05 1,899.81 
2006-10 2,937.24 
2011-6 3,369.93 
Source: Source: (OECD-DAC, 2018b) 
Appendix I: Average net ODA disbursement and share of top 10 donors by regimes (constant, 2016 USD million) 
Haile Selassie Imperial Regime (1960-1973) EPRDF Government (1991-2016) 
Donor Total 
Yearly 
Average 
Share (% 
of total 
Regime 
Net ODA) 
Donor Total 
Yearly 
Average 
Share (% of
total 
Regime Net
ODA) 
United States 1,161.5 83.0 42% United States 3,129.7 439.1 20% 
Italy 420.3 30.0 15% World Bank 1,131.7 438.3 20% 
Sweden 269.9 19.3 10% EU Institutions 816.6 186.1 9% 
Germany 262.1 18.7 10% United Kingdom 783.9 180.7 8% 
World Bank 245.1 17.5 9% African Development Bank 732.9 121.6 6% 
UNDP 105.6 7.5 4% Germany 332.0 81.5 4% 
United Kingdom 82.2 5.9 3% Global Fund 253.4 70.2 3% 
Japan 19.3 1.4 1% Canada 59.6 58.1 3% 
UNTA 16.5 1.2 1% Netherlands 51.8 57.6 3% 
UNHCR 14.6 1.0 1% Japan 45.7 52.9 2% 
Total 2,597.0 185.5 95% Total 4,3839 1,686.1  79% 
Derg Socialist Regime (19674-90) Aggregate, All Regimes (1960-2016) 
Donor Total 
Yearly 
Average 
Share (% 
of total 
Regime 
Net ODA) 
Donor Total 
Yearly 
Average 
Share (% of
Aggregate 
Net ODA) 
Italy 1,996.7 117.5 14% United States 13,779.2 241.7 19% 
EU Institutions 1,984.6 116.7 14% World Bank 13,158.4 230.8 18% 
World Bank 1,518.2 89.3 11% EU Institutions 6,830.0 119.8 9% 
United States 1,200.0 70.6 9% United Kingdom 5,227.6 91.7 7% 
WFP 960.5 56.5 7% Italy 3,642.0 63.9 5% 
Sweden 769.2 45.2 5% African Development Bank 3,480.1 61.1 5% 
Germany 751.6 44.2 5% Germany 3,134.0 55.0 4% 
UNHCR 590.5 34.7 4% WFP 2,173.8 38.1 3% 
UNDP 472.5 27.8 3% Sweden 2,076.2 36.4 3% 
United Kingdom 447.7 26.3 3% Canada 1,934.7 33.9 3% 
Total 10,692 628.9 76% Total 55,436.1 972.6 76% 
Source: Source: Authors’ calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018b) 
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Appendix J: Net ODA disbursements by top 10 bilateral donors in Ethiopia (constant, 2016 USD millions): 1960 - 
2016 
Donor Total 
Yearly 
Average 
Share (% of 
Total Net 
ODA) 
Cumulative Share 
United States 13,779.18 241.74 19% 19% 
United Kingdom 5,227.62 91.71 7% 26% 
Italy 3,642.04 63.90 5% 31% 
Germany 3,134.00 54.98 4% 36% 
Sweden 2,076.22 36.42 3% 38% 
Canada 1,934.69 33.94 3% 41% 
Netherlands 1,799.49 31.57 2% 44% 
Japan 1,549.64 27.19 2% 46% 
Norway 1,255.99 22.03 2% 47% 
Ireland 805.63 14.13 1% 49% 
Total 35,204.50 617.62 49%   
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018e) 
Appendix K: Net ODA disbursements by top 10 multilateral donors in Ethiopia (constant, 2016 USD millions): 1960 - 
2016 
Donor/Year Total Yearly Average 
Share (% of 
Total Net ODA) 
Cumulative 
Share 
World Bank/IDA 13,158.44 230.85 18% 18% 
EU Institutions 6,830.02 119.82 9% 27% 
African Development Bank 3,480.09 61.05 5% 32% 
WFP 2,173.82 38.14 3% 35% 
Global Fund 1,826.39 32.04 3% 38% 
UNICEF 1,140.97 20.02 2% 40% 
UNHCR 1,059.63 18.59 1% 41% 
UNDP 1,015.31 17.81 1% 42% 
GAVI 776.59 13.62 1% 43% 
IMF 428.99 7.53 1% 44% 
Total 31,890.25 559.48 44%  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018e) 
Appendix L: Net ODA disbursements to Ethiopia by major types of aid (5-year average, constant, 2016 USD 
millions): 1960-2016 
Aid Type/Year 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 
Grants 715.21 689.77 930.08 1,230.85 2,458.07 5742.48 
ODA Loans 32.08 291.69 544.69 868.04 784.27 1,108.71 
Technical Cooperation 44.33 505.81 643.85 450.44 710.96 1,338.69 
Development Food Aid 0 0.00 0.00 215.08 620.74 1,335.28 
Humanitarian Aid 0 2.22 13.82 5.72 89.81 388.75 
Continued…. 
      
Aid Type/Year 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-14 2015-16 
Grants 5,897.27 3,483.88 6,239.44 15,704.66 12,567.50 5,004.01 
ODA Loans 1,375.04 1,034.28 2,098.38 -2,219.77 3,748.75 2,266.59 
Technical Cooperation 1,174.77 908.66 972.29 911.19 857.95 397.21 
Development Food Aid 1,232.63 606.73 562.15 746.91 1,130.42 455.51 
Humanitarian Aid 342.54 334.32 1,815.03 2,826.11 2,389.97 1,294.65 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018e) 
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Appendix M: ODA disbursements to Ethiopia by major types of aid (5-year average, constant, 2016 USD millions): 
1960-2016 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018e) 
 
Appendix N: Yearly average net ODA disbursements by type of aid by regimes from 1960-2016 (constant, 2016 USD 
million) 
Aid Type 
Haile Selassie Imperial Regime (1960-73)  
Yearly Average (USD 
million) 
Share (% of 
Yearly Average 
ODA) 
Total 
Other Net ODA + [CPA] 117.9 60.4% 1650.88 
Technical Cooperation 76.1 39.0% 1064.89 
Humanitarian Aid 1.0 0.5% 14.55 
Aid Forgiveness & Related 0.0 0.0% 0.00 
Development Food Aid 0.0 0.0% 0.00     
Aid Type 
Derg Socialist Regime (1974-1990) Total 
Yearly Average (USD million) 
Share (% of 
Yearly Average 
ODA) 
 
Other Net ODA + [CPA] 473.8 57% 8054.4 
Technical Cooperation 174.3 21% 2963.0 
Development Food Aid 144.9 17% 2462.6 
Humanitarian Aid 34.7 4% 590.5 
Aid Forgiveness & Related 0.4 0% 6.3   
  
 
Aid Type 
EPRDF Government (1991-2016) Total 
Yearly Average (USD million) 
Share (% of 
Yearly Average 
ODA) 
 
Other Net ODA + [CPA] 1,213.7 57% 31555.5 
Humanitarian Aid 342.2 16% 8897.9 
Aid Forgiveness & Related 230.9 11% 6004.4 
Technical Cooperation 188.0 9% 4888.3 
Development Food Aid 170.9 8% 4442.9     
Aid Type 
Aggregate of All Regimes (1960-2016) Total 
Yearly Average (USD million) 
Share (% of 
Total Net ODA) 
 
Other Net ODA + [CPA] 723.9 57% 41222.9 
Humanitarian Aid 166.7 13% 9502.9 
Technical Cooperation 156.4 12% 8916.2 
Development Food Aid 121.1 10% 6905.5 
Aid Forgiveness & Related 105.5 8% 6010.7 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018e) 
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Appendix O: External financial resource inflow to Ethiopia by regimes from 1968 to 2016 (constant, 2016 USD million) 
Aid Flow Type/Year 1968-73 1974-90 1991-2016 
Total 
(1968-
2016) 
Share (% 
of Total 
Flow) 
ODA, Net 250.53 944.52 2220.94 71,327.43 66.5% 
FDI, Net Inflows 0.00 0.34 569.05 14,801.19 13.8% 
NGOs 0.00 0.00 409.49 10,646.72 9.9% 
Personal Remittances 0.00 7.68 311.63 8,233.04 7.7% 
OOF and Export Credits, Net 33.92 33.25 31.21 1,580.32 1.5% 
Private Aid 0.00 0.00 15.01 390.25 0.4% 
Securities and Claims 0.97 -0.61 8.54 217.46 0.2% 
Total 285.42 985.18 3565.87 107196.40 100.0% 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018i, 2018b, 2018g), NBE (2014), and the 
World Bank (2018e) 
Appendix P: External financial inflows to Ethiopia in USD million (1968-2016) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018i, 2018b, 2018g), NBE (2014), and the 
World Bank (2018e) 
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Appendix Q: Net ODA receipt per capita (USD), and net ODA receipt as percentage of GNI and GDP of Ethiopia from 
1960-2106 
Year 
Net ODA Receipt Per Capita Net ODA Receipt (% of GNI) Net ODA Receipt (% of GDP) 
ETH SSA World ETH SSA World ETH SSA World 
1960 0.7 2.6 1.4 
 
2.0 0.3 
 
2.1% 0.3% 
1961 0.9 3.4 1.7 
 
2.6 0.4 
 
2.7% 0.3% 
1962 1.2 3.8 1.7 
 
2.8 0.4 
 
2.7% 0.3% 
1963 1.0 3.7 1.8 
 
2.4 0.4 
 
2.5% 0.3% 
1964 0.7 4.0 1.8 
 
2.7 0.3 
 
2.5% 0.3% 
1965 0.8 4.2 1.9 
 
2.6 0.3 
 
2.4% 0.3% 
1966 1.0 4.4 1.9 
 
2.6 0.3 
 
2.5% 0.3% 
1967 1.1 4.7 1.9 
 
2.9 0.3 
 
2.8% 0.3% 
1968 1.6 4.1 1.8 
 
2.4 0.3 
 
2.4% 0.2% 
1969 1.4 3.9 1.7 
 
2.1 0.2 
 
2.0% 0.2% 
1970 1.4 4.0 1.8 
 
1.8 0.2 
 
1.8% 0.2% 
1971 1.6 4.5 2.1 
 
2.1 0.2 
 
1.8% 0.2% 
1972 1.6 4.7 2.1 
 
2.0 0.2 
 
1.7% 0.2% 
1973 2.1 5.7 2.8 
 
1.9 0.2 
 
1.7% 0.2% 
1974 3.7 8.0 3.7 
 
2.1 0.3 
 
2.1% 0.3% 
1975 4.1 10.4 4.6 
 
2.6 0.3 
 
2.4% 0.3% 
1976 4.2 9.4 4.4 2.2 0.3 2.1% 0.3% 
1977 3.4 10.9 4.5 
 
2.4 0.3 
 
2.2% 0.2% 
1978 4.1 14.3 5.9 
 
2.9 0.3 
 
2.7% 0.3% 
1979 5.5 17.8 6.6 
 
3.1 0.3 
 
2.8% 0.3% 
1980 6.0 20.0 7.8 
 
2.9 0.3 
 
2.9% 0.3% 
1981 6.8 18.9 7.4 3.3 2.8 0.3 7% 3.0% 0.3% 
1982 5.4 19.2 6.6 2.6 3.1 0.3 6% 3.2% 0.2% 
1983 8.8 18.0 6.2 4.0 3.2 0.3 9% 3.2% 0.2% 
1984 9.1 19.4 6.3 4.4 3.8 0.3 11% 3.4% 0.2% 
1985 17.6 20.7 6.6 7.6 4.5 0.3 23% 3.8% 0.2% 
1986 15.0 24.1 7.6 6.4 4.8 0.3 15% 3.7% 0.2% 
1987 14.3 27.2 8.3 5.9 4.8 0.2 11% 3.7% 0.2% 
1988 21.5 29.9 8.7 8.9 5.1 0.2 16% 3.7% 0.2% 
1989 15.7 31.1 8.9 6.4 5.2 0.2 12% 3.9% 0.2% 
1990 21.0 34.8 11.0 8.3 6.0 0.3 14% 3.9% 0.2% 
1991 21.9 33.8 11.4 8.2 5.9 0.3 16% 3.7% 0.2% 
1992 22.5 35.5 11.1 11.1 6.4 0.2 18% 3.9% 0.2% 
1993 20.2 31.2 10.1 12.4 6.1 0.2 15% 3.7% 0.2% 
1994 19.2 33.6 10.7 15.5 6.9 0.2 14% 3.8% 0.2% 
1995 15.3 31.7 10.3 11.5 5.7 0.2 10% 3.2% 0.2% 
1996 13.8 27.1 9.7 9.6 4.9 0.2 8% 2.7% 0.2% 
1997 9.5 24.0 8.3 6.8 4.3 0.2 6% 2.5% 0.1% 
1998 10.5 22.8 8.7 8.5 4.4 0.2 8% 2.5% 0.1% 
1999 10.0 20.2 8.8 8.4 4.0 0.2 7% 2.2% 0.1% 
2000 10.3 19.5 8.1 8.4 3.7 0.1 7% 2.2% 0.1% 
2001 16.1 20.7 8.4 13.5 4.4 0.2 11% 2.5% 0.1% 
2002 18.8 26.9 9.8 17.0 5.5 0.2 13% 3.1% 0.2% 
2003 22.3 34.3 11.2 18.9 5.6 0.2 14% 3.3% 0.2% 
2004 24.5 35.5 12.3 18.2 4.8 0.2 13% 2.9% 0.2% 
2005 25.1 42.9 16.6 15.6 5.1 0.2 12% 3.3% 0.2% 
2006 25.8 52.3 16.2 13.3 5.4 0.2 11% 3.7% 0.2% 
2007 32.2 44.7 16.2 13.2 4.1 0.2 11% 2.8% 0.2% 
2008 39.9 48.4 18.7 12.2 4.0 0.2 13% 2.9% 0.2% 
2009 44.8 51.9 18.5 11.8 4.5 0.2 14% 3.1% 0.2% 
2010 39.4 50.5 18.9 11.6 3.4 0.2 11% 3.0% 0.2% 
2011 38.8 52.5 20.2 11.0 3.2 0.2 10% 2.9% 0.2% 
2012 35.1 50.4 18.8 7.5 3.0 0.2 8% 2.8% 0.2% 
2013 40.9 50.1 21.0 8.2 3.0 0.2 9% 2.7% 0.2% 
2014 36.8 47.5 22.2 6.5 2.7 0.2 7% 2.5% 0.2% 
2015 32.4 45.5 20.8 5.0 3.0 0.2 7% 2.5% 0.2% 
2016 39.8 42.9 21.2 5.6 3.0 0.2 8% 2.5% 0.2% 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on World Development Indicator (World Bank, 2018e) 
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Appendix R: Sectoral ODA disbursement by non-DAC donors in Ethiopia from 2007 to 2016 (current prices, USD 
million) 
Sector/Donor China    India Turkey Kuwait 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Total 
Energy Generation and Supply 553.9 51.9   24.3 7.0 637.1 
Transport and Storage 521.5 0.4   39.2 12.3 573.4 
Agriculture 3.1 351.1       354.2 
Railway   0.4 217.7     218.1 
Industry   156.1       156.1 
Water Supply & Sanitation 153.3         153.3 
Multisector 9.2         9.2 
Education 5.1         5.1 
Total 1,246.0 559.9 217.7 63.5 19.3 2,106.4 
Source: (MoFEC, 2018a) 
Appendix S: Aid flow from China to Ethiopia by aid intention from 2000 to 2014 (constant, 2014 USD million) 
Aid Intent USD million Share 
Developmental 13,230 79% 
Commercial 528 3% 
Mixed 2945 18% 
Total 16,704 100% 
Source: Based on data from AidData (Dreher et al., 2017) 
Appendix T: Aid flow from China to Ethiopia by aid type from 2000 to 2014 (constant, 2014 USD million) 
Source: Based on data from AidData (Dreher et al., 2017) 
Appendix U: Comparison of aid flow from China to Ethiopia from 2000 to 2014 with the aid of traditional donors in 
Ethiopia 
Total, Net ODA Disbursements (2000-2014) USD million 
China Share (% of total Net ODA) 
Developmental ODA-like 
All Donors 38,107.21 35% 11% 
DAC Countries 20,153.68 66% 21% 
Multilateral Donors 17,514.81 76% 25% 
Non-DAC Countries 438.72 3016% 979% 
United States 8,709.74 152% 49% 
Based on data from AidData (Dreher et al., 2017) and OECD-DAC datasets (OECD-DAC, 2018b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aid Type USD million Share 
Vague Official Finance 10,178 61% 
ODA-like 4297 26% 
OOF-like 1920 11% 
Debt Forgiveness 309 2% 
Total 16,704 100% 
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Appendix V: Net ODA disbursement by sector aggregate to Ethiopia from 2002-2016 (constant, 2016 USD millions) 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CRS data by OECD-DAC (2018g) 
Appendix W: Share of CPA and other aid as percentage of net ODA disbursements to Ethiopia and Africa (2004-2014) 
Composition 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
CPA, Africa 56 56 29 68 74 74 70 69 69 79 78 
CPA, Ethiopia 65 56 23 79 62 76 72 74 77 80 81 
Debt Relief, ETH 9 9 70 1 1   1    
Humanitarian and Food Aid, ETH 24 32 6 15 34 23 25 23 21 18 17 
Other and Unallocated, ETH 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Support to NGOs, ETH 1 1  1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
Total CPA, ETH (USD million) 1,432 1,303 1,520 2,075 2,068 3,067 2,593 2,665 2,506 3,198 2,914 
Source: OECD (2018e) 
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Appendix X: Donor countries’ strategies towards Ethiopia during the first Growth and Transformation Plan (2010-
2015) 
S.N. DP/(Period) Programme Area/Pillars/Focus 
Alignment 
with GTP-I 
Pillars 
Budget 
(million) 
1.  AfDB  
(2011-2015) 
Infrastructure: Road and Energy Pillar I USD 532.0 
Basic services (PBS -III) and business climate (Derba 
Cement Factory and Ethiopian Airlines) 
Pillar V 
120.0  
2.  EU  
(2014-2020) 
Sustainable agriculture and food security Pillar II EU 252.4 
Health Pillar V 200.0 
Roads (phasing out) and energies (Phasing in) Pillar I 230.0 
Civil society and synergetic governance Pillar VI 52.0 
Support measures Pillar VII 10.6 
3.  United Nations  
(2012-2015) 
Sustainable economic growth and risk reduction Pillar I USD 971.250 
Basic social service Pillar V 797.816 
Governance and capacity development Pillar VI 130.320 
Women, youth and children Pillar VII 69.399 
4.  World Bank 
(2012-2016) 
Fostering competitiveness and employment aiming to 
achieve the following strategic objectives 
x Stable microeconomic environment 
x Increased competitiveness and productivity 
x Increased and improved delivery of infrastructure 
x Enhanced regional integration 
Pillar I - IV 
USD 81.09 
Enhancing resilience and reducing vulnerabilities 
x Improving social service delivery 
x Developing comprehensive approach to social 
protection and risk management 
Pillar V 
551.68 
Foundation: Good governance and state building Pillar VI, VII 8.87 
5.  Netherlands  
(2014-2017) 
Food security Pillar II 127.619 
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) Pillar VII 77.668 
Security and rule of law Pillar VI 8.526 
Trade/Investment Pillar I 0.450 
6.  UK  
(2011-2016) 
Education Pillar V Programme 
Cost: Pound 
(millions) 303 
Operation cost: 
4.235 
Water and sanitation Pillar V 
Poverty, hunger, and vulnerability Pillar V 
Humanitarian Pillar II 
Health Pillar V  
Wealth creation Pillar I  
Climate change Pillar VII  
Governance and security Pillar VI  
7.  USA  
(2011-2016) 
Peace and security (Conflict migration and reconciliation) Pillar VII 0.15  
Governing justly and democratically (good governance, 
civil society, rule of law and human rights…) 
Pilar VI 
0.11 
Investing in people (health, education, services/protection 
for vulnerable population) 
Pillar V 
1,574.99 
Economic growth Pillar I 445.56 
Humanitarian assistance Not specified 1,498.27 
8.  Sweden  
(2016-2020) 
Strengthen democracy and gender equality, and greater 
respect for human rights 
Pillar VII, VI 
SEK 1.0 
Better opportunities and tools to enable poor people to 
improve their living conditions 
Pillar II 
Better environment, limited impact, and greater resilience 
to environmental impact, climate change and natural 
disasters 
Pillar VII 
9.  Canada  
(2015-2018) 
Health and rights of women and children Pillar VI 
USD 189.0 
Food security and sustainable agriculture Pillar II 
Job opportunity in non-agriculture sector (from small and 
medium-sized enterprises and the extractive sector 
development) 
Pillar II 
Strengthening accountability and responsiveness of 
government 
Pillar VI 
10.  Italy  
(2013-2015) 
Agriculture and rural development 
x Drought resilience and sustainable livelihoods 
Pillar II  
EU 12.00 
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x Integrated agro-food parks 
x Agricultural Growth Program (AGP) 
x Value chains development 
x Multi-donor initiative for private sector development 
1.80 
6.00 
2.50 
15.00 
Provision of basic services: Health, WASH, Education 
x MDG Fund 
x Health Information System development 
x Health Pool Fund 
x Soft loan to support the health sector 
x PBS III 
x GEQIP 
x Sensitization and literacy promotion program 
x Urban WASH 
Pillar V  
 
EU 7.00 
3.50 
5.00 
5.00 
8.00 
7.50 
0.30 
15.00 
11.  Austria  
(2014-2016) 
Food security, land use, and Sustainable Land 
Management Program 
Pillar II 
Not available 
Public services (PBS) at local level Pillar V Not available 
12.  Denmark  
(2014-2017) 
Greening Agricultural Transformation in Ethiopia (Gate) 
Pillar II 
DKK 177.5 
13.  Finland  
(2014-2017) 
Education Pillar V EU 17.1 
Water Pillar V 13.2 
Agriculture and rural economic development Pillar II 15.3  
Others Pillar VII 3.2 
14.  German 
(Not available) 
Engineering Capacity Building Programme Pillar VI Not available 
Sustainable Land Management Program Pillar II Not available 
Urban Governance and Decentralization Pillar VI Not available 
Protection/Promotion of Basic Services (PBS) Pillar V Not available 
Energy Capacity Building Program Pillar VI Not available 
15.  Ireland  
(2014-2018) 
Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) Pillar II EU 60.00 
Rural livelihoods Pillar II 16.25 
Civil society support Pillar VI 15.00 
Maternal health Pillar V 25.00 
Nutrition Pillar V 15.00 
Cross-programme support Pillar VII 4.75 
16.  Spain  
(2011-2015) 
Promotion of Basic Services (PBS) Pillar V 52.57 
Health Pillar V 25.75 
Rural development Pillar II 16.65 
Gender Pillar VII 5.25 
Culture Pillar VII 1.2 
17.  Korea  
(2012-2015) 
Maternal and child health/drinking water and sanitation Pillar V 
Not available 
Agricultural and rural development, agricultural technical 
training 
Pillar II 
Technical and Vocational Education and Training Pillar V 
Energy (Power, renewable energy) and road Pillar IV 
18.  Japan  
(2013-2017) 
Agriculture and rural development 
x Agricultural productivity improvement 
x Rural commercialization 
x Natural resource management 
x Disaster risk management and food security 
Pillar II Yen 100.00 
13.30 
9.80 
20.03 
22.86 
Improvement of access to and maintenance/management 
of safe water 
Pillar V 
29.17 
Private sector development Pillar I 12.7 
Road system development and disaster prevention Pillar IV 137.41 
Diversification and efficiency of power generation Pillar I  
Access to quality basic education environment Pillar V 32.08 
Others Pillar VII  
Sources: Various country strategy papers of donors to Ethiopia 
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Growth and Transformation Plan I (GTP-I) Pillars: 2010 - 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pillar I: Rapid and equitable economic growth in stable macro 
Pillar II: Agriculture a major source of economic growth 
Pillar III: Industry to play a key role in the economy 
Pillar IV: Expand quality infrastructure 
Pillar V: Expand quality of social development 
Pillar VI: Strengthening good governance and capacity building 
Pillar VII: GTP cross-cutting sectors (Gender, environment, and climate change): Empowering 
women and youth and ensuring their benefits 
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Chapter 3 
Appendix A: Composition of aid: Ethiopia, 2004-2014 
Composition 
Years/Share (%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
CPA 65 56 23 79 62 76 72 74 77 80 81 
Debt Relief 9 9 70 1 1   1    
Humanitarian and Food Aid 24 32 6 15 34 23 25 23 21 18 17 
Other and Unallocated 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Support to NGOs 1 1  1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
Source: (OECD-DAC, 2018f) 
Appendix B: Donors' actual CAP disbursement per sector in million USD in 2004 
S. No. 
Donor 
Group 
Donor 
Total CPA 
(USD 
million) 
Donor's Share 
of Total CPA 
to Ethiopia 
Total 
Relations 
No. of 
Significant 
Relations 
CR 
(D as % of C) 
Cumulative 
CPA Share 
to Ethiopia 
A B C D E   
1 ML IDA/World Bank 590.60 42.94% 9 2 22% 42.94% 
2 DAC United Kingdom 117.90 8.57% 12 1 8% 51.51% 
3 ML EU Institutions 99.10 7.21% 6 2 33% 58.72% 
4 DAC United States 97.34 7.08% 7 2 29% 65.80% 
5 ML 
Africa Development Bank 
(AfDB) 
86.79 6.31% 5 1 20% 72.11% 
6 DAC Netherlands 47.55 3.46% 8 3 38% 75.56% 
7 DAC Sweden 47.43 3.45% 10 3 30% 79.01% 
8 DAC Norway 44.30 3.22% 11 4 36% 82.23% 
9 DAC Germany 39.81 2.89% 11 4 36% 85.13% 
10 DAC Ireland 38.43 2.79% 10 4 40% 87.92% 
11 ML IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) 37.65 2.74% 1 1 100% 90.66% 
12 DAC Japan 30.97 2.25% 12 3 25% 92.91% 
13 ML UNICEF 22.70 1.65% 7 3 43% 94.56% 
14 ML UNDP 13.35 0.97% 7 3 43% 95.53% 
15 DAC Canada 12.21 0.89% 5 2 40% 96.42% 
16 DAC Belgium 11.86 0.86% 6 2 33% 97.28% 
17 DAC France 11.44 0.83% 9 1 11% 98.11% 
18 DAC Italy 10.78 0.78% 8 1 13% 98.90% 
19 ML UNFPA 5.61 0.41% 1 1 100% 99.30% 
20 DAC Austria 4.82 0.35% 9 4 44% 99.65% 
21 DAC Spain 3.04 0.22% 7 2 29% 99.88% 
22 DAC Greece 1.01 0.07% 6 4 67% 99.95% 
23 DAC Switzerland 0.29 0.02% 4 1 25% 99.97% 
24 DAC Denmark 0.21 0.02% 1 1 100% 99.99% 
25 ML 
Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) 
0.19 0.01% 1 1 100% 100.00% 
26 DAC Portugal 0.01 0.00% 1 1 100% 100.00% 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from OECD historical CPA records (OECD-DAC, 2014) 
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Appendix C: Donors' actual CAP disbursement per sector in million USD in 2014 
S. No. 
Donor 
Group 
Donor 
Total CPA 
(USD million) 
Donor's 
Share of 
Total CPA 
Total 
Relations 
No. of 
Significant 
Relations 
CR 
(D as % of C) 
Cumulative 
CPA Share 
to Ethiopia 
 A B C D E 
1 ML IDA/World Bank 888.23 30.01% 10 5 50% 30.01% 
2 DAC United States 406.17 13.72% 11 3 27% 43.73% 
3 DAC United Kingdom 402.65 13.60% 10 3 30% 57.34% 
4 ML 
Africa Development Bank 
(AfDB) 
175.70 5.94% 3 2 67% 63.28% 
5 ML EU Institutions 171.88 5.81% 11 4 36% 69.08% 
6 ML 
Global Alliance for Vaccines 
and Immunization [GAVI] 
113.78 3.84% 1 1 100% 72.93% 
7 ML Global Fund 103.26 3.49% 2 1 50% 76.42% 
8 DAC Japan 77.06 2.60% 11 2 18% 79.02% 
9 DAC Netherlands 69.12 2.34% 8 3 38% 81.36% 
10 DAC Canada 66.84 2.26% 9 2 22% 83.61% 
11 DAC France 57.50 1.94% 10 3 30% 85.56% 
12 
Private 
Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation 
47.44 1.60% 6 2 33% 87.16% 
13 DAC Norway 42.65 1.44% 10 3 30% 88.60% 
14 DAC Korea 40.97 1.38% 11 2 18% 89.99% 
15 ML UNICEF 39.79 1.34% 8 2 25% 91.33% 
16 DAC Germany 37.12 1.25% 9 3 33% 92.58% 
17 DAC Finland 31.47 1.06% 9 3 33% 93.65% 
18 DAC Italy 26.19 0.88% 7 2 29% 94.53% 
19 DAC Poland 23.23 0.78% 3 1 33% 95.32% 
20 DAC Sweden 17.60 0.59% 9 3 33% 95.91% 
21 DAC Ireland 17.42 0.59% 8 2 25% 96.50% 
22 DAC Denmark 16.75 0.57% 7 2 29% 97.07% 
23 ML UNDP 13.78 0.47% 5 2 40% 97.53% 
24 DAC Australia 9.79 0.33% 6 2 33% 97.86% 
25 DAC Austria 7.52 0.25% 9 2 22% 98.12% 
26 DAC Spain 7.01 0.24% 8 2 25% 98.35% 
27 NDAC Kuwait [KFAED] 6.56 0.22% 1 1 100% 98.57% 
28 ML UNFPA 6.49 0.22% 1 1 100% 98.79% 
29 ML 
Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) 
5.87 0.20% 2 1 50% 98.99% 
30 DAC Switzerland 5.00 0.17% 7 2 29% 99.16% 
31 ML WFP 4.51 0.15% 2 1 50% 99.31% 
32 ML 
Arab Bank for Economic 
Development in Africa 
[BADEA] 
3.87 0.13% 2 1 50% 99.44% 
33 ML 
OPEC Fund for International 
Development [OFID] 
3.57 0.12% 2 1 50% 99.56% 
34 DAC Czech Republic 3.20 0.11% 5 4 80% 99.67% 
35 NDAC United Arab Emirates 2.32 0.08% 2 1 50% 99.75% 
36 ML 
World Health Organization 
(WHO) 
2.29 0.08% 2 1 50% 99.83% 
37 ML 
Global Green Growth 
Institute [GGGI] 
1.77 0.06% 1 1 100% 99.89% 
38 ML UNAIDS 1.25 0.04% 3 2 67% 99.93% 
39 DAC Luxembourg 0.64 0.02% 4 1 25% 99.95% 
40 DAC Belgium 0.61 0.02% 4 1 25% 99.97% 
41 DAC Iceland 0.39 0.01% 1 1 100% 99.99% 
42 DAC New Zealand 0.21 0.01% 1 1 100% 99.99% 
43 DAC Greece 0.08 0.00% 2 1 50% 100.00% 
44 DAC Portugal 0.05 0.00% 2 1 50% 100.00% 
45 NDAC Hungary 0.03 0.00% 2 1 50% 100.00% 
46 NDAC Estonia 0.03 0.00% 1 1 100% 100.00% 
47 DAC Slovak Republic 0.02 0.00% 2 1 50% 100.00% 
48 NDAC Romania 0.002 0.00% 1 1 100% 100.00% 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from OECD historical CPA records (OECD-DAC, 2014) 
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Appendix D: Summary of changes in aid fragmentation ratio of donors contribute CPA in both 2004 and 
2014 in Ethiopia  
Donor 
Group 
Donor 
D
on
or
's
 A
ve
ra
g
Sh
ar
e 
(2
00
4/
14
)
of
 T
ot
al
 C
P
A
 
Total No. of 
Relations 
No. of 
Insignificant 
Relations 
Fragmentation 
Ratio (FR) 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 F
R
 
(2
01
4 
as
 %
 o
f 
20
04
) 
A B (B as % of A) 
2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 
ML Africa Development Bank (AfDB) 6.12% 5 3 4 1 80% 33% -59% 
ML IDA/World Bank 36.48% 9 10 7 5 78% 50% -36% 
DAC United Kingdom 11.09% 12 10 11 7 92% 70% -24% 
DAC France 1.39% 9 10 8 7 89% 70% -21% 
DAC Italy 0.83% 8 7 7 5 88% 71% -19% 
DAC Switzerland 0.10% 4 7 3 5 75% 71% -5% 
ML EU Institutions 6.51% 6 11 4 7 67% 64% -4% 
DAC Sweden 2.02% 10 9 7 6 70% 67% -4% 
DAC Netherlands 2.90% 8 8 5 5 63% 63% 0% 
ML IMF 1.37% 1   0   0%   0% 
ML UNFPA 0.31% 1 1 0 0 0% 0% 0% 
DAC United States 10.40% 7 11 5 8 71% 73% 3% 
DAC Germany 2.07% 11 9 7 6 64% 67% 5% 
ML UNDP 0.72% 7 5 4 3 57% 60% 5% 
DAC Spain 0.23% 7 8 5 6 71% 75% 6% 
DAC Japan 2.43% 12 11 9 9 75% 82% 9% 
DAC Norway 2.33% 11 10 7 7 64% 70% 9% 
DAC Belgium 0.44% 6 4 4 3 67% 75% 12% 
DAC Ireland 1.69% 10 8 6 6 60% 75% 25% 
DAC Canada 1.57% 5 9 3 7 60% 78% 30% 
ML UNICEF 1.50% 7 8 4 6 57% 75% 32% 
DAC Austria 0.30% 9 9 5 7 56% 78% 39% 
DAC Portugal 0.00% 1 2 0 1 0% 50% 50% 
ML Global Environment Facility (GEF) 0.11% 1 2 0 1 0% 50% 50% 
DAC Greece 0.04% 6 2 2 1 33% 50% 52% 
DAC Denmark 0.29% 1 7 0 5 0% 71% 71% 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from OECD historical CPA records (OECD-DAC, 2014) 
Appendix E: Aid fragmentation ratio of donors in Ethiopia in 2014 (had no CPA contribution in 2004) 
Donor 
Group 
Donor 
D
on
or
's
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 
T
ot
al
 C
P
A
 
Total No. 
Relations 
No. of 
Insignificant 
Relations 
Fragmentation 
Ratio (FR) 
A B (B as % of A) 
DAC Korea 1.38% 11 9 82% 
DAC Luxembourg 0.02% 4 3 75% 
DAC Finland 1.06% 9 6 67% 
DAC Poland 0.78% 3 2 67% 
DAC Australia 0.33% 6 4 67% 
Private Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 1.60% 6 4 67% 
DAC Slovak Republic 0.00% 2 1 50% 
ML World Health Organization (WHO) 0.08% 2 1 50% 
ML OPEC Fund for International Development [OFID] 0.12% 2 1 50% 
ML BADEA] 0.13% 2 1 50% 
ML WFP 0.15% 2 1 50% 
ML Global Fund 3.49% 2 1 50% 
Non-DAC Hungary 0.00% 2 1 50% 
Non-DAC United Arab Emirates 0.08% 2 1 50% 
ML UNAIDS 0.04% 3 1 33% 
DAC Czech Republic 0.11% 5 1 20% 
DAC Iceland 0.01% 1 0 0% 
DAC New Zealand 0.01% 1 0 0% 
ML GAVI 3.84% 1 0 0% 
ML Global Green Growth Institute [GGGI] 0.06% 1 0 0% 
Non-DAC Romania 0.00% 1 0 0% 
Non-DAC Estonia 0.00% 1 0 0% 
Non-DAC Kuwait [KFAED] 0.22% 1 0 0% 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from OECD historical CPA records (OECD-DAC, 2014) 
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Appendix F: DAG-Ethiopia architecture 
 
Source: (DAG, 2016) 
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Appendix G: Current DAG-Ethiopia members (2018) 
S. 
No. 
Donor Donor Group 
Donor Size 
(2016 ODA 
Disbursement) 
1.  African Development Bank Group (AfDB) Multilateral Big 
2.  Australia DAC Small 
3.  Austria DAC Small 
4.  Belgium DAC Small 
5.  Canada DAC Medium 
6.  Denmark DAC Small 
7.  European Union DAC Big 
8.  Finland DAC Small 
9.  France DAC Small 
10.  Germany DAC Big 
11.  International Monetary Fund (IMF) Multilateral None 
12.  India Non-DAC None 
13.  Ireland DAC Small 
14.  Israel Non-DAC Small 
15.  Italy DAC Small 
16.  Japan DAC Medium 
17.  Netherlands DAC Medium 
18.  Norway DAC Medium 
19.  Spain DAC Small 
20.  Sweden DAC Small 
21.  Switzerland DAC Small 
22.  Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) Non-DAC Small 
23.  United States/USAID (Co-chair) DAC Big 
24.  UK Aid DAC Big 
25.  UN Multilateral Big 
26.  WFP Multilateral Small 
27.  UNAIDS Multilateral Small 
28.  World Bank Multilateral Big 
29.  UNDP (Co-chair) Multilateral Small 
30.  Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) DAC Medium 
31.  New Zealand DAC Small 
Source: Based on DAG-Ethiopia data and OECD. Stat (DAG, 2018a; OECD-DAC, 2018g) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
530174-L-bw-Teshome
Processed on: 18-4-2019 PDF page: 215
 
205 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Appendix A: Agricultural aid from all donors to Ethiopia, 5-year annual average (constant price, 2015 USD 
million), 1973-2015 
Year 1973 1974-78 1979-83 1984-89 1990 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-10 2011-15 
Commitment 185.6 18.3 14.1 148.8 30.8 41.7 15.0 9.9 44.1 156.2 
Disbursement      0.8 4.7 13.9 31.7 66.9 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from FAO (FAOSTAT, 2018) 
Appendix B: Trend of annual GDP and agriculture sector growth of Ethiopia (1982-2016) 
Indicator Name 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
GDP growth (annual %) 0.9 8.2 -2.8 -11.1 9.7 13.9 0.5 -0.4 2.7 -7.1 -8.7 13.1 3.2 
Agriculture, value 
added (annual % 
growth) 
-3.1 14.1 -12.4 -20.5 16.5 17.4 -1.4 0.9 5.4 2.5 -1.6 6.6 -2.6 
 
Continued… 
Indicator Name 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
GDP growth (annual %) 6.1 12.4 3.1 -3.5 5.2 6.1 8.3 1.5 -2.2 13.6 11.8 10.8 11.5 
Agriculture, value 
added (annual % 
growth) 
3.8 17.0 2.0 -9.6 3.4 3.1 9.6 -1.9 -10.5 16.9 13.5 10.9 9.4 
Continued… 
Indicator Name 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
GDP growth (annual %) 10.8 8.8 12.6 11.2 8.6 10.6 10.3 10.4 7.6 
Agriculture, value added 
(annual % growth) 
7.5 6.4 5.1 9.0 4.9 7.1 5.4 6.4 2.3 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018e) 
 
Appendix C: Top five agriculture and rural development ODA recipient countries (1995-2015) 
Recipient 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Ethiopia 212 157 78 201 58 76 88 137 139 169 60 172 248 
Viet Nam 270 406 221 412 220 102 345 204 379 386 139 296 431 
India 871 394 780 660 350 222 232 589 418 339 569 390 1,012 
Bangladesh 127 200 187 316 326 341 95 150 125 52 83 404 232 
Pakistan 93 159 576 84 70 60 165 188 91 104 177 89 144 
Afghanistan 7 1 1 4 5 4 16 79 101 190 395 185 422 
Continued… 
Recipient 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Ethiopia 368 261 298 317 294 582 323 787 
Viet Nam 194 234 290 278 427 310 263 761 
India 326 429 1,446 1363 723 436 462 672 
Bangladesh 212 355 287 185 335 388 249 497 
Pakistan 142 258 167 245 555 196 395 462 
Afghanistan 530 572 701 599 442 588 434 387 
Source: Credit Reporting System (OECD-DAC, 2017a) 
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Appendix D: Top 10 donors to agriculture and rural development sector in Ethiopia (2011-2015 average) 
Donor 
Average Total 
(2011 ― 2015)  
Share (% of 
average total 
ODA to ARD) 
Cumulative 
Share 
World Bank 158 34% 34% 
United States 45 10% 44% 
Canada 37 8% 52% 
Netherlands 34 7% 59% 
IFAD 32 7% 66% 
Germany 26 6% 72% 
United Kingdom 17 4% 76% 
AfDB 16 4% 79% 
EU Institutions 14 3% 82% 
Norway 13 3% 85% 
Average total ODA to ARD (2011 ― 2015) 460 100% 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on data from Creditor Reporting System of OECD-DAC (2017a) 
Appendix E: CPA disbursement in Ethiopia in general agriculture in USD million in 2004 (2013 constant 
price) 
S. No. 
Donor 
Type 
Donor 
Donor's 
Total CPA 
to ETH. 
Donor's Total 
CPA to Agr. 
in ETH 
Donor's CPA 
Share (% of 
Total CPA to 
ETH) 
Donor's Agri. 
CPA Share (% of 
Total CPA to 
Agri. in ETH) 
Cumulative 
CPA Share 
1 ML World Bank 590.6 52.758 42.94% 59.01% 59.0% 
2 ML AfDB 86.79 14.05 6.31% 15.72% 74.7% 
3 DAC Norway 44.3 4.47 3.22% 5.00% 79.7% 
4 DAC Germany 39.81 4.06 2.89% 4.54% 84.3% 
5 DAC Ireland 38.43 3.44 2.79% 3.85% 88.1% 
6 DAC Canada 12.21 2.55 0.89% 2.86% 91.0% 
7 DAC United States 97.34 2.42 7.08% 2.71% 93.7% 
8 DAC Japan 30.97 1.76 2.25% 1.96% 95.6% 
9 DAC United Kingdom 117.9 1.01 8.57% 1.13% 96.8% 
10 DAC France 11.44 0.87 0.83% 0.98% 97.7% 
11 DAC Austria 4.82 0.76 0.35% 0.85% 98.6% 
12 DAC EU Institutions 99.1 0.71 7.21% 0.79% 99.4% 
13 DAC Belgium 11.86 0.29 0.86% 0.33% 99.7% 
14 DAC Spain 3.04 0.19 0.22% 0.21% 99.9% 
15 DAC Greece 1.01 0.06 0.07% 0.07% 100.0% 
  Total 1375.39 89.41 100% 100%   
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on historical actual CPA disbursement (OECD-DAC, 2014) 
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Appendix F: CPA disbursement in Ethiopia in general agriculture in 2014 in USD million (2013 constant 
price) 
S. No.
Donor 
Type 
Donor 
Donor's 
Total 
CPA to 
ETH. 
Donor's 
Total CPA 
to Agr. in 
ETH 
Donor's CPA 
Share (% of 
Total CPA to 
ETH) 
Donor's Agri. 
CPA Share (% of 
Total CPA to 
Agri. in ETH) 
Cumulative 
CPA Share 
1 ML World Bank 888.23 87.69 30.0% 26.43% 26% 
2 DAC United States 406.17 61.90 13.7% 18.66% 45% 
3 DAC Canada 66.84 34.73 2.3% 10.47% 56% 
4 Private Gates Foundation 47.44 25.69 1.6% 7.74% 63% 
5 DAC Poland 23.23 22.99 0.8% 6.93% 70% 
6 DAC Netherlands 69.12 22.51 2.3% 6.78% 77% 
7 DAC Norway 42.65 13.71 1.4% 4.13% 81% 
8 DAC Germany 37.12 12.14 1.3% 3.66% 85% 
9 DAC Italy 26.19 10.15 0.9% 3.06% 88% 
10 DAC Denmark 16.75 7.45 0.6% 2.25% 90% 
11 DAC Japan 77.06 6.69 2.6% 2.02% 92% 
12 DAC Spain 7.01 5.25 0.2% 1.58% 94% 
13 DAC Finland 31.47 5.13 1.1% 1.55% 95% 
14 DAC EU Institutions 171.88 2.99 5.8% 0.90% 96% 
15 DAC Korea 40.97 2.98 1.4% 0.90% 97% 
16 DAC Australia 9.79 2.15 0.3% 0.65% 98% 
17 DAC Switzerland 5.00 2.14 0.2% 0.65% 98% 
18 ML AfDB 175.70 1.97 5.9% 0.59% 99% 
19 DAC Sweden 17.60 1.02 0.6% 0.31% 99% 
20 DAC Austria 7.52 0.97 0.3% 0.29% 100% 
21 DAC Czech Republic 3.20 0.83 0.1% 0.25% 100% 
22 DAC Ireland 17.42 0.38 0.6% 0.11% 100% 
23 DAC United Kingdom 402.65 0.31 13.6% 0.09% 100% 
Total 2959.65 331.76 100% 100%   
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on historical actual CPA disbursement (OECD-DAC, 2014) 
Appendix G: Gross ODA disbursements to top 10 recipients in SSA (constant, 2016 USD million) 
Recipient 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Five-Year 
Average 
Ethiopia 132.8  164.6  244.3  284.1  299.2  1,125.0  225.0 
Egypt 75.3  49.0  74.0  421.6  252.0  872.1  174.4 
Ghana 219.3  180.8  110.5  123.1  145.4  779.0  155.8 
Morocco 162.4  171.6  258.0  113.6  52.9  758.5  151.7 
Mali 220.4  140.0  120.2  150.3  117.2  748.2  149.6 
Kenya 115.3  128.3  156.5  150.3  166.2  716.6  143.3 
Mozambique 91.8  111.5  145.7  117.6  192.6  659.2  131.8 
Senegal 96.6  76.3  116.9  155.5  190.2  635.5  127.1 
Burkina Faso 112.7  147.8  143.1  136.7  90.5  630.8  126.2 
Tanzania 101.8  124.4  142.8  130.9  118.0  617.9  123.6 
Source: (OECD-DAC, 2018h) 
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Appendix H: The agricultural sector flagship programs: Priority areas and context 
Program AGP PSNP and HABP SLMP 
Goals 
x Sustainable increase in 
agricultural productivity and 
production 
x Agricultural growth and 
commercialization 
To achieve universal food security and 
protect vulnerable households from 
natural disasters 
x Reducing degradation and improve 
the productivity of natural 
resources 
x Land Administration and Land Use 
Development Program 
Components 
x Agriculture production and 
commercialization 
x Small-scale rural 
infrastructure development 
x Program management and 
M&E 
x Social protection and disaster risk 
management 
x Productive safety net transfer 
x Livelihood strengthening 
x Safety net system strengthening 
x Watershed management 
x Rural land certification and 
administration 
x Institutional strengthening and 
capacity development 
x Project management 
Targets 
Potential woredas for 
agricultural growth 
Chronically food-insecure woredas 
Smallholder farmers in the potential 
areas who are increasingly becoming 
vulnerable to land degradation 
Beneficiaries 
AGP-I (2011-2015): 1.57 
million rural HH in 96 woredas 
x PSNP-I (2005-2006): 5 million HH 
SLMP-I (2008-2013): 98,000 rural 
HH in 45 watersheds/woredas x PSNP-II (2007-2009): 7.2 million 
HH 
AGP-II (2015-2020): 157 
woredas 
x PSNP-III (2010-2014): 8.4 million 
HH SLMP-II (2014-2019): 1.85 million 
people in 135 watersheds/woredas x PSNP-IV (2015-2020): >8 million 
HH 
Original 
Budget (in USD 
million) 
AGP-I: $281.2 (Revised to 
$367.8 million) 
PSNP-I: $700 SLMP-I: $37.79 million (Revised $ 93 
million) PSNP-II: $200 
AGP-II: 581.8 
PSNP-III: $850 
SLMP-II: $107.6 million 
PSNP-IV: $3.625 billion 
Source of 
Funds 
GoE, USAID, COMM/USA, 
GAFS, IDA, UNDP, 
CANADA, EU, Netherlands, 
Spain, Italy 
GoE ($500 million), IDA/WB ($600 
million), Canada, DFID, EC, Irish Aid, 
Denmark, UK, SIDA, UNICEF, 
USAID, and WFP 
GoE, IDA/WB, Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), Norway, Canada, 
Germany, IFAD 
Policy 
Alignment 
x CAADP Pillar IV: 
Agricultural research and 
extension 
x CAADP Pillar II: Improve 
rural infrastructure, market 
access, and trade capacities 
x PIF Strategic Objective 1: 
To achieve a sustainable 
increase in agricultural 
sector productivity and 
production 
x CAADP Pillar II: Rural 
Commercialization (HABP) 
x CAADP Pillar III: Enhance food 
security and improve disaster risk 
management 
x PIF Strategic Objective 4: To 
achieve universal food security and 
protect vulnerable households from 
natural disasters 
x Disaster Risk Management Strategy 
(1993, 2013) 
x Federal Environmental Policy 
(1997) 
x National Action Plan to Combat 
Desertification (2001) 
x Climate Resilient Green Economy 
(2011) 
x Food Security Strategy (2002) 
x National Nutrition Program II 
(2016) 
x CAADP Pillar I: Improve natural 
resources management and 
utilization 
x PIF Strategic Objective 3: To 
reduce degradation and improve 
the productivity of natural 
resources 
Sources: Based on projects’ document information of the World Bank (World Bank, 2010, 2016c, 2018c, 2018a, 
2018b), the Country CAADP Compact, PIF, ESMF, other related government documents 
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Chapter 5 
Appendix A: Top 10 SSA DAH (constant, 2015 USD million) recipient countries (1990–2014) 
Year 
N
ig
er
ia
 
T
an
za
n
ia
 
K
en
ya
 
E
th
io
p
ia
 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
U
ga
n
da
 
M
oz
am
b
iq
u
e 
Z
am
bi
a 
C
on
go
, D
R
 
M
al
aw
i 
Total 
10530.
2 
10000.
1 
9778.6 9421.3 7807.0 7755.7 
7334.
1 
5872.
5 
4914.
3 
4570.
2 
Yearly 
Average 
421.2 400.0 391.1 376.9 312.3 310.2 293.4 234.9 196.6 182.8 
Source: Data from Financing Global Health Database 2016 by IHME (2017) 
 
Appendix B: 5-year average (2011–2015) health and reproductive health aid* (in million USD, 2015 
constant prices) to Ethiopia from all donors 
Donor 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
5-year average 
(2011–2015) 
5-year average 
share 
United States 300.8 337.3 340.7 294.4 258.3 306.3 35.5% 
Global Fund 172.4 85.2 249.4 93.6 153.2 150.8 17.5% 
United Kingdom 113.2 113.0 160.5 122.0 97.0 121.1 14.1% 
GAVI 80.3 85.4 97.6 103.1 134.6 100.2 11.6% 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 45.7 36.4 54.9 48.8 86.8 54.5 6.3% 
World Bank 11.8 10.2 80.7 61.8 11.2 35.1 4.1% 
Canada 18.9 24.3 24.2 23.1 9.2 20.0 2.3% 
Netherlands 16.0 15.9 18.1 23.5 24.7 19.6 2.3% 
UNICEF 16.9 10.3 15.1 12.1 11.2 13.1 1.5% 
EU Institutions 1.7  0.7  0.8  21.7  17.6  8.5 1.0% 
Italy 10.0 2.8 3.6 7.4 12.8 7.3 0.9% 
Japan 2.5 8.7 10.4 1.7 3.4 5.3 0.6% 
Australia 1.6 12.4 3.7 4.7 0.5 4.6 0.5% 
Norway 3.1 3.5 3.3 4.7 5.9 4.1 0.5% 
Spain 6.9 4.2 0.8 1.5 1.4 3.0 0.3% 
WHO 2.4 1.7 2.8 2.1 3.4 2.5 0.3% 
Sweden 2.1 0.6 2.2 3.2 1.0 1.8 0.2% 
UNAIDS 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.4 0.9 1.2 0.1% 
Germany 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.1% 
Denmark 1.5 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1% 
Austria 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1% 
Switzerland 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.0% 
Finland 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0% 
France 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0% 
Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0% 
UNDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0% 
Total 811.6 757.3 1,071.6 832.3 835.5 861.7 100% 
Source: OECD-DAC (2017b) extracted on 15 October 2017 
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Appendix C: Contribution of MDG PF by DPs (in million USD) from 2009 to 2015 
Donors 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
DFID 4.41 12.93 43.31 81.58 106.96 142.56 45.34 
World Bank 
  
      35.39 34.52 
Netherlands       5.71 7.14 14.86 
Irish Aid  1.92 2.22 3.48 2.45 5.52 13.62 
European Union 
  
        7.57 
Italian Cooperation 
 
   3.79 0.00 0.00 3.54 
Spanish Aid 6.21 7.35 6.42 6.85 0.45 2.02 1.11 
UNICEF 
 
    0.50 1.00 1.50 0.50 
AusAid 
 
    7.45 12.56 4.97 0.00 
UNFPA 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 
GAVI 
 
        33.42 0.00 
WHO 
 
0.66 0.30 0.70 0.00 0.15 0.00 
Total 10.6 23.9 53.3 105.3 129.1 234.7 121.1 
CPA disbursement 570.7 751.8 821.4 764.4 1,094.8 841.4 817.9 
MDG PF (% CPA 
disbursement) 
2% 3% 6% 14% 12% 28% 15% 
Source: Ministry of Health (2014b, 2015a) 
Appendix D: Share of health financing by sources and by spending agents (1995–2014) 
Year 
External 
resources 
(% THE) 
Domestic 
resources 
(% THE) 
Public 
expenditure 
on health 
(% of THE) 
Private 
expenditure 
on health 
(% of THE) 
Out-of-
pocket 
expenditure 
(% of THE) 
Private 
insurance 
and NGOs 
(% of 
THE) T
ot
al
 h
ea
lt
h
 
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
 
(T
H
E
) 
in
 
m
il
li
on
 U
S
D
 
1995 11.9% 88.1% 40.6% 59.4% 46.5% 12.9% 230.1 
1996 12.7% 87.3% 38.1% 61.9% 48.6% 13.3% 248.2 
1997 15.2% 84.8% 40.9% 59.1% 46.4% 12.7% 266.3 
1998 12.5% 87.5% 43.8% 56.2% 44.7% 11.5% 282.4 
1999 15.0% 85.0% 46.6% 53.4% 42.5% 10.9% 288.1 
2000 16.0% 84.0% 54.6% 45.4% 35.9% 9.5% 356.7 
2001 21.8% 78.2% 52.3% 47.7% 38.1% 9.6% 345.5 
2002 10.3% 89.7% 53.9% 46.1% 37.0% 9.1% 370.2 
2003 21.9% 78.1% 55.1% 44.9% 36.1% 8.7% 398.8 
2004 39.4% 60.6% 56.1% 43.9% 35.4% 8.6% 428.2 
2005 36.9% 63.1% 61.4% 38.6% 30.6% 8.0% 520.2 
2006 33.0% 67.0% 56.6% 43.4% 33.5% 9.8% 681.2 
2007 38.5% 61.5% 54.8% 45.2% 35.2% 10.0% 906.6 
2008 39.8% 60.2% 51.9% 48.1% 38.5% 9.6% 1,115.7 
2009 32.7% 67.3% 54.9% 45.1% 38.4% 6.7% 1,265.3 
2010 50.1% 49.9% 54.2% 45.8% 33.7% 12.1% 1,837.4 
2011 39.1% 60.9% 57.0% 43.0% 31.8% 11.2% 1,995.7 
2012 33.5% 66.5% 57.4% 42.6% 33.2% 9.4% 2,435.3 
2013 30.6% 69.4% 56.9% 43.1% 33.4% 9.7% 2,367.9 
2014 41.7% 58.3% 58.7% 41.3% 32.3% 9.0% 2,583.7 
Source: Global Health Expenditure Database, WHO (2017b) 
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Appendix E: Health finance (in million USD) and per capita health expenditure (constant, 2010 USD 
million), population, and GDP in Ethiopia (1995–2014) 
Y
ea
r 
T
ot
al
 e
xp
en
di
tu
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on
 h
ea
lt
h 
(C
on
st
an
t,
 2
01
0 
U
SD
 m
il
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n)
 
P
u
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 f
un
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E
xt
er
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l r
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ou
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es
 
G
ov
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en
t 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
(G
G
H
E
) 
P
ri
va
te
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 
P
ri
va
te
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
O
ut
-o
f-
po
ck
et
 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
O
ut
 o
f 
po
ck
et
 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
as
 %
 o
f 
P
vt
H
E
 
N
on
-p
ro
fi
t 
in
s.
 (
e.
g.
 
N
G
O
s)
 
P
op
ul
at
io
n  
('
00
0)
 
G
D
P
 
1995    277  
 
33 113 164 1.0 129 78 16 57,237.2     9,368  
1996    307  
 
39 117 190 1.1 149 79 19 59,076.4   10,532  
1997    348  
 
53 142 206 1.2 161 79 21 60,893.3   10,862  
1998    392   49 171 220 1.1 175 79 23 62,707.5   10,486  
1999    436  
 
65 203 233 1.1 185 80 24 64,550.2   11,027  
2000    510  168 82 279 232 1.1 184 79 24 66,443.6   11,697  
2001    540  194 117 283 257 1.8 205 80 29 68,393.1   12,668  
2002    608  217 63 328 280 2.9 225 80 33 70,391.2   12,860  
2003    583  206 128 322 262 3.8 211 81 33 72,432.3   12,582  
2004    605  212 239 339 266 5.6 214 80 35 74,507.0   14,290  
2005    671  205 247 412 259 7.7 205 79 38 76,608.4   15,978  
2006    791  233 261 448 343 7.9 265 77 61 78,735.7   17,710  
2007    926  240 356 508 418 8.1 326 78 75 80,892.0   19,739  
2008    936  216 373 486 450 6.7 360 80 75 83,079.6   21,868  
2009   1,049  213 343 576 473 7.9 403 85 53 85,302.1   23,793  
2010   1,837  286 921 995 842 8.4 619 74 204 87,561.8   26,779  
2011   1,949  334 763 1,112 837 8.4 619 74 199 89,858.7   29,773  
2012   1,866  330 626 1,071 795 8.4 619 78 156 92,191.2   32,347  
2013   1,852  377 567 1,054 799 8.4 618 77 160 94,558.4   35,678  
2014   1,902  405 793 1,117 785 8.4 614 78 150 96,958.7   38,948  
Source: Global Health Expenditure database, WHO (2017b) 
Appendix F: Per capita health expenditure and health expenditure (constant prices, 2010 USD) as 
percentage of GDP in Ethiopia (1995–2014) 
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O
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 e
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%
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N
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t 
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s 
%
 
of
 G
D
P
 
1995 4.0 1.6 2.4 1.9 0.5 0.5 3.0 1.2 0.4 0.2 1.4 0.2 
1996 4.2 1.6 2.6 2.0 0.6 0.5 2.9 1.1 0.4 0.2 1.4 0.2 
1997 4.4 1.8 2.6 2.0 0.6 0.7 3.2 1.3 0.5 0.2 1.5 0.2 
1998 4.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 0.5 0.6 3.7 1.6 0.5 0.2 1.7 0.2 
1999 4.5 2.1 2.4 1.9 0.5 0.7 4.0 1.8 0.6 0.2 1.7 0.2 
2000 5.4 2.9 2.4 1.9 0.5 0.9 4.4 2.4 0.7 0.2 1.6 0.2 
2001 5.1 2.6 2.4 1.9 0.5 1.1 4.3 2.2 0.9 0.2 1.6 0.2 
2002 5.3 2.8 2.4 1.9 0.5 0.5 4.7 2.6 0.5 0.2 1.7 0.3 
2003 5.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 0.5 1.2 4.6 2.6 1.0 0.1 1.7 0.3 
2004 5.7 3.2 2.5 2.0 0.5 2.3 4.2 2.4 1.7 0.1 1.5 0.2 
2005 6.8 4.2 2.6 2.1 0.5 2.5 4.2 2.6 1.5 0.1 1.3 0.2 
2006 8.7 4.9 3.8 2.9 0.9 2.9 4.5 2.5 1.5 0.1 1.5 0.3 
2007 11.2 6.1 5.1 3.9 1.1 4.3 4.7 2.6 1.8 0.1 1.7 0.4 
2008 13.4 7.0 6.5 5.2 1.3 5.3 4.3 2.2 1.7 0.1 1.6 0.3 
2009 14.8 8.1 6.7 5.7 1.0 4.9 4.4 2.4 1.4 0.1 1.7 0.2 
2010 21.0 11.4 9.6 7.1 2.5 10.5 6.9 3.7 3.4 0.1 2.3 0.8 
2011 22.2 12.7 9.5 7.1 2.5 8.7 6.5 3.7 2.6 0.1 2.1 0.7 
2012 26.4 15.2 11.3 8.8 2.5 8.9 5.8 3.3 1.9 0.1 1.9 0.5 
2013 25.0 14.2 10.8 8.4 2.4 7.7 5.2 3.0 1.6 0.1 1.7 0.4 
2014 26.6 15.6 11.0 8.6 2.4 11.1 4.9 2.9 2.0 0.1 1.6 0.4 
Source: Global Health Expenditure database, WHO (2017b) 
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Appendix G: Health status indicators in Ethiopia: LE, FR, <5MR, NnMR, MMR, TBI 
Year 
LE FR <5MR NnMR MMR TBI 
ETH SSA ETH SSA ETH SSA LIC ETH SSA LIC ETH SSA LIC ETH SSA LIC 
1990 47.1 49.9 7.2 6.4 203 180 188 59.7 46.2 49.7 1,250 987 1,010 
   
1991 47.5 49.9 7.2 6.3 199 179 185 58.7 45.9 48.9 1,230 975 997 
   
1992 47.9 49.9 7.1 6.2 193 177 182 57.6 45.5 48.2 1,210 965 988 
   
1993 48.3 49.9 7.1 6.2 188 176 179 56.3 45.2 47.6 1,180 956 976 
   
1994 48.8 49.9 7.0 6.1 181 175 178 55.0 44.8 47.0 1,130 944 959 
   
1995 49.3 49.9 7.0 6.0 174 173 174 53.6 44.5 46.3 1,080 928 939 
   
1996 49.8 49.9 6.9 6.0 168 170 169 52.3 44.0 45.6 1,040 916 922 
   
1997 50.3 50.0 6.9 5.9 161 167 166 51.1 43.5 44.9 998 901 901 
   
1998 50.8 50.0 6.8 5.9 155 164 162 50.1 42.8 44.1 959 884 880 
   
1999 51.4 50.1 6.7 5.8 150 160 157 49.2 42.1 43.2 927 867 860 
   
2000 51.9 50.3 6.5 5.8 144 155 151 48.3 41.3 42.1 897 846 838 421 344 309 
2001 52.6 50.6 6.4 5.7 137 150 145 47.3 40.3 41.1 871 827 816 409 349 304 
2002 53.3 51.0 6.2 5.7 131 144 139 46.2 39.3 39.9 846 801 791 393 353 303 
2003 54.2 51.5 6.0 5.6 124 138 133 45.0 38.4 38.8 814 773 764 376 355 300 
2004 55.2 52.0 5.9 5.6 117 132 127 43.7 37.4 37.7 780 744 735 358 355 294 
2005 56.2 52.7 5.7 5.5 110 127 121 42.3 36.4 36.7 743 717 706 341 354 287 
2006 57.3 53.4 5.5 5.5 104 121 115 40.9 35.5 35.6 698 689 682 325 350 282 
2007 58.4 54.2 5.4 5.4 97 115 110 39.4 34.6 34.6 654 673 661 310 344 280 
2008 59.4 54.9 5.2 5.4 91 110 105 37.8 33.8 33.7 608 646 635 296 337 276 
2009 60.4 55.6 5.0 5.3 86 105 100 36.3 32.9 32.7 566 642 614 282 329 270 
2010 61.3 56.3 4.9 5.2 81 101 97 34.9 32.1 31.8 523 625 594 268 320 265 
2011 62.1 56.9 4.8 5.2 76 96 91 33.4 31.3 30.8 482 601 571 253 312 257 
2012 62.8 57.5 4.6 5.1 72 92 87 32.0 30.5 29.9 447 587 552 239 304 251 
2013 63.4 58.1 4.5 5.0 68 88 83 30.8 29.8 29.1 410 573 531 224 293 242 
2014 64.0 58.5 4.4 5.0 64 85 79 29.6 29.0 28.3 378 560 513 207 282 237 
2015 64.6 59.0 4.3 4.9 61 81 76 28.5 28.3 27.5 353 547 496 192 276 232 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2018e) 
Notes: ETH = Ethiopia; LIC = low-income country; LE = life expectancy; FR = fertility rate; <5MR = under-five mortality 
rate per 1,000 livebirths; NnMR = neonatal mortality rate per 1,000 livebirths; MMR = maternal mortality rate per 100,000 
livebirths; TBI = tuberculosis incidence per 100,000 people 
Appendix H: 5-year moving average DAH flow to health sub-sectors in Ethiopia from 1990 to 2015 
(constant, 2015 USD million) 
Year 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-15 Share 
HIV 10.2 7.2 49.1 277.6 493.8 39.3% 
New-born and Child Health 6.5 8.9 28.7 103.0 246.9 18.6% 
Other DAH 23.7 36.1 41.2 61.4 155.1 14.6% 
Maternal Health 9.5 10.9 20.3 60.2 107.4 9.6% 
Malaria 1.2 1.5 14.8 95.7 90.2 9.3% 
SWAP and Health Sector Strengthening 15.6 12.6 15.7 19.4 32.5 4.3% 
Tuberculosis 1.5 5.4 4.0 9.5 35.0 2.6% 
Other Infectious Diseases 2.2 2.6 8.6 16.3 5.0 1.5% 
Non-communicable Diseases 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.3 0.2% 
Authors’ own calculation based on DAH data from global health database by IHME (2018) 
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Appendix I: Donors’ CPA share and fragmentation level in health and reproductive health sectors in 
Ethiopia in 2004 and 2014 (constant, 2013 USD million) 
1) Health 
Donor Group 
Total CPA to Health, 
ETH (USD million, 
2013 Prices) 
Total No. of 
Donors 
Non-significant 
Relations 
Fragmentation Ratio 
(B as % of A) 
A B C 
2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 
DAC Countries 47.1 246.4 13 18 6 9 38% 38% 
Multilaterals 75.1 213.7 3 5 0 0 0% 0% 
Private   6.4   1   1   4% 
All Donors, Total 122.2 466.5 16 24 6 10 38% 42% 
 
2) Population Policies and Reproductive Health 
Donor Group 
Total CPA to Pop. & 
RH, ETH (USD 
million, 2013 Prices) 
Total No. of 
Donors 
Non-significant 
Relations 
Fragmentation Ratio 
(B as % of A) 
A B C 
2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 2004 2014 
DAC Countries 72.2 268.9 11 14 5 11 33% 52% 
Multilaterals 22.3 95.1 4 6 1 3 7% 14% 
Private   10.8   1   0   0% 
All Donors, Total 94.5 374.9 15 21 6 14 40% 67% 
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on historical CPA disbursements data from OECD-DAC (OECD-DAC, 
2014) 
Appendix J: ODA gross disbursements to the health sub-sectors in Ethiopia from 2002-2015 (constant, 2015 
USD million) 
Year 2002-04 2005-07 2008-10 2011-13 2014-15 Total  (2002-2015) Share 
STD Control Including 
HIV/AIDS 
46.2 179.4 331.6 350.6 257.1 3,237.5  66% 
Reproductive Health Care 12.6 22.3 26.0 48.7 58.7  446.3  9% 
Basic Nutrition 5.2 7.6 22.3 37.8 58.6  335.9  7% 
Family Planning 1.4 2.9 11.6 16.3 27.3  151.1  3% 
Health Policy 28.7 12.3 17.2 22.1 27.8  296.6  6% 
Infectious Disease Control 13.7 27.2 10.8 8.3 12.6  205.2  4% 
Population Policy 4.5 3.9 2.4 3.2 7.3    56.5  1% 
Medical Services 3.0 2.6 6.2 1.8 3.5    48.0  1% 
Basic Health Infrastructure 1.2 1.0 1.6 3.9 2.5    28.2  1% 
Medical Education/Training 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.9    18.5  0% 
Health Education 0.3 1.5 0.7 3.7 2.1    22.6  0% 
Health Personnel Development 1.6 0.4 1.4 1.8 1.9    19.1  0% 
Medical Research 1.5 1.1 0.9 1.5 2.1    19.1  0% 
Total 
     
4,884.4  100% 
Source: Based on CRS data from OECD-DAC (2017b) 
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Appendix K: Top five African countries with high GGHE as % of GGE (2014) 
Country 
General government 
expenditure on health as 
% of total government 
expenditure  
Country 
Per capita GGE on 
health (USD) 
1997 2014   1997 2014 
Malawi 5.1 16.8 
 
Tanzania 4 24 
Swaziland 11.9 16.6 
 
Mozambique 7 24 
Ethiopia 7.3 15.7 
 
Gambia 7 21 
Gambia 6.7 15.3 
 
Chad 4 20 
South Africa 13.8 14.2 
 
Rwanda 5 20 
Central African Republic 9.2 14.2 
 
Comoros 11 19 
Burundi 6.8 13.2 
 
Benin 6 19 
Lesotho 5.1 13.1 
 
Burkina Faso 5 18 
Kenya 6.8 12.8 
 
Ethiopia 2 16 
Sao Tome and Principe 8.3 12.4 
 
Malawi 4 15 
       
Country 
Total expenditure on 
health as % of GDP 
 
Country 
External resources 
for health as % of 
total expenditure on 
health   
1997 2014  
 1997 2014 
Malawi 5.2 11.4  Malawi 29.6 73.8 
Liberia   10.0  Sao Tome and Principe 54.8 58.0 
Burundi 4.1 7.5  Lesotho 2.4 52.2 
Gambia 3.1 7.3  Burundi 22.6 50.3 
Uganda 5.6 7.2  Liberia   49.1 
Tanzania 2.8 5.6  Mozambique 30.2 48.7 
Burkina Faso 5.1 5.0  Rwanda 19.4 46.2 
Ethiopia 3.2 4.9  Central African Republic 1.3 45.7 
DR Congo 3.6 4.3  Gambia 3.2 45.5 
Central African Republic 3.6 4.2  South Sudan   42.4 
    Ethiopia 15.2 41.7 
Source: Global Health Expenditure database (WHO, 2017b) 
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Appendix L: Progress on health and health-related MDGs and selected indicators for Ethiopia (1990–2015) 
MDG 4: Reduce child mortality 
MDG 5: Improve maternal health 
MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases 
MDG 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
MDG target 
1990 
MDG base 
1997 
HSDP-I 
2000 
2002 
HSDP-II 
2005 
HSDP-
III 
2010 
HSDP-
IV 
2014/15 
end of 
HSDP 
MDG 
target 
 Reduce under-five child mortality rate (<5MR) per 1,000 live birth by two-thirds 
<5MR 203 161 144 131 110 81 61 68 
Progress (%) 21% 11% 9% 16% 26% 25% 71% 67% 
 Reduce maternal mortality ratio (MMR) per 100, 000 live birth by three-fourths 
MMR 1,250 998  846 743 523 353 312 
Progress (%) 20% 15%  12% 30% 33% 72% 75% 
 Reduce HIV prevalence among population aged 15–49 years by half and reverse the trend 
Prevalence (%) 0.9 3.9 4.5 3.6 2.58 1.46 1.1 <4.5 
Progress (%)  8%  28% 43% 18% 76% 50% 
 Reduce malaria incidence per 1,000 people at risk by half and reverse the trend 
Incidence rate  662  131 106 59 331 
Progress (%)  80% 19% 45% 91% 50 
 Reduce death rates associated with malaria by half 
Death rate  1,681 1,607 1,086 1,581 213 740 
Progress (%) 4%  32% -46% 87% 87% 50% 
 Reduce TB incidence rate/100,000 population per year by half 
Incidence rate   421 393 341 268 192 210 
Progress (%)   6.7% 13.2% 21.4% 28.4% 54% 50% 
 Percentage of TB cases successfully treated with Directly Observed TB Case finding 
and Treatment Strategy (DOTS) 
Cases 61 (1995)  80  79 89 92.1 90% 
Progress (%) 31% -1.3% 12.7% 3.5% 51%  
Source: Based on Millennium Development Goal Indicators (UN, 2016), World Bank Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2018e), World Health Observatory, UNDP MDGs Report (UNDP, 2015), World Population 
Prospects (UN/DESA, 2017) 
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Summary 
Aid effectiveness has in the last 70 years always been debated not only in the academic world 
but also among policymakers, opinion leaders, and the general public. The traditional approach 
in development cooperation has been criticized because it was seen as mainly supply-driven, 
limiting not only the agency of the aid recipient but also leading to poor coordination. In 
response, as laid down in the Paris Declaration of 2005, ownership and coordination have 
become central concepts at the heart of the so-called ‘aid effectiveness agenda’. This ‘Paris 
Agenda’ set out a broader global framework of reform, underlining the stewardship role of the 
aid-recipients in development cooperation. Nevertheless, practically, implementation in 
accordance with the spirit of the Paris Agenda has been uneven, and coordination efforts seem 
generally to have led to a certain fatigue, sometimes even with an increasing trend in aid 
fragmentation. This mixed progress was also seen in the Paris Agenda survey of 2010 and the 
post-Busan evaluation of 2013, in which Ethiopia was portrayed as one of the good performers.  
These mixed results show the need for context-specific micro-level analysis to document 
empirical evidence on how the policy assumptions and objectives of the Paris Agenda are 
turned into practice in a given political economy context of a recipient country. In the case of 
Ethiopia, for example, studying country ownership and donor coordination dynamics in a 
‘developmental state’ setting could tell a particularly important story. The purpose of this study 
was, therefore, to conduct in-country analysis on how the policy assumptions and objectives of 
the Paris Agenda were and are implemented in a ‘developmental state’ context and what then 
not only explains, but also involves ownership and effective donor coordination, substantiated 
by further empirical evidence at a sector level in Ethiopia. In that sense, this study tries to 
address the following main research question:  
How are policy assumptions guiding country ownership and coordination practiced 
in an aid-dependent developmental state, and what political economy factors and 
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coordination approaches explain any divergences between the assumptions and the 
practices? 
This study specifically addresses the following research questions: a) How does the political 
economy context in Ethiopia influence the magnitude, sources, and composition of foreign aid 
flow throughout the evolution of donor-government relations across the three regimes in 
Ethiopia? b) How do policy assumptions according to the Paris and Busan principles turn into 
practices in a ‘developmental state’ context like in Ethiopia, and how is country ownership 
explained in this process? c) How do sector-specific factors explain effective coordination in 
the health sector in Ethiopia, and to what extent does this affect results being achieved? and d) 
How do sector-specific factors explain effective coordination in the agriculture sector in 
Ethiopia, and to what extent are results being achieved in the context of country ownership? 
In answering the research questions, a single case research design was employed. Ethiopia was 
selected as a critical case in which the health and agriculture sectors were considered as 
embedded critical cases for further micro-analysis at a sector level. Ethiopia is one of Africa’s 
poorest countries but with one of its fastest growing economies. It attracted more support from 
donors from the West and South because of its strategic importance in the Horn of Africa and 
impressive results in poverty reduction through its ‘developmental state’ model and a context 
of strong country ownership. Ethiopia is currently the largest aid recipient in Africa. The study 
employed a qualitative approach, using data mainly based on interviews, complemented by the 
analysis of datasets from international and national online databases. The original qualitative 
data was collected through two rounds of interviews conducted in 2016 and 2017 with heads 
of agencies, program officers, and senior experts in health and agriculture from donor 
organizations in Addis Ababa, as well as with government officials from the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Cooperation (MoFEC), Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Agriculture 
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and Natural Resources (MoANR). Based on the analysis of all this data, evidence was 
documented in four studies in this thesis. 
In Chapter 2, we analyze how the political economy context of a recipient country influences 
the pattern of aid flows and the dynamics of the relationship between the donor and the aid-
recipient partner. The findings drawn from the Ethiopian case show that political economy 
factors affect the dynamics of the relationships in the aid architecture. In the past two decades 
starting in the 2000s, the international community increased its support, and Ethiopia has 
become one of the top aid recipients in Africa. This may be surprising because Ethiopia is seen 
as an ‘authoritarian’ developmental state, known for violations of human and democratic rights 
over the last three decades, and also because it officially rejected the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
principles. The perhaps unexpected growth of development assistance can be partly explained 
by the fact that Ethiopia has been and is a strategic ally both for the traditional donors from the 
West and the new emerging donors from the South, something that is further reinforced by 
developmental orientations of the EPRDF government that converge around poverty reduction 
and the security goals of donors. Other sources of finance besides ODA, including FDI, 
remittances, and aid by INGOs have also expanded in this same period. All this, together with 
the increased autonomy and power of the political elite resulting from the ‘developmental state’ 
form of governance, reinforced the stewardship role of the government and changed the nature 
of the traditional principal-agent kind of donor-recipient relationships in the local aid 
architecture. 
In Chapter 3, we study how the Paris principles and stewardship theoretical assumptions turn 
into practice in a ‘developmental state’ context such as that in Ethiopia. The findings show that 
the practice is complicated and the results are mixed. On the one hand, it appears that attributes 
of the developmental state model not only strengthen ownership and coordination by the 
Ethiopian government, but they also give excessive power and autonomy to the central 
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government, which results in top-down coordination that excludes the civil society and the 
private sector from the coordination architecture and limits the practice of ‘real’ policy 
dialogue. This limits the translation of the policy assumptions in the Paris Agenda, which 
define ‘ownership’ in a broader scope to also include ‘civil society organizations’ through an 
inclusive policy dialogue. Also, despite the fact the fact that there are relatively functional 
donor coordination platforms and centralized coordination structures, aid fragmentation, which 
mainly emanates from the bilateral donors, has continued as a major flip side of coordination 
and of the implementation of the Paris Agenda. 
On the other hand, the increased level of commitment by the lead donors in the joint 
coordination structures operating under a technocratic approach, along with the strong political 
commitment from the government to the aid effectiveness agenda, led to ‘good practices’ of 
Program-Based Approaches (PBAs) and country-owned and -led coordination that reinforce 
joint ownership in the coordination architecture. The practices of multi-donor basket/pooled 
funding to finance and coordinate the national flagship programs, like in the case of the 
Sustainable Development Goals Performance Fund (SDG PF) in the health sector, which is 
exclusively administered by the Ministry of Health, show best practices in the realization of 
policy assumptions in the spirit of the Paris Agenda.  
In Chapter 4 and 5, we further analyze sector-level coordination and ownership in Ethiopia, 
taking the health and agriculture sectors as critical cases to study what explains effective 
coordination and ownership by comparatively analyzing the context of the two sectors. The 
studies’ findings point to: visionary and well-periodized home-based national development 
plans like the Health Sector Development Plans (HSDPs) that are implemented in four 
consecutive phases through woreda-based planning, based on the ‘One Plan, One Budget, One 
Report’ principle; top leadership with a capacity to formulate its own development agenda and 
with a strong political commitment to achieve national goals and to defend the established 
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priorities; and coordination structures that are owned and led by the aid-recipient government 
with active participation from almost all of its development partners. The increased use of 
Program-Based Approaches (PBAs) like joint financing models in the health sector could be 
seen as a result of strong country ownership and coordination, which at the same time 
contributed to producing better results. However, further analysis of the two sectors shows that 
policy dialogue and a low level of participation by civil society and the private sector in the 
coordination architecture are major flip sides of coordination in Ethiopia. 
Finally, this study could contribute to the debate on aid effectiveness, signifying that 
strengthening the stewardship role of the aid recipient in development coordination would 
increase operative donor coordination and aid effectiveness. High agency of the aid recipient 
in the exercise of its country ownership in the aid architecture, as promoted precisely by the 
stewardship theory, could help to effectively put the policy assumptions and objectives of the 
Paris Agenda into practice and yield positive results in donor coordination and also in stronger 
aid effectiveness. This, in short, means that aid works if well-coordinated in the context of 
strong country ownership, mainly with the leadership of an aid-recipient country in the 
‘driver’s seat’. This leadership must be committed to developmental objectives under a 
functional development policy context that enables alignment and coordination around 
functional development programs. Practical lessons for policymakers and donors in their aid 
policies and practices could be derived from this, e.g. the importance of considering the 
centrality of the stewardship role of the aid recipients in coordination platforms in the process 
of development cooperation. 
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Samenvatting 
 
De doeltreffendheid van ontwikkelingshulp heeft in de laatste 70 jaar veelvuldig ter discussie 
gestaan niet alleen in de academische wereld maar ook bij beleidsmakers, opinieleiders en het 
grote publiek. De traditionele aanpak in de ontwikkelingssamenwerking waarbij de donoren 
veelal het voortouw hadden, heeft nogal wat kritiek gekregen, omdat vooral het aanbod hierin 
voorop stond, wat leidde tot beperking van de handelingsvrijheid van hulpontvangers, maar 
ook tot een slechte coördinatie van de hulp. Als antwoord daarop, zoals in de verklaring van 
Parijs van 2005, zijn eigenaarschap (‘ownership’) en coördinatie centrale begrippen geworden 
in de huidige, zogeheten ‘effectiviteit van hulp agenda’. Deze 'Parijse agenda ' verschaft een 
breder mondiaal kader voor hervorming van ontwikkelingssamenwerking en de 
rentmeesterschap rol van de hulp-ontvangers. In de praktijk is de tenuitvoerlegging daarvan in 
de geest van de Parijse agenda nogal ongelijk geweest en de coördinatie-inspanningen schijnen 
in het algemeen te hebben geleid tot een zekere vermoeidheid bij donoren en hulpontvangers, 
soms zelfs leidend tot een verdere versnippering van de hulp. Deze gemengde vooruitgang kon 
ook worden teruggelezen in de evaluatie van de Parijse Agenda van 2010 en de post-Busan 
evaluatie van 2013, waarin Ethiopië overigens werd afgeschilderd als een van de landen waarin 
samenwerking met donoren en coördinatie wel goed verliep. 
Deze gemengde resultaten tonen de noodzaak aan van analyse en onderzoek op een meer 
context-specifiek (micro-)niveau om zo empirisch bewijs te vergaren over hoe het beleid en de 
veronderstellingen en doelstellingen van de Parijse Agenda worden omgezet in de praktijk, in 
een bepaalde politieke economie context van een hulpontvangend land. In het geval van 
Ethiopië, bijvoorbeeld, zou het bestuderen van eigenaarschap van de Ethiopische regering en 
de dynamiek van de donorcoördinatie een bijzonder verhaal kunnen vertellen, vanwege de 
‘ontwikkelingsstaat’ (‘developmental state’) die Ethiopië wil zijn. Het doel van deze studie was 
daarom om een analyse uit te voeren op hoe de beleidsuitgangspunten en de doelstellingen van 
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de agenda van Parijs werden en worden uitgevoerd in de context van een ' ontwikkelingsstaat 
', een staat de regering overtuigd het heft in handen neemt wat betreft sociale en economische 
ontwikkeling, wat dat zou dan erop kunnen duiden en kunnen impliceren dat ‘eigenaarschap’ 
en coördinatie, ook op sectorniveau, nadrukkelijk in handen van die regering liggen. In die zin 
probeert deze studie de volgende centrale onderzoeksvraag aan te pakken: 
Hoe worden de beleidsuitgangspunten die leidend zijn voor het ‘eigenaarschap’ en 
donorcoördinatie, geïmplementeerd in een hulp-afhankelijke ontwikkelingsstaat en 
welke factoren uit de politieke economie en benaderingen van coördinatie verklaren 
een mogelijke divergentie tussen deze uitgangspunten en de uitvoeringspraktijk? 
Deze studie richt zich specifiek op de volgende onderzoeksvragen: a) Hoe beïnvloedt de 
context van de politieke economie in Ethiopië de omvang, de bronnen en de samenstelling van 
de buitenlandse hulp bij de veranderende relaties tussen donoren en de Ethiopische overheid 
gedurende de drie verschillende regimes in Ethiopië?; b) Hoe worden de beleidsuitgangspunten 
en principes van de Verklaring van Parijs en Busan omgezet in de praktijk van een 
‘ontwikkelingsstaat', in een context zoals die in Ethiopië en hoe valtt in dit proces 
‘eigenaarschap’ te duiden?; c) Hoe verklaren sectorspecifieke factoren een doeltreffende 
coördinatie in de gezondheidssector in Ethiopië, en in hoeverre is dit van invloed op de 
resultaten die worden behaald?; en d) Hoe verklaren sectorspecifieke factoren een effectieve 
coördinatie in de landbouwsector in Ethiopië en in hoeverre worden resultaten in de landbouw 
geboekt in het kader van dat ‘eigenaarschap’? 
Bij de beantwoording van deze onderzoeksvragen werd een case-study-research ontwerp 
toegepast. Ethiopië werd geselecteerd als een kritisch casus, waarin de gezondheids- en 
landbouwsectoren worden gezien als voorbeelden voor een verdere micro-analyse op sectoraal 
niveau. Ethiopië is een van de armste landen in Afrika, maar tegelijkertijd behoort het tot de 
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snelst groeiende economieën in Afrika, die meer steun van donoren uit het Westen en het 
Zuiden heeft aangetrokken vanwege zijn strategische belang in de Hoorn van Afrika en 
indrukwekkende resultaten wat betreft armoedebestrijding door het ‘developmental state’-
model. Ethiopië is momenteel de grootste hulpontvanger in Afrika. Deze studie is kwalitatief, 
met gegevens voornamelijk gebaseerd op interviews, aangevuld met de analyse van datasets 
uit internationale en nationale onlinedatabases. De oorspronkelijke kwalitatieve gegevens 
werden verzameld door middel van twee rondes van interviews uitgevoerd in 2016 en 2017 
met hoofden ontwikkelingssamenwerking, programma verantwoordelijken, en senior-experts 
in de gezondheidszorg en de landbouw van donororganisaties die hun kantoren hebben in Addis 
Abeba, alsmede met overheidsfunctionarissen van het Ministerie van Financiën en 
Economische Samenwerking (MoFEC), het Ministerie van Volksgezondheid (MoH), en het 
Ministerie van Landbouw en Natuurlijke Hulpbronnen (MoANA). Op basis van de analyse van 
al deze gegevens werd het bewijsmateriaal geconstrueerd in de vier studies in dit proefschrift. 
In hoofdstuk 2, analyseren we hoe de politiek-economische context van een ontvangende land 
het patroon van de hulpstromen en de dynamiek van de relatie tussen de donor en de hulp-
ontvanger partner beïnvloedt. De bevindingen uit de Ethiopische casus duiden aan dat 
politieke-economie factoren van invloed zijn op de dynamiek van relaties in de 
hulparchitectuur. In de afgelopen twee decennia, te beginnen in de jaren 2000, verhoogde de 
internationale gemeenschap haar steun, en is Ethiopië uitgegroeid tot een van de top 
hulpontvangers in Afrika. Dit ondanks het feit dat Ethiopië werd gezien als een ' autoritair' 
ontwikkelingsland, bekend om schendingen van de mensenrechten en democratische rechten 
en ook ondanks het feit het zich officieel tegen de principes van de zogenaamde ‘Washington 
consensus’ keerde. De, misschien onverwachte, groei van de ontwikkelingshulp kan deels 
worden verklaard uit het feit dat Ethiopië een strategische bondgenoot is geweest van zowel de 
traditionele donoren uit het Westen als van de nieuwe opkomende donoren uit het zuiden, in 
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het bijzonder China. Dit wordt verder versterkt door ontwikkelingsoriëntatie van de EPRDF-
regering waarin doelen op het terrein van armoedebestrijding en veiligheidsdoelstellingen van 
donoren samenkomen. Ook andere financieringsbronnen, met inbegrip van buitenlandse 
investeringen, overmakingen van Ethiopische migranten en hulp van internationale NGO’s, 
zijn in diezelfde periode fors toegnomen. Dit alles, samen met de toegenomen autonomie en 
de macht van de politieke elite als gevolg van de ' developmental state ' vorm van bestuur, 
versterkt de rol van rentmeesterschap van de overheid, en veranderde de aard van de 
traditionele principal-agent soort donor-ontvanger relaties in de lokale hulp architectuur. 
In hoofdstuk 3, bestuderen we hoe de principes van de Verklaring van Parijs en theoretische 
veronderstellingen rondom het begrip rentmeesterschap in de praktijk van een 
‘ontwikkelingsstaat’ als Ethiopië zijn geïmplementeerd. De bevindingen tonen aan dat de 
praktijk ingewikkeld is en dat de resultaten een gemengd beeld opleveren. Aan de ene kant lijkt 
het erop dat eigenschapen die horen bij een ‘ontwikkelingsstaat’ niet alleen versterking van het 
‘eigenaarschap’ en de coördinatie door de Ethiopische regering bewerkstelligen, maar 
tegelijkertijd geeft dit ook buitensporig veel macht en autonomie aan de centrale overheid, wat 
resulteert in top-down coördinatie die het maatschappelijk middenveld en de particuliere sector 
buitensluit in de coördinatie-architectuur en de praktijk van de beleidsdialoog beperkt houdt. 
Dit verengt ook de vertaling van de beleidsuitgangspunten van de Parijse Agenda, waarin 
‘ownership’ op een bredere manier is gedefinieerd en ook ' maatschappelijke organisaties ' 
omvat. Ondanks het feit dat er behoorlijk functionerende donorcoördinatie platforms en 
gecentraliseerde coördinatiestructuren zijn, is de versnippering (fragmentatie) van de hulp, die 
voornamelijk afkomstig is van de bilaterale donoren, voortgezet als een belangrijke keerzijde 
van de coördinatie en van de uitvoering van de Verklaring van Parijs. 
Aan de andere kant, heeft de toegenomen betrokkenheid van de leidende donoren in de 
gezamenlijke coördinatiestructuren en in een meer technocratische aanpak, tegelijk met een 
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eveneens grote betrokkenheid van de Ethiopische regering bij de ‘effectiviteit van de hulp 
agenda’, geleid tot een een praktijk van het toepassen van op Programma’s Gebaseerde 
Benaderingen (PBAs) die ook het Ethiopische ‘eigenaarschap’ en de door Ethiopië geleide 
coördinatie hebben versterkt. Dit leidde tot een praktijk van gebundelde financiering van 
verschillende donoren om speciale programma’s te financieren en te coördineren die als een 
boegbeeld dienen, zoals in het geval van het Sustainable Development Goals Performance 
Fund (SDG PF) in de gezondheidssector. Dit soort gezamenlijke programma’s die uitsluitend 
worden beheerd door de betreffende ministeries, zijn een van de beste voorbeelden van de de 
realisatie van een beleid in de geest van de Parijse Agenda. 
In hoofdstuk 4 en 5, analyseren we op sectorniveau coördinatie en ‘eigenaarschap’ in Ethiopië 
en nemen van de gezondheid- en de agrarische sector als kritische cases om te zien wat 
effectieve coördinatie en ‘eigenaarschap’ inhouden. De studies tonen aan dat visionaire en goed 
in tijd ontwikkelde nationale ontwikkelingsplannen tot bijzondere resultaten kunnen leiden. De 
Gezondheidssector Ontwikkelingsplannen (HSDPs) zijn daarvan een voorbeeld. Zij werden 
uitgevoerd in vier opeenvolgende fasen door middel van een planning gebaseerd op de laagste 
administratieve niveaus (de ‘woreda’); uitgevoerd op basis van het principe ‘één plan, één 
budget, één verslag '; met leiderschap aan de top van het ministerie met een capaciteit om zijn 
eigen ontwikkelingsagenda te formuleren en met een sterke politieke betrokkenheid om de 
nationale doelstellingen te verwezenlijken en de prioriteiten te verdedigen; met 
coördinatiestructuren die eigendom zijn van en geleid worden door de hulpontvangende 
overheid met actieve participatie van bijna al zijn ontwikkelingspartners. Het toegenomen 
gebruik van op programma gebaseerde benaderingen (PBAs), zoals gezamenlijke 
financieringsmodellen in de gezondheidssector, zou kunnen worden gezien als een resultaat 
van een sterk ‘eigenaarschap’ en van coördinatie, die tegelijkertijd hebben bijgedragen tot het 
produceren van betere resultaten. Uit een verdere analyse van de twee sectoren blijkt echter dat 
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de beleidsdialoog en de lage participatiegraad van het maatschappelijk middenveld en de 
particuliere sector in de coördinatie architectuur belangrijke keerzijden zijn van de coördinatie 
in Ethiopië. 
Deze studie zou kunnen bijdragen aan het debat over de doeltreffendheid van hulp, omdat ze 
aantoont dat de versterking van de rol van het rentmeesterschap van de hulpontvanger in 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking kan leiden tot een grotere operationele donorcoördinatie en 
daardoor een verhoging van de doeltreffendheid van de hulp. Een sterke rol van het 
hulpontvangende land in de uitoefening van zijn ‘ownership’ in de hulparchitectuur, zoals naar 
voren gebracht in de rentmeesterschap theorie, zou kunnen helpen om de 
beleidsuitgangspunten en doelstellingen van de Verklaring van Parijse in de praktijk te brengen 
en door middel van coördinatie van donoren ook de effectiviteit van de hulp te versterken. Dit 
betekent in het kort dat de ontwikkelingshulp werkt als goed ze gecoördineerd wordt met een 
sterke leiding van het hulpontvangende land, anders gezegd met de regering van het 
hulpontvangende land in de ‘stoel van de bestuurder’; met een leiderschap dat zich inzet om 
ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen van een functioneel ontwikkelingsbeleid te behalen via 
coördinatie en het op één lijn brengen van donoren door middel van heldere, duidelijke, 
haalbare ontwikkelingsprogramma's. Praktische lessen voor beleidsmakers en donoren in hun 
hulpbeleid kunnen hieruit worden afgeleid, bijvoorbeeld dat het van betekenis is om de centrale 
rol van rentmeesterschap van hulpontvangers in de coördinatie platforms in het proces van 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking in ogenschouw te nemen. 
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